

ŁUKASZ MATUSZ

University of Silesia

lukasz.matusz@us.edu.pl

HAVE YOU HEARD THE NEWS? METONYMIC EXTENSIONS OF THE VERB *HEAR* IN ENGLISH

Bierwiazzonek (2013: 201-202) proposed an analysis of the polysemy of the verb *see* based on propositional metonymic mappings. In Matusz (2020) I supported this claim with a short dictionary analysis. In the present paper, I propose a similar analysis of the polysemy of *hear* based on propositional metonymy processes.

In order to do that a short dictionary analysis is performed to determine the basic non-metonymic meaning of the verb and to distinguish the senses motivated by metonymic mappings. The analysis performed on the basis of three dictionary sources shows that a significant number of senses of *hear* may plausibly be explained as cases of PART FOR WHOLE propositional metonymic patterns. The metonymic shift may be demonstrated on the basis of State-of-Affairs Scenarios (SASs), as proposed by Panther and Thornburg (1999), due to the fact that within such scenarios the stage of auditory perception constitutes a particularly salient stage (a stage of SAS for SAS). Alternatively, some dictionary samples are ambiguous between the PART FOR WHOLE metonymic interpretation and the metaphoric reading wherein metonymy plays an active role in the emergence of the metaphoric shift. Thus, reference to metonymy-metaphor interaction appears indispensable. In the paper, I propose an analysis of such cases based on Ruiz de Mendoza and Díez Velasco (2002), who consider the role of metonymic domain expansion within the source of the metaphoric mappings.

Keywords: *hear*, auditory perception, propositional metonymy, State-of-Affairs Scenarios, metonymy-metaphor interaction

1. A brief outline of the propositional metonymy theory

The theory of metonymy in cognitive linguistics has gradually been expanding its focus from its word-for-word referential aspects (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Norrick 1981, Nunberg 1978) to a more comprehensive look at

the problem, which includes also the study of formal, propositional or illocutionary metonymy (Bierwiaczonek 2001, 2007, 2013, Hernández 2007, Panther and Thornburg 1999, 2003b, 2003c, 2017, Ruiz de Mendoza and Otal Campo 2002). A significantly broad account of metonymy is provided by Bierwiaczonek (2013), whose definition is a generalisation of that of Kövecses and Radden's (1998: 39). In Bierwiaczonek's (2013: 16) terms, metonymy is "a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, the vehicle, provides mental access to another conceptual entity, the target, associated with it within the same single integrated conceptualisation". This definition encompasses also the type of propositional metonymy, as it is presented by Panther and Thornburg (1999, 2003a, 2005, 2007, 2017). Bierwiaczonek (2013: 156) defines propositional metonymy in the following way:

Propositional metonymy is a metonymy in which the whole propositional content *p* of a sentence *S* is used to access either the whole ICM, or another propositional content *q* within the same ICM. If the proposition serving as the target is accessed by a sentence whose propositional meaning is completely different from the target (i.e., its subject and predicate are different), then the metonymy may be called *sentential*. If the propositional metonymy is limited to the predicate, the metonymy is referred to as *predicative*.

A well-known example of propositional metonymy is the way in which speakers of Ojibwa – a native tongue of central Canada – commonly refer to the act of travelling in a vehicle to a location. Lakoff (1987: 78) cites the following English examples.

- (1) I started to come.
- (2) I stepped into a canoe.
- (3) I got into a car.

Lakoff (1987: 78) concludes that while talking about travelling Ojibwa speakers conventionally use the stage of Embarkation, which is a part of a complex travelling script:

Using the stage of Embarkation to represent travelling as a whole is an example of PART FOR WHOLE propositional metonymy. As Lakoff (1987: 87) notes, this metonymic pattern is not limited to Ojibwa. In English a number of different stages of the Travelling Scenario may give rise to propositional PART FOR WHOLE metonymy:

- (4) I have a car. (Precondition)
- (5) I borrowed my brother's car. (Precondition)
- (6) I hopped on a bus. (Embarkation)
- (7) I just stuck out my thumb. (Embarkation)
- (8) I drove. (Centre)

Table 1. The Travelling Scenario (Lakoff 1987: 78)

1	Precondition	You have (or have access to) the vehicle.
2	Embarkation	You get into the vehicle and start it up.
3	Centre	You drive (row, fly, etc.) to your destination.
4	Finish	You park and get out.
5	End point	You are at your destination.

