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**Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Aphorism:  
‘from these, consciousness’ (*tebhyaś caitanyam*)**

**Abstract**

Once flourishing in the early medieval India, the materialist Cārvāka/Lokāyata tradition of philosophy vanished centuries ago leaving mere bits from their foundational sūtra, and from a few commentaries thereon. These are scattered in the works of their opponents, hence the winding path to reconstructing the Cārvāka/Lokāyata thought necessarily begins with evaluating the reliability of the source material. This paper deals with the problem of the brief account of two interpretations of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata aphorism: ‘from these, consciousness’, recorded by the 8<sup>th</sup>-century Buddhist authors Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla in the *Lokāyata-parīkṣā* Chapter XXII of the *Tattva-saṅgraha(-pañjikā)*, critically edited by the author of the present paper.

**Keywords:** Cārvāka, Lokāyata, Indian materialism, materialist ontology, Bṛhaspatīsūtra, Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, Buddhist philosophy

**Introduction**

The subject of this essay<sup>1</sup> is the very brief account of two interpretations of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata aphorism: *tebhyaś caitanyam*, ‘from these, consciousness’, recorded in two Indian Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophical works, Śāntarakṣita’s (725–788 A.D.) *Tattva-*

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*saṅgraha* ('Compendium of Principles', henceforth TS), verse 1858, and Kamalaśīla's (ca. 740–795 A.D.) commentary thereon, the *Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjikā* (henceforth TSP). The Cārvāka/Lokāyata system (also referred to as, e.g., Bārhaspatya, *bhūta-vāda*, 'elementalism', or *bhūta-catustaya-vāda*, 'doctrine of the four elements') represents the classical period of Indian materialist thought. It flourished on the Indian philosophical scene sometime between the 6<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> century. A case is made by some scholars for identifying the early–9<sup>th</sup>–century sceptic Jayarāsi Bhaṭṭa as affiliated (to some extent) with the Cārvāka/Lokāyata.<sup>2</sup> This would make his *Tattvōpaplava-siṃha*, 'The Lion of Annihilation of [all] Principles', the sole work of this tradition to have come down to us. The foundational sūtra of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata, referred to here as the *Bṛhaspati-sūtra*, and (some of) the commentaries thereon survived only in fragments. These are scattered in the works of Brahmanical, Jaina and Buddhist authors, the ardent opponents of the materialists. From this meagre, and often indeed dubious, source material emerges a picture of an antireligious tradition of thought which rejected past and future lives, karmic retribution, the authority of the sacred scriptures, and the cognitive validity of all the means of valid cognition, variously admitted by their opponents, with the lone exception of perception (*pratyakṣa*).<sup>3</sup>

The main sources at our disposal include two doxographic works, the *Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya* by the Jaina author Haribhadra (ca. 8<sup>th</sup> century), and the *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha* by the Advaita Vedānta author Mādhava (14<sup>th</sup> century). Kamalaśīla's TSP constitutes another significant source. The publication of the *editio princeps* of the TS(P) (based on the Pāṭan mss.) by Embar Krishnamacharya in 1926 provided scholars with several invaluable fragments, including quotations from the commentaries by two Cārvāka/Lokāyata authors, Aviddhakarṇa and Purandara.<sup>4</sup> Chapter XXII of the TS(P), entitled

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my deep sense of indebtedness to Hiroko Matsuoka (University of Leipzig) who most kindly shared with me another set of photocopies of the Jaisalmer mss., along with photocopies of the Pāṭan mss. My gratitude is due to Dr. Ernst Prets (Austrian Academy of Sciences) who organized a workshop entitled 'Critical edition of the Sanskrit text of the *Lokāyataparīkṣā*', held at the Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia, Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna, on 31 January 2017, thus providing me with a most fruitful opportunity to share and discuss excerpts from the then-early draft of my edition. I offer my deepest thanks to the participants of the workshop, Dr. Ernst Prets, Dr. Yasutaka Muroya, Dr. Patrick McAllister, Dr. Toshikazu Watanabe (all Austrian Academy of Sciences), Hiroko Matsuoka, and Yuki Kyogoku (both University of Leipzig), for their remarks and suggestions regarding selected fragments from the text, and editorial methodology. One of the fragments discussed during the workshop is included in the present essay (*tasmāt tal-lokāyata*°...). I am also grateful to Dr. Krishna Del Toso for his remarks on a later draft of this paper.

<sup>2</sup> This identification is championed, e.g., by Eli Franco, whose studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata and Jayarāsi include an edition and an annotated English translation of the first chapter of the *Tattvōpaplava-siṃha* (in Eli Franco, *Perception, Knowledge and Disbelief: a Study of Jayarāsi's Scepticism*, Stuttgart 1987, reprint: Delhi 1994). The contrary view has been expressed, e.g., by Ramkrishna Bhattacharya, who has authored a plethora of works on a vast array of aspects of Indian materialism of the classical and pre-classical periods.

<sup>3</sup> The Buddhists admit two, perception and inference (*anumāna*). (Some of) the Cārvāka/Lokāyata appear to have accepted limited validity of inference insofar as it is verifiable by perception, or 'well-established in the world' (*loka-prasiddha*), a matter which shall not be elaborated on here.

<sup>4</sup> On a certain Kambalāśvatara, mentioned by both Śāntarākṣita and Kamalaśīla, see my forthcoming dissertation.

*Lokāyata-parīkṣā*, ‘The Examination of the Lokāyata system’,<sup>5</sup> takes on the mind-body problem in what sets about as a refutation of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata criticism of past and future lives, and develops into a proof of the other-world (*paraloka*). Contrary to what its title may suggest, the chapter does not constitute an actual examination, or survey, etc., of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata doctrine (in fact the lengthier excerpts from the Cārvāka/Lokāyata works are found earlier in the work, in Chapter XVIII *Anumāna-parīkṣā*, ‘The Examination of Inference’). Its purpose, as Kamalaśīla tells us in the introductory passage, is to justify the qualification of the dependent arising (*pratītya-samutpāda*) as ‘beginningless and endless’. Here, the materialist serves as the most fitting adversary in the interlocutory narrative convention employed. It is the *Lokāyata-parīkṣā* wherein we find the said account of two interpretations of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata aphorism: ‘from these, consciousness’ (*tebhyaś caitanyam*). Another account of those two interpretations is made by the 11<sup>th</sup>–century Jaina author Prabhācandra.

The present essay, in an abridged version, was presented on 15 November 2017 at the 6<sup>th</sup> International Conference of Oriental Studies: Rare, Forgotten and Endangered Languages and Literatures, held at the University of Warsaw on 14–16 November 2017. The substance of the essay comes from my forthcoming doctoral dissertation, the subject of which is a critical edition of the Sanskrit text of the *Lokāyata-parīkṣā* Chapter XXII of Śāntarakṣita’s *Tattva-saṅgraha* and Kamalaśīla’s commentary (*Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjikā*) based on the Sanskrit manuscripts, the Tibetan version, and the modern editions (with an annotated English translation). Given the theme of the conference, the essay discusses TS(P) 1858 as a Cārvāka/Lokāyata source material.<sup>6</sup> In it I wish to draw attention to less (or not at all) discussed issues concerning this fragment, and argue that – contrary to the seemingly universal agreement – regardless of whether the attested schools of interpretations of *tebhyaś caitanyam* were indeed very different and opposing, their account by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla does not itself actually indicate this.

One technical/philological note should be made here, viz. in presenting the text of the TS(P) I follow the orthographical and sandhi conventions used in my critical edition of the *Lokāyata-parīkṣā* in my forthcoming dissertation, the discussion of which I shall omit here, with the exception of noting that vowel sandhi is indicated with circumflexes (^), and compound members are separated with hyphens (-). The peculiarities of the mss. are not brought up in this essay, except for one, mentioned later in the essay, which bears importance for the issues discussed. The sources for my critical edition, from

<sup>5</sup> TS 1856–1963 (1857–1964 in the edition by Krishnamacharya who mistakenly conjectured that a verse is missing from the text following TS 525).

<sup>6</sup> For the broader context of the investigation carried by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla in the *Lokāyata-parīkṣā* I refer to my forthcoming dissertation. Also, I do not attempt to propose an answer to the problem of the development of opposing views within the materialist milieu before Udbhāta (see below) with regard to the *tebhyaś caitanyam* aphorism, and to the mind-body problem itself. I do opine that the available sources very much allow conjectures on the matter, this, however, would require a substantial broadening of the scope of this essay. Instead, the crux of this essay, the evaluation of TS(P) 1858 as a Cārvāka/Lokāyata source material, is intended as (hopefully) a contribution to the discussion of the said problem.

which the passages quoted here come, are: the Jaisalmer mss. of the TS (henceforth **J<sub>K</sub>**) and the TSP (henceforth **J<sub>P</sub>**); the Pāṭan mss. of the TS (henceforth **P<sub>K</sub>**) and the TSP (henceforth **P<sub>P</sub>**) which are direct copies of the Jaisalmer set; the edition of the TS(P) by Embar Krishnamacharya (henceforth **K**) prepared based on **P<sub>K</sub>** and **P<sub>P</sub>**; the edition of the TS(P) by Dwarikadas Shastri (henceforth **Ś**) based on both sets of mss. and **K**; the Tibetan translation of the TS by Guṇākaraśrībhadrā and Zhi ba 'od (for the purpose of this essay I refer only to the Derge edition, henceforth **D<sub>K</sub>**, and the Peking edition, henceforth **Q<sub>K</sub>**); and the Tibetan translation of the TSP by Devendrabhadra and Grags 'byor shes rab (Derge, henceforth **D<sub>P</sub>**, and Peking, henceforth **Q<sub>P</sub>**).<sup>7</sup> Sanskrit equivalents of Tibetan words are indicated by an asterisk (\*).

### ‘From these, consciousness’

The pioneering work on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata fragments was done by D. R. Shastri, who first compiled various available quotations etc., in a work entitled *Chārvāka Shashṭi*, published in 1928. This collection (followed by two more, smaller), however, suffered from multiple misattributions, and included fragments from belles-lettres pieces wherein the materialists' positions are blatantly mocked.<sup>8</sup> In 1976 Japanese scholar Mamoru Namai published a Japanese article (with an English introductory summary)<sup>9</sup> containing a new compilation, with an analysis, of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata fragments. The most recent, enhanced and re-evaluated, collection of fragments was put together by Ramkrishna Bhattacharya and published (in an article) in 2002.<sup>10</sup> This collection is divided into three sections: ‘Aphorisms and pseudo-aphorisms’, ‘Extracts from commentaries’, ‘Verses attributed to the Cārvākas’. Below I provide nine of the aphorisms from the *Bṛhaspati-sūtra* (henceforth BS) which are relevant for the further discussion. These nine aphorisms open the first section of Bhattacharya's collection, and are provided here in the same order in which Bhattacharya put them:<sup>11</sup>

<sup>7</sup> For details see bibliography. The problem of the reliability of the two modern editions (including additional problems with which the third printing of Ś presents itself), and the Tibetan translation of the TS is not discussed here. For these see my forthcoming dissertation.

<sup>8</sup> See Ramkrishna Bhattacharya, *Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata*, Società Editrice Fiorentina, Firenze 2009, pp. 70, 93.

<sup>9</sup> Mamoru Namai, *A Survey of Bārhaspatya Philosophy*, “Indological Review” (Kyoto) 2 (1976), pp. 29–74. This article was reprinted in Mamoru Namai, *Rinne no ronshō: Bukkyō ronrigakuha ni yoru yuibusuron hihan*, Tōhō shuppan, Osaka 1996, as a part of a larger volume of the scholar's various works on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata.

<sup>10</sup> Ramkrishna Bhattacharya, *Cārvāka fragments: A New Collection*, “Journal of Indian Philosophy” 30:6 (2002), pp. 597–640. This article was reprinted in Bhattacharya, *Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata*, as a part of a larger volume consisting of twenty three chapters devoted to various aspects of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata, all authored by R. Bhattacharya.

<sup>11</sup> Bhattacharya, *Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata*, pp. 78–79. For the survey of source material and the aphorisms' variants see *ibidem*. Note that the order in which the aphorisms are put by Bhattacharya is not meant to be definitive, and differs from that of Namai's and Shastri's compilation. Also the content itself is, naturally, open for re-evaluation and addition of newly discovered etc., aphorisms.