Bierwiazzonek (2013: 158) notes that the Travelling Scenario may also be accessed by more conceptually distant sentential metonymies, as in (9) and (10):

(9) My brother gave me a lift. (Precondition)

(10) My sister had lent me her car. (Precondition)

The Travelling Scenario (*Table 1*), is a specific realisation of Panther and Thornburg's (1999: 337) State-of-Affairs Scenario (SAS), that is, a general script for propositional contents describing an existing (actual) state of affairs. A SAS is divided into four stages unfolding in time, each stage with its specific components, as demonstrated in *Table 2*:

Table 2. State-of-Affairs Scenario (Panther and Thornburg 1999: 337)

1.	The Before	Necessary preconditions: motivations, potentialities, capabilities, abilities, dispositions, etc., which can bring about the State of Affairs
2.	The Core	The existing, true State of Affairs
3.	The Effects	Necessary consequences immediately following from the State of Affairs
4.	The After	Non-necessary consequences of the State of Affairs

In the present analysis, I adopt the framework of SASs in order to propose a number of scripts where the stage of X hearing Y is an indispensable element of the conceptual description of the scenarios. In accordance with Panther and Thornburg (1999: 337), the stage of auditory perception will be shown to be a salient part of the scripts, providing access to the whole scenarios by means of PART FOR WHOLE propositional metonymy. The metonymic shifts will be illustrated by appropriate samples from a short dictionary database.

2. Methodology

In Matusz (2020) I proposed a brief dictionary analysis of the metonymic patterns in the polysemy of the verb *see*. In this paper I undertake a similar study of the English verb of auditory perception *hear*. For the purposes of the present analysis, I omit less crucial issues, such as the discussion of different processes and factors related to human auditory perception, its representation in language and its relation to other human modalities. Instead, I focus my enquiry on those senses of *hear* that have emerged as a result of propositional metonymic processes.

For the purposes of my analysis I have consulted three different dictionary sources: Collins COBUILD Advanced Learner's English Dictionary (2005), henceforth CCALED, Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English (2005), henceforth LDCE, and The New Oxford Dictionary of English (1998), henceforth TNODE. The analysis consists of four stages. Firstly, I identify the primary sense of *hear*, namely the one of involuntary auditory perception of sound. Secondly, I analyse the dictionary entries for HEAR to distinguish those senses of the verb where the element of auditory perception is a part of the semantic description of *hear*. In line with Bierwiazzonek's (2013: 201-202) analysis of *see*, I present those senses as PART FOR WHOLE metonymic patterns. Thirdly, in accordance with Panther and Thornburg (1999), I propose a number of specific hearing-related SASs to study the metonymic processes in more detail. In these scenarios the stage of auditory perception is shown to be a salient part of the script that provides the basis for the metonymic shifts. Fourthly, the role of metonymy-metaphor interplay in the polysemy of *hear* is considered. In accordance with the representation of KNOWING IS SEEING metaphor in Matusz (2020: 102-103), I expect to find in the dictionary database certain examples that can plausibly be analysed as cases of metonymic domain expansion within the source of a metaphoric mapping, as proposed by Ruiz de Mendoza and his collaborators (Ruiz de Mendoza 2000, Ruiz de Mendoza and Díez Velasco 2002, Ruiz de Mendoza and Otal Campo 2002). The phenomenon of metonymic expansion within the source of the emergent metaphor will be shown to be congruent with propositional PART FOR WHOLE metonymy analysis.

There are, admittedly, a number of possible problems with the study based on the methodology presented above. Firstly, the database formed from a small pool of dictionary entries for the verb *hear* is considerably limited and may cast doubt on whether it adequately and sufficiently represents the rich polysemy of the verb. In this respect, a more comprehensive and wider corpus study would be much more adequate. Secondly, the present analysis pertains solely to the verb *hear*, ignoring a more comprehensive look at the representation of human auditory modality in English. Thirdly, the representation of different SASs

provides a considerably simplified and idealised picture of the events and processes they are meant to represent. Similarly, the processes of metonymy-metaphor interplay are presented in a considerably cursory and imperfect way.

Despite these problems and inadequacies, I hope the analysis undertaken in this paper to be satisfactory for the basic representation of the adequacy of the metonymic processes operating in the polysemy of *hear*. More specific suggestions for further studies in this area will be provided in the conclusions (section 6).

3. Metonymic patterns of *hear*

The dictionary sources present the primary sense of *hear* as perceiving or being aware of physical sound. TNOED defines *hear* as “to perceive with the ear the sound made by (someone or something)”. LDCE states that “to know that a sound is being made using your ears”. CCALED says that “when you hear a sound you become aware of it through your ears”. This is illustrated by the following examples:

- (11) He did not hear very well. (TNOED)
- (12) Blanche heard a crash as the back door was flung open. (LDCE)
- (13) And then we heard the bells ringing out. (CCAED)

Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976: 617-618) characterize the verb *hear* as a stative predicate denoting the psychological relation of auditory perception. This perception, though guided and managed by the processes of attention, is largely unintentional and independent from human active involvement. In this sense, Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976: 617-618) contrast *hear* with the agentive meaning of *listen*, and draw a parallel with the modality of vision where the most common stative and agentive English verbs are *see* and *look* respectively. Therefore, in the following analysis I consider the sense of involuntary perception of physical sound to be the primary meaning of *hear*.