*athâtas tattvaṃ vyākhyāsyāmaḥ* | BS 1<sup>12</sup>  
*pr̥thivy āpas tejo vāyur iti tattvāni* | BS 2  
*tat-samudāye śarīrēndriya-viṣaya-samjñāḥ* | BS 3  
*tebhyaś caitanyam* | BS 4  
*kiṇvādibhyo mada-śakti-vat* | BS 5  
*caitanya-viśiṣṭaḥ kāyaḥ puruṣaḥ* | BS 6  
*śarīrād eva* | BS 7  
*śarīre bhāvāt* | BS 8  
*jala-budbuda-vaj jīvāḥ* | BS 9

This translates as follows:<sup>13</sup>

- BS 1: ‘Now we shall explain the principles (*tattva*).’  
 BS 2: ‘The principles are: Earth, Water, Fire and Air.’  
 BS 3: ‘Terms [such as] “body”, “sense-faculty” and “sense-object” [refer] to aggregates (*samudāya*) of these.’  
 BS 4: ‘From these, consciousness.’  
 BS 5: ‘Like from a fermenting agent (*kiṇva*) etc., the capacity (*śakti*) of intoxication.’  
 BS 6: ‘A “person” (*puruṣa*) is a body qualified by consciousness.’  
 BS 7: ‘From the body alone.’  
 BS 8: ‘Because [it] is there when the body is there.’  
 BS 9: ‘“Souls” (*jīva*) are like water bubbles.’

Some of the aphorisms leave room for interpretation. Other seemingly exclude the possibility of more than one interpretation. Some initial conclusions can be made based on this material alone:

1. The four elements, i.e., physical matter, is all there is (BS 2).
2. Corporeal things are merely specific configurations of matter (BS 2–3).
3. If the designation ‘person’ applies to a body qualified by consciousness, then a body is not always qualified by consciousness, otherwise ‘person’ would refer to the body alone (BS 6).
4. Consciousness is invariably concomitant with the body (BS 6–9).

The following can be considered as safe assumptions derived from both the quoted aphorisms and the afore-mentioned conclusions:

<sup>12</sup> For the sake of simplification I refer to these selected aphorisms henceforth as ‘BS 1’, ‘BS 2’, and so on. Indication of vowel sandhi and separation of compound members are mine.

<sup>13</sup> For Bhattacharya’s translation see Bhattacharya, *Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata*, pp. 86–87.

5. The specific body which is qualified by consciousness is a living body, although this does not necessarily exhaust the requirement for the said qualification.<sup>14</sup>
6. The body is not invariably concomitant with consciousness, just like there can be water but no water bubbles, and because ‘person’ would refer to the body alone.
7. Consciousness is supported by the body.

If we are, at this point, to examine the sūtra alone, given that the commentarial tradition as we know it displays (at least on some occasions) different approaches towards the aphorisms, then this is where conjectures enter. If the body is to be the support for consciousness, then is it a cause, consciousness being the effect (*kārya*), or is it a quality-possessor, consciousness being the quality (*guṇa*), or is it a capacity-possessor, consciousness being the capacity (*śakti*)?<sup>15</sup> The third type of relation is clearly indicated by BS 5 which provides an explicit example of a capacity. But in the opinion of Eli Franco<sup>16</sup> BS 4 and (more importantly) BS 7 point to the causal relation. Franco further writes that the quality-possessor-and-quality relation is not indicated in any of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata fragments known to him. This relation is, however, deduced by some scholars, to which I shall return shortly.

The sūtra itself is thus ambiguous enough to prompt different schools of interpretations even without the “assistance” of any revision-etc.-inducing criticism from other philosophical traditions. Moreover, that even the supposedly straight-forward aphorisms can be subject of reinterpretation is evident from the radical revision of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata doctrine by the 9<sup>th</sup>-century materialist thinker Udbhata Bhaṭṭa (or Bhaṭṭodbhaṭa). The revision brought, among other things, an expansion of the set of the principles in BS 2 to include, i.a., consciousness. This expansion was allowed (in the eyes of Udbhata) by reading the marker *iti* not as closing the enumeration of the principles, but as implying other principles not directly referred to in the aphorism. For Udbhata consciousness is independent from the body. This dualistic approach required from him a novel interpretation of BS 4. Thus, Udbhata explains the ablative *tebhyas* as employed in the meaning of the dative, i.e., ‘for the sake of’, rather than ‘from’ or ‘by’ (Sanskrit grammar allows such a reading).

Clearly, BS 4 is the most cryptic of these aphorisms. The missing, or better – elided, verb leaves open the question regarding the exact manner of the relation which is to obtain between the body and consciousness, and the remaining passages are inconclusive on the matter (or at least can be argued to be such). Namai records the aphorism as cited in four works.<sup>17</sup> This list is revised and expanded by Bhattacharya to include

<sup>14</sup> Cf. PV II 35–36a, TS 1863.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Eli Franco, *Dharmakīrti on Compassion and Rebirth*, Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Vienna 1997, pp. 96–97.

<sup>16</sup> Ibidem, pp. 98–99.

<sup>17</sup> Namai, *Rinne no ronshō*, p. 9.

altogether fourteen witnesses spanning six and a half centuries.<sup>18</sup> Of these, the TSP is the earliest.

As said, three authors, viz. Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla and Prabhācandra, provide us with accounts of a pair of supplementary words. These are:

1. Śāntarakṣita: a) *jāyate* ('originates'), b) *vyajyate*: ('is manifested');
2. Kamalaśīla: a) *utpadyate* ('originates'), b) *abhivyajyate*, ('is manifested');
3. Prabhācandra: a) *abhivyajyate*, or *abhivyaktim upayāti* ('is manifested'), b) *prādur-bhavati*, or *utpadyate* ('originates').<sup>19</sup>

The root  $\sqrt{jan}$  and the root  $\sqrt{pad}$  prefixed with *ud* (*ut- $\sqrt{pad}$* ) carry the meaning of being born, originating, or arising, and typically denote standard causal relation. A child is born from its mother, a sprout arises from its seed. Manifestation (*vyakti*, *abhivyakti*) is opaque. It is not clear, or in fact not known, as to how the Cārvāka/Lokāyata understood the process which this term designates, and other philosophical traditions differed on this matter. Prabhācandra in his account (presented below) argues that what is manifested is necessarily priorly existent. But opposing views are well attested. For instance, the 6<sup>th</sup>-century Nyāya author Uddyotakara strongly criticises the idea of manifestation as not involving actual production. He refers to manifestation as a specific production (*utpatter viśeṣaḥ*). Transformation (*pariṇāma*) unequivocally entails for him the arising of something new.<sup>20</sup>

'Originates' and 'is manifested' are, scholars argue, two very different positions. Bhattacharya regards the two approaches as 'contradictory explanations': the acceptance of one renders the other false. He reads the 'originates' interpretation as asserting that consciousness is not there prior to existence of a living body, while the second interpretation, 'is manifested', according to him points to the existence of consciousness which precedes the existence of a living body.<sup>21</sup> Jonardon Ganeri examines the two interpretations in terms of, respectively, epiphenomenalist and emergentist approaches.<sup>22</sup> Namai proposes to read 'is manifested' as pointing to consciousness being a *dharma*, a quality (he uses the English term 'attribute'),<sup>23</sup> while Krishna Del Toso argues that such a position is, in addition, suggested by BS 6.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Bhattacharya, *Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata*, p. 79.

<sup>19</sup> For the text-sources see below.

<sup>20</sup> See W. Halbfass, *On Being and What There Is: Classical Vaiśeṣika and the History of Indian Ontology*, Albany 1992, pp. 187–188.

<sup>21</sup> R. Bhattacharya, *What the Cārvākas Originally Meant. More on the Commentators on the Cārvākasūtra*, "Journal of Indian Philosophy" 38:6 (2010), pp. 537–538.

<sup>22</sup> See J. Ganeri, *Emergentisms, Ancient and Modern*, "Mind" 120 (2011), pp. 671–703. Franco also observes that the 'originates' position can be labeled epiphenomenalist (*Dharmakīrti on Compassion and Rebirth*, p. 98).

<sup>23</sup> Namai, *Rinne no ronshō*, p. 564.

<sup>24</sup> K. Del Toso, *Is cognition an attribute of the self or it rather belongs to the body? Some dialectical considerations on Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa's position against Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika*, "Open Journal of Philosophy" 1:2 (2011), p. 49.

Aside from the accounts by the three mentioned thinkers, several other authors attest a single supplementary word each. In some works the verb form is ‘arises’, in other ‘is manifested’.<sup>25</sup> Note especially the use of the verb form *prādur-bhavati* which can mean both ‘originates’ and ‘is manifested’. The Buddhist author Prajñākaragupta (9<sup>th</sup> century) provides what, according to Franco, is a quotation or a paraphrase of a Cārvāka/Lokāyata passage:<sup>26</sup>

*mada-śaktis tu madyâśritā kaṣāyâdi-rasa-samparkād apūrvā prādur-bhavati |,*

– ‘The capacity of intoxication, on the other hand, is supported by, or rests on, the intoxicating drink (*madya*), [and] does not become manifest/originate (*prādur-bhavati*) before the mixing [of that drink] with such liquids as *kaṣāya* etc.’<sup>27</sup>

Compare this with a passage from Haribhadra:

*tatra pṛthivy-ādīni bhūtāni catvāri tattvāni tebhya eva dehākāra-parinatebhyaḥ kiṅvādibhyo mada-śakti-vac caitanyam upajāyate |,*

– ‘There (i.e., in the Cārvāka/Lokāyata) the four elements, Earth etc., are the principles. From them alone, transformed into the form of a body, originates (*upajāyate*) consciousness, like the capacity of intoxication [originates] from a fermenting agent, etc.’<sup>28</sup>

It is Prabhācandra’s account (with his elaboration on manifestation) which is often regarded as explicitly pointing to the contradiction between the ‘originates’ and ‘is manifested’ interpretations.<sup>29</sup> Prabhācandra records the augmentations of the aphorism in two of his works, *Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa* (‘The Sun that [opens] the Lotus of Cognisable Objects’, henceforth PKM) and *Nyāya-kumuda-candra* (‘The Moon that [opens] the Lotus of Reasoning’, henceforth NKC). In the NKC he attests the verb forms *abhivyajyate* and *prādur-bhavati*,<sup>30</sup> and in the PKM the phrase *abhivyaktim upayāti*, and the verb form *utpadyate*.<sup>31</sup> The form *utpadyate* implies, as he says in the PKM, the arising of consciousness from what is termed as the body, sense-faculties and sense-objects,<sup>32</sup> i.e.,

<sup>25</sup> See the references provided in Bhattacharya, *Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata*, p. 121.

<sup>26</sup> Franco, *Dharmakīrti on Compassion and Rebirth*, p. 97.

<sup>27</sup> PVA 53,31–54,1. This comes from a larger fragment which is translated in Franco, *Dharmakīrti on Compassion and Rebirth*, p. 97. I leave *kaṣāya* untranslated (Franco does so as well), as I am unable to identify the intended referent of this polysemous term. Franco renders *prādur-bhavati* with ‘is manifested’.

<sup>28</sup> SDS 2,11–12.

<sup>29</sup> Cf., e.g., Ganeri, *Emergentisms, Ancient and Modern*, p. 8.

<sup>30</sup> NKC 342,2–3: *atra kecid abhivyajyata iti kriyābhisambandhaṃ pratipadyante | anye tu prādur-bhavatīti |.*

<sup>31</sup> PKM 116,3: *abhivyaktim upayātīti kriyādhyāhārād.* PKM 117,6: *utpadyata iti kriyādhyāhārān.*

<sup>32</sup> PKM 117,5: *śarīrēndriya-viśaya-saṃjñēbhyas caitanyasyōtpatty-abhyupagamāt.*



from the combinations of the four elements. As for the *abhivyaktim upayāti* supplement, Prabhācandra weighs three possible interpretations: that consciousness which is manifested is already existent (*sat*), that it is non-existent (*asat*) priorly, or that it is both existent and non-existent (*sad-asat*).<sup>33</sup> This inquiry is most likely meant as a thorough refutation of the position. The first position, according to Prabhācandra, implies that a basic Cārvāka/Lokāyata assumption suffers from a cardinal fallacy. For the materialist cannot claim that consciousness would be already existent and at the same time deny that it is without beginning and end.<sup>34</sup> The third option is considered merely for the sake of the said thorough refutation. The second option clearly is meant here as our natural choice. It is not exposed as absurd or discordant with the materialist doctrine. It is rejected because it is not tenable for Prabhācandra. The Jaina author evokes some definitions of a manifesting subject (*vyañjaka*) and a creating subject (*kāraṅka*) in PKM 116,12–13:

*prāk sataḥ svarūpa-saṃskāraṅkaṃ hi vyañjakam | asataḥ svarūpa-nirvartakaṃ kāraṅkam ity |,*

– ‘For the manifesting subject reforms (*svarūpa-saṃskāraṅka*, ‘puts together, or prepares [something in terms of its] own form’) [what is] already existent, [whereas] the creating subject forms (*svarūpa-nirvartaka*, ‘brings about [something in terms of its] own form’) the [hitherto] non-existent.’