In relation to the verb *hear* in the three dictionary sources the meaning of auditory perception is provided in the first entry. However, there are a number of senses where the physical perception of sound can be construed as part of their semantic description. Therefore, such examples are analysable in the light of PART FOR WHOLE metonymy. LDCE provides 16 distinct senses of *hear*, of which 13 can be characterised as PART FOR WHOLE metonymy. In CCALED there are 12 senses for the verb *hear*, 10 of which can be explained by the metonymic pattern. In TNOED there are 12 senses of *hear*, of which 10 are plausibly identified with PART FOR WHOLE metonymic shift. Therefore, it appears that PART FOR WHOLE metonymy constitutes a significantly productive pattern in the polysemy of the verb *hear*. Consider the following

examples from the dictionary database, which have been grouped by the author according to their specific metonymic patterns.

PART OF LISTENING FOR LISTENING:

- (14) Did you hear the programme on whales the other night? (LDCE)
- (15) You can hear commentary on the match in about half an hour's time. (CCAED)
- (16) She just doesn't hear what I'm telling her. (TNODE)

PART OF LEARNING FOR LEARNING:

- (17) I'm sorry to hear he died. (LDCE)
- (18) Have you heard of the news? (TNODE)
- (19) My mother heard of this school through Leslie. (CCAED)

PART OF CONTACTING FOR CONTACTING:

- (20) (The) police want to hear from anyone who has any information. (LDCE)
- (21) If you would like to join the committee, we would love to hear from you. (TNODE)
- (22) It's always great to hear from you. (CCAED)

PART OF COURT PROCEEDINGS FOR COURT PROCEEDINGS:

- (23) An all-woman jury heard the case. (TNODE)
- (24) The Supreme Court heard the case on Tuesday. (LDCE)
- (25) The jury have heard evidence from the defence witnesses. (CCAED)

PART OF DISCUSSING FOR DISCUSSING

- (26) Just hear me out, will you? (LDCE)
- (27) Joseph gravely heard them out but never offered advice. (TNODE)
- (28) Furness shrugs wearily. He has heard it all before. (CCAED)

PART OF AGREEING WITH A PROPOSAL FOR AGREEING WITH A PROPOSAL

- (29) Hear! Hear! (LDCE)
- (30) I won't hear of such idiocy! (TNODE)
- (31) I've always wanted to be an actor, but dad wouldn't hear of it. (CCAED)

PART OF ARGUMENT FOR ARGUMENT

- (32) I'll sue him. He hasn't heard the last of me yet. (LDCE)

PART OF INTERACTION WITH THE DIVINE FOR INTERACTION WITH THE DIVINE

- (33) Our Heavenly Father has heard our prayers! (TNODE)

I believe that all of the above examples illustrate PART FOR WHOLE metonymy in which the stage of auditory perception (hearing) stands for the whole SASs. In the following section, specific scenarios will be proposed in order to illustrate the metonymic transfer in (14) – (22). In (23) – (33), auditory perception can also be construed as a part of a SAS. Hearing testimonies in the court of law (samples [23]-[25]), for example, is a part of the whole judicial process in which a legal case is attended to, analysed, judged and publicly announced. Similarly, if the Heavenly Father is said to have heard prayers (33), the divine actor is assumed to have perceived, evaluated and granted them, performing an appropriate act in the process. In all of these scenarios it is the stage of auditory perception that provides metonymic access to their respective scripts.

In general, the metonymic categories presented above seem to exhibit a degree of flexibility, since in a single dictionary sample the stage of auditory perception may be part of different scripts depending on the context of its utterance. Sentence (26), for instance, may plausibly belong to the argument, agreeing with a proposal or even court proceedings script. (29) may be construed as part of the discussing scenario. (30) – (31) may be part of arguing.

On the other hand, some language samples appear to be subject to considerable grammatical and pragmatic restrictions, as in (30) – (32), which in the context of a discussion or an argument seem to appear mainly in their negative form. This observation points to the feasibility of analysing such samples in the framework of construction grammar in order to plausibly account for their grammatical and pragmatic restrictions. Though such endeavours go far beyond the scope of this paper, some suggestions for further studies will be provided in the concluding section.

4. *Hear* and SASs

Dictionary samples (14) – (16) represent the metonymic transfer in which the stage of auditory perception is used to access the whole scenario of actively and voluntarily listening to somebody or something in order to acquire a certain piece of information. In