In Prabhācandra’s view one who holds that consciousness which becomes manifest is previously non-existent does not distinguish between manifestation and creation.<sup>35</sup> A similar point is made in NKC 348,17–18:

*prāg asato vyaktis tu pratīti-viruddhā | sato hi ghaṭādeḥ dīpādīnā prakāṭi-karaṅga-mātram abhivyaktiḥ prasiddhā na punar asataḥ |,*

– ‘Manifestation (*vyakti*) of [something] priorly non-existent is contradictory to what is commonly acknowledged (*pratīti-viruddha*). For manifestation (*abhivyakti*) is well-established (*prasiddha*) as [consisting in] merely making visible (*prakāṭi-karaṅga*) the [already] existent, [for instance making] a pot and so forth [visible] by means of a lamp and so forth, and not the non-existent.’

Prabhācandra’s account may suggest that for the Cārvāka/Lokāyata the manifestation of consciousness involves coming into existence of a new entity. This does not necessarily imply reference to some ‘dualist’ materialism, nor does it point to Udbhaṭa (who is not mentioned by Prabhācandra). In fact, Prabhācandra’s account of the ‘is manifested’

<sup>33</sup> PKM 116,6–7: *kiṃ ca sato ’bhivyaktiś caitanyasyāsato vā syāt sad-asad-rūpasya vā |.*

<sup>34</sup> PKM 116,7ff: *prathama-kalpanāyāṃ tasyānādy-anantatva-siddhiḥ | sarvadā sato ’bhivyaktes tām antareṇānupapatteḥ |...*

<sup>35</sup> PKM 116,11–12: *na caīvaṃ vādino vyañjaka-kāraṅkayor bhedaḥ.*

position is rather a case of mere dialectical method. Regardless of whether consciousness is or is not a separate entity in the Cārvāka/Lokāyata's ontological picture, it is one in Prabhācandra's. Here none of the three interpretations of the 'is manifested' position works. Thus I think it is curious that Prabhācandra's definition of manifestation would be employed as a source material in an attempt to reconstruct the Cārvāka/Lokāyata 'is manifested' position, when it is used to invalidate it. Not to mention the fact that it is evoked as an invalidator of one of the *three supposed* interpretations of the said position. I regard Prabhācandra's account as inconclusive, as it neither explicitly denies nor proves that those positions were indeed deemed contradictory by the materialists themselves.

On the other hand, as I shall argue below, Śāntarakṣita's and Kamalaśīla's accounts of the two positions, preceding Prabhācandra's by three centuries, may be read as pointing to there being no contradiction between them.

### TS(P) 1858<sup>36</sup>

Verse 1858 of the TS belongs to the *pūrva-pakṣa* section of Chapter XXII *Lokāyata-parīkṣā*. It is as follows:

*tasmād bhūta-viśeṣebhyo yathā śukta-surādīkam |  
tebhya eva tathā jñānam jāyate vyajyate 'thavā ||*,<sup>37</sup>

– 'Therefore, like in the case of vinegar, spirituous liquor, etc., consciousness originates or is manifested from specific elements alone'.

The following is a fragment from TSP ad TS 1857–1858 pertaining specifically to what Śāntarakṣita says in the second of the two verses:

*tasmāt tal-lokāyata-pakṣānulomanam eva jñātam | tathā hi tasyaītat sūtram  
paralokino 'bhāvāt paralokābhāva iti | tathā ca pṛthivy āpas tejo vāyur iti  
catvāri tattvāni tebhyaś caitanyam iti | tatra kecid vṛtti-kārā vyācakṣate  
| utpadyate tebhyaś caitanyam | anye 'bhivyajyata ity āhuḥ | ataḥ pakṣa-  
dvayam āha | jāyate vyajyate cēti | śuktam āmlavattvam | surēti mada-  
janana-śaktiḥ | ādi-śabdena mūrchādi-janana-sāmarthya-parigrahaḥ |*,<sup>38</sup>

– 'From that, exactly this regular order of these Lokāyata positions is known. For there is this sūtra of theirs: "There is no other-world because there is nothing belonging to the other-world." And accordingly: "The four

<sup>36</sup> Note: with regard to the text of the TS and the TSP only those emendations and *variae lectiones* are indicated here which are relevant for the matter discussed. This is, to borrow from Kamalaśīla, *vyavahāra-lāghavāya*, for the sake of practical brevity. For the proper critical edition of the text see my forthcoming dissertation.

<sup>37</sup> J<sub>K</sub>94a5; P<sub>K</sub>34b7–8; K520,6–7; Ś633,8–634,1; = D<sub>K</sub> Ze 68a2; Q<sub>K</sub> 'e 82a3–4.

<sup>38</sup> J<sub>P</sub>196b1–2; P<sub>P</sub>218a6–8; K520,9–13; Ś633,20–11; = D<sub>P</sub> 'e 90a6–b2; Q<sub>P</sub> Ye 125b6–162a2.

principles are Earth, Water, Fire and Air.<sup>39</sup> From these, consciousness”. With regard to this, some [Lokāyata] commentators elucidate [that] consciousness “originates” from these [four elements, while] others say [it] “is manifested” [from them]. Hence [Śāntarakṣita] speaks of two [Lokāyata] positions: “originates”, and “is manifested”. “Vinegar” [indicates] the state of being endowed with sourness. “Spirituos liquor” [indicates] capacity to produce intoxication. “Etc.” refers to [other substances possessing] capacity to produce insensibility.’

The verse does not easily translate into English. A literal translation would be: ‘Therefore, just like vinegar, spirituous liquor, etc., are from specific elements, in the same manner (*tathā*) from them alone (*tebhya eva*) consciousness originates or is manifested’. Also, the Tibetan translation of the verse is tentative.<sup>40</sup>

The first sentence of the quoted fragment from the TSP is highly problematic and involves a complicated manuscript situation, with scribal corrections made in both mss.<sup>41</sup> The reading *ante correctionem* of **J<sub>P</sub>** is *tathā lokāyata*<sup>o</sup>, and the reading *post correctionem* is *tasmāl lokāyata*<sup>o</sup>.<sup>42</sup> **P<sub>P</sub>** reads *tasmāl lokāyata*<sup>o</sup>, with *akṣara ‘smā’* inserted by the scribe.<sup>43</sup> Tib. reading *de lta bas na* corroborates *tasmāt*. Next, the final word in the sentence is *jātam* in **J<sub>P</sub>**, and *jñātam* in **P<sub>P</sub>**. The **J<sub>P</sub>** reading is, however, again a result of scribal correction. The reading *ante correctionem* is *jñātam* (copied to **P<sub>P</sub>**), with *ñ* rubbed out from the ligature. Tib. is problematic. Where the Sanskrit reads *anulomanam eva jñātam/jātam*, Tib. has *...rjes su mthun pa yin par grub po* (*bo* in **Q<sub>P</sub>**), ‘established (‘*grub pa*) as being concordant...’.<sup>44</sup> The reading *grub po*<sup>45</sup> corroborates neither *jñātam* nor *jātam*.

<sup>39</sup> Note the variant of BS 2 with *catvāri*, ‘four’.

<sup>40</sup> Guṇākaraśrībhadrā and Zhi ba ’od either failed to comprehend the meaning behind the metaphor of vinegar and spirituous liquor, and assumed corruption of the manuscript at their disposal, or actually worked on a corrupt ms. Where **J<sub>K</sub>** and **P<sub>K</sub>** have *śukta-surādīkam*, Tib. reads *rgyu dang nus sogs*, with *rgyu* (= *\*hetu* etc. LC, SW, JSN, but also, e.g., *\*mūla* JSN) meaning ‘cause, or material’, and *nus* (= *\*śakti* etc. LC, SW, JSN) meaning ‘capacity’. *Pāda d* retains the reading of both mss. (**K** prints accordingly based on **P<sub>K</sub>**). The variant *jāyate vyajyate ’ha ca* found in **Ś** appears to be a misreading of **J<sub>K</sub>**, rather than a (failed) emendation. **Ś** records only *’thavā* as the **P<sub>P</sub>K** variant in his apparatus. On the problems with **Ś** see my forthcoming dissertation.

<sup>41</sup> I am obliged to Prof. Marek Mejor, Dr. Ernst Prets, Dr. Yasutaka Muroya, Dr. Toshikazu Watanabe and Hiroko Matsuoka for their instructive comments on the meaning of this passage. I also thank Dr. Patrick McAllister and Hiroko Matsuoka for their remarks on the manuscript situation.

<sup>42</sup> There is a note on the margin of the folio, marked as ‘*pā*’ (i.e., *pāthāntara*, reading of another manuscript consulted) which reads *smāl lo*, attesting variant: *tasmāl lokāyata*<sup>o</sup>. This note is almost entirely rubbed out. Through the scribal correction of the text this variant is incorporated into the text. A detailed record of the manner of specific corrections is given in my dissertation.

<sup>43</sup> The reading *ante correctionem* is thus either *tal lokāyata*<sup>o</sup>, or *tal-lokāyata*<sup>o</sup>.

<sup>44</sup> Dr. Patrick McAllister hints me that *yin par*, ‘being’, might be the translators’ way of interpreting the Sanskrit *eva*, although indeed a curious one. This common particle does not generally appear to prove problematic for Tibetan translators, and in this case a free rendering of it is not strictly speaking necessary.

<sup>45</sup> *\*siddha* (LC, SW, JSN), *\*niṣpanna* (LC, SW, JSN), etc. JSN does attest the use of *grub pa* to render the Sanskrit *jāta* based on the Tibetan version of a passage from Guṇaprabhā’s (7<sup>th</sup> century) *Vinaya-sūtra* (see JSN

The latter form, *jātam*, ‘born, brought forth, arisen, etc.’, clearly does not make good sense in the sentence. I follow the **J<sub>P</sub>** reading *ante correctionem*, viz., *jñātam*, ‘is known’. In *jāyate vyajyate cēti* I follow the reading of the mss.<sup>46</sup> Last but not least: *śuktam āmlavattvam*. **J<sub>P</sub>** reads *āmlavatvam*, with *va* canceled by the/a scribe. The reading *ante correctionem* is thus *āmlavattvam*, with *tt* degeminated before a semi-vowel according to the practice of the scribe of this ms. The Sanskrit *āmlavattva* means ‘state of being endowed with sourness’, from *āmla*, ‘sourness’, construed with the possessive suffix *-vat* and the abstract suffix *-tva*. The reading *post correctionem* is *āmlatvam*, which is itself incorrect. The Sanskrit *āmla*, from *amla*, ‘sour’, already designates sourness. With the initial *a* lengthened the term literally translates into ‘sournessness’. This is why Ś emends it to *amlatvam*, ‘sourness’. **P<sub>P</sub>** copies the reading *post correctionem* of **J<sub>P</sub>**, and **K** prints accordingly with *ā*.<sup>47</sup>

My initial problem with reading *jāyate* and *vyajyate* in the verse as pointing to ‘contradictory’ positions is Śāntarākṣita’s use of the *śukta-surādīkam* example. If two contradictory properties were to be predicated of two entities then two analogous cases ought to be provided. ‘Vinegar, spirituous liquor, etc.’ cannot be both originated and manifested if one property is incompatible with the other. If we are to read *jāyate* and *vyajyate* as signifying two very different positions, then the compound *śukta-surādīkam* needs to be read as supplying two distinct exemplifications. Thus between *śukta* and *surā* one would be ‘originated’, and the other ‘manifested’. This leaves ‘etc.’ as signifying either, on the one hand, some entities which are originated and, on the other hand, some which are manifested, or only those entities which possess the same property as *surā* (‘like *śukta*, or like *surā* etc.’). This is indeed misleading and dubious, to say the least.

*Śukta*, synonymous to *cukra*, is a medical term for vinegar.<sup>48</sup> MW reads s.v. *cukra*: ‘vinegar made by acetous fermentation’, and s.v. *śukta*: ‘anything fermented or become sour, any sour liquor or gruel (esp. a kind of acid beverage prepared from roots and fruits)’.<sup>49</sup> *Surā*, in turn, is, according to Marianne S. Oort, an alcoholic beverage prepared, as reported in the Brahmanic literature, in the first place from malted grain (*śuṣpa*) and

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s.v. *grub pa*). In the case of the TS and the TSP forms of the Tibetan *grub pa* regularly render derivatives of Sanskrit roots conveying the meaning of establishing, proving, etc.

<sup>46</sup> Both **K** and Ś emend the text so that it reads exactly what is said in TS 1858d (according to their reading of the *pāda*). Thus **K** proposes *thavēti*, and Ś *tha cēti*. The commentator, however, does not need to quote verbatim from the commented text, which makes these two emendations needless.

<sup>47</sup> Tib. is of no help here, as it renders the abstract noun simply with *skyur po*, ‘sour’.

<sup>48</sup> See Om Prakash, *Food and Drinks in Ancient India (from Earliest Times to c. 1200 A.D.)*, Delhi 1961, p. 284; H.W. Bailey, *Buddhist Sanskrit*, “The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland” 1:2 (1955), p. 23.

<sup>49</sup> The Tibetan version of the TSP renders *śukta* with *tshwa* (‘salt’) which MVy 5712 attests as an equivalent of *cukra*. Bailey (*Buddhist Sanskrit*, p. 23) writes that *tshwa* is used for both ‘salt’ and ‘acid’, he also reports that the Tibetan version of Ravigupta’s (7<sup>th</sup> cent.) *Siddha-sāra* renders *śukta* as *chang gi nang du tshwa*, translated by Bailey as ‘the acid in wine (or beer)’.

thus resembling beer.<sup>50</sup> The term, however, can denote a variety of spirituous liquors, consumed both on a daily basis and on festive occasions. In the *Atharvaveda* hymns V 10 and VIII 12 of the Paippalāda recension,<sup>51</sup> which are addressed to *surā* itself, we find a description of a ritualized process of distillation involving use of specified apparatus designed to heat up the liquid, collect the vapor bubbles (*budbuda*), etc. This brings to mind BS 9 according to which the so-called ‘souls’ are like water bubbles.<sup>52</sup> Just as a vapor bubble emerging in the process of distillation is merely a transitory state of the liquid, similarly consciousness may appear to be distinct of the body but in fact have no existence independent of it. Whether a liquid undergoes acetous fermentation or distillation, no distinctly separate entity comes into being.

Kamalaśīla’s gloss on *surā* as indicating a capacity of producing intoxication provides what appears to be a standard illustration for the relation between body-qua-capacity-possessor and consciousness-qua-capacity. The gloss on *śukta* is curious, in that the reading *ante correctionem*, which I prefer, viz., *āmlavattvam*, may be read as indicating a capacity of a liquid to turn sour,<sup>53</sup> but the reading *post correctionem* printed in the two modern editions<sup>54</sup> provides undeniably an example of a quality. This reference to a quality of sourness is, surprisingly, overlooked, or at least not pointed to explicitly. I suspect that it is this variant that might have led Namai to conclude that one of the two positions, *abhivyajyate*, points to a substance-and-quality relation between the body and consciousness. Following this assumption Namai writes that the ‘is manifested’ position is ‘to be used to refute the orthodox who maintain that mental functions are attributes

<sup>50</sup> M.S. Oort, *Surā in the Paippalāda Saṃhitā of the Atharvaveda*, “Journal of the American Oriental Society”, 122:2 (2002), pp. 355–356. The Tibetan version of the TSP renders *surā* with *chang*, which is a type of traditional Tibetan beer typically made of barley (HAJ s.v. *chang* gives a detailed description of the process of brewing of this beer).

<sup>51</sup> Translated in Oort, *Surā in the Paippalāda Saṃhitā of the Atharvaveda*, pp. 356–357.

<sup>52</sup> I do not believe this comparison to be pushed too far, as the metaphor of alcohol is after all made by the Cārvāka/Lokāyata themselves, and repeatedly evoked by their opponents with reference to the materialists’ positions.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. *kāryavattva*, ‘state of having effects’, in TSP ad TS 1885: *na hy avaśyaṃ kāraṇānām kāryavattvam* |<sup>a</sup>, – ‘For causes do not necessarily have effects’. This is a paraphrase of Dharmakīrti’s (600–660, or 550–610<sup>b</sup>) PVSV 98,16–17: *na hy avaśyaṃ hetavaḥ phalavanto vaikalya-pratibandha-sambhavāt* |, – ‘For causes do not necessarily have effects, because [there is] the possibility of insufficiency [of causal complex] and an impediment.’ (= PVin II 77,5–6). For instance, a seed is not invariably concomitant with a sprout. To produce a sprout it requires assistance of auxiliary conditions such as sunlight. Just as effect is invariably concomitant with the cause, but not vice versa, similarly in the Cārvāka/Lokāyata consciousness is invariably concomitant with the body, but the body is not invariably concomitant with consciousness. The Sanskrit *āmlavattva* can refer thus to a capacity to turn sour under the circumstance of acetous fermentation. Franco writes on how the Cārvāka/Lokāyata possible understood capacity: ‘[T]o say that something has capacity, power or disposition means that whenever a particular set of conditions occurs, there is a change of particular kind in a state of affairs’ (*Dharmakīrti on Compassion and Rebirth*, p. 98).

<sup>a</sup> Jp198a6; Pp219b13; K526,19–20 ; Ś641,8; = Dp ‘e 94a3; Qp Ye 129b7–8. This fragment involves a few emendations, see my forthcoming dissertation.

<sup>b</sup> See P. Balcerowicz, *On the Relative Chronology of Dharmakīrti and Samantabhadra*, “Journal of Indian Philosophy” 44:3 (2016), pp. 437–483.

<sup>54</sup> In K with the said mistake (*ā* for *a*).

of an *ātman*’, whereas the ‘originates’ position is ‘to be used against the Buddhists, in order to prove that mental functions arise from the body of the present life and do not presuppose the consciousness of a former existence’. I am not aware, however, of any textual evidence which could validate this.

Suppose, now, that one of the positions is meant to entail a capacity-possessor-and-capacity relation, and the other a substance-and-quality relation (and the correct reading is therefore *amlatvam*). Without going into the details of the discussion in the *Lokāyata-parīkṣā*, neither Śāntarakṣita nor Kamalaśīla explicitly differentiates between and refutes two contradictory materialist positions. On the contrary, both authors appear to regard the two as similar, at least in their consequences. Early in the *uttara-pakṣa* section of the chapter Śāntarakṣita briefly rejects a few ideas on the origin of initial consciousness, i.e., the first conscious moment in (the present) life, which presuppose that consciousness is not without beginning and end. Śāntarakṣita asks in TS 1879c:

*bhūta-mātrōdbhavaṃ vāpi*,<sup>55</sup>

– ‘Or [would it] come to be (*udbhava*) from the elements alone?’

It could be argued, I suppose, that while *udbhava*, from *ud-√bhū*, ‘to come forth, arise, exist, etc.’, refers to the ‘originates’ position, Śāntarakṣita does not concern himself with the ‘is manifested’ position as this position does not deny the beginninglessness and endlessness of consciousness (which is already there prior to its manifestation by the body). The author, however, addresses the *bhūta-mātrōdbhava* position as follows:

*kṣoṇī-tejo-jalādibhyo bhūtebhyo bhūtir asya na |  
vyaktir vā sarva-cittānāṃ yaugapadya-prasaṅgataḥ ||*,<sup>56</sup>

– ‘It does not come into being (*bhūti*) nor is manifested (*vyakti*) from elements of Earth, Fire, Water, etc., as it would [undesirably] follow (*prasaṅga*) with the simultaneity (*yaugapadya*) of all of consciousnesses’.

Next, in TS 1900ab Śāntarakṣita says:

*para-pakṣe nanu jñānaṃ kāyād evēti samsthitiḥ |*,<sup>57</sup>

– ‘[Objection:] “Is it not that according to the other side it is established that consciousness is *from the body alone?* (...)”’.

<sup>55</sup> J<sub>K</sub>95a6–b1; P<sub>K</sub>35a4; K524,10; Ś638,11; = D<sub>K</sub> Ze 68b5; Q<sub>K</sub> 'e 83a1.

<sup>56</sup> J<sub>K</sub>95b2–3; P<sub>K</sub>35a6; K524,17–18; Ś639,7–8; = D<sub>K</sub> Ze 68b7; Q<sub>K</sub> 'e 83a4.

<sup>57</sup> J<sub>K</sub>96b2; P<sub>K</sub>35a16; K535,23; Ś653,3; = D<sub>K</sub> Ze 97b1–2; Q<sub>K</sub> 'e 83b7. *Nanu* is my emendation, its explanation, however, requires a lengthy elaboration on this verse and the following one (see my forthcoming dissertation), and which is needless here.

In Kamalaśīla's commentary (TSP ad TS 1900–1905) we find mention of only one of the two positions:

*yasya ca nityam kāyād eva vijñānam utpadyata iti darśanam...*,<sup>58</sup>

– ‘And for those who [hold] the [false] view (*darśana*) that consciousness arises (*utpadyate*) always from the body alone (...)’.

Indeed, the fragments from the *Lokāyata-parīkṣā* suggest that the positions are understood by Śāntarākṣita and Kamalaśīla as not exactly distinct, and surely not contradictory. This, however, does not mean that they were actually non-different. It is not uncommon for an author to present the views of his opponents from the perspective of his own commitments, i.e., to demonstrate what specific positions entail within the framework of his own conceptual system. Thus, for instance, in the eyes of a realist Naiyāyika, the Mādhyamika anti-realist is nihilistic, and the latter's core concept, emptiness (*śūnyatā*), entails for the realist total nonexistence.<sup>59</sup> Similarly, what could be different or even contradictory for the Cārvāka/Lokāyata may not necessarily be for Śāntarākṣita and Kamalaśīla in their understanding.<sup>60</sup> There is, however, a possible hint about the relation between the two positions.

What exactly is the meaning of *tal-lokāyata-pakṣānulomanam*? Dr. Yasutaka Muroya suggests to me reading *anulomana*, a rather rare term, as meaning ‘regular order’, or ‘right sequence’. This gives: ‘the regular order, or right sequence, of these Lokāyata positions’. To my understanding this passage refers to the chronology of the two positions, i.e., suggests that the ‘is manifested’ position is the later of the two, either meant to supersede the ‘originates’ position (which was, for instance, held oversimplified or insufficient, or was met with too strong a criticism from the adversaries), or to rival it. With regard to this I would like to venture the following hypothesis:

The first pair of verb forms supplied to the aphorism, i.e., *jāyate* and *utpadyate*, represents intransitive verbs. Consciousness is the agent of the action, it appears from the elements which, in a specific configuration, constitute the body. This is only slightly more of an ‘interpretation’ of *tebhyas caitanyam* than is supplying the verb ‘is’ to the

<sup>58</sup> J<sub>p</sub>201b7, P<sub>p</sub>223a17; K536,7–8; Ś636,13; = D<sub>p</sub> 'e 102a2; Q<sub>p</sub> Ye 138a8.

<sup>59</sup> See S.J. Kania, *Does a Dialectician Always Mean What He Says? A Few Words On The No-Thesis Statement of Nāgārjuna and The Incommensurability of Philosophical Theories*, “Studia Indologiczne” 21 (2014), pp. 17–23.

<sup>60</sup> This indeed is one of the crucial problems with reconstructing the Cārvāka/Lokāyata thought. Other include cases of denigration, ridiculing, or intentional twisting of the materialist doctrine, misattribution of views and misquotes, corruption of the source at our disposal, and secondhand testimony. Furthermore, the opponent might, as Bhattacharya observes (in *Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata*, p. 73), add to the exponent's position in order to ‘strengthen’ it, so that the latter would be equipped with the best possible arguments, refuted then by the former. Last but not least, an attempt at a proper reconstruction of a forgotten philosophical enterprise requires evaluation of the reliability of source. And the results of weighing of the evidence produced by witnesses who attempt to prove that the views of their opponents are inconsistent with reason might not be exactly coherent. The said reliability becomes thus highly subjective if we seek coherence, as we need to dismiss some evidence or even adjust our interpretation to fit our needs.

aphorism. The *vyajyate/abhivyajayte* pair, in turn, represents verbs in the passive voice. Here consciousness is caused to appear from the elements. Juxtaposed with the alcohol metaphor/example, this implies that the presence of specific circumstances triggers the appearance of consciousness in the body, just as a carefully designed process of distillation or acetous fermentation allows, or better – forces, the liquid to transform, or to enter a specific state. The *vyajyate/abhivyajyate* position is thus not a counter-position to the first ‘view’. The difference lies, in my understanding, not in what is this consciousness which appears but in simply elaborating on what seems to be an obvious augmentation of the aphorism, albeit an opaque one. Hence Kamalaśīla’s use of the term *anulomana* which signifies the ‘regular order’ in which the two supplements had been proposed by the Lokāyata commentators.

This is, in my opinion, one of the possible solutions to the problem of the two interpretations, and it most certainly requires new Cārvāka/Lokāyata fragments to validate it. I cannot decisively rule out that, for instance, the ‘originates’ position represents the ‘classical’ Cārvāka/Lokāyata, and the ‘is manifested’ position anticipates the revision by Udbhata.<sup>61</sup> On the contrary, I consider this solution equally possible. As shown, however, the account in the TS(P) should not be regarded as evidence for this and similar assumptions.

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<sup>61</sup> See Del Toso, *Is cognition an attribute of the self or it rather belongs to the body?*, p. 49.



- J<sub>P</sub>** = Jaisalmer manuscript of the *Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjikā* (Kamalaśīla), Śrī Jinabhadrasūri Tāḍapatrīya Grantha Bhaṅḍāra, Jaisalmer no. 378.
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- P<sub>P</sub>** = Pāṭan ms. of the TSP, Śrī Hemacandrācārya Jaina Jñānamandira, Pāṭan, no. 6678
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- TSP = *Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjikā* (Kamalaśīla), see: **D<sub>P</sub>**, **J<sub>P</sub>**, **K**, **Q<sub>P</sub>**, **P<sub>P</sub>**, **Ś**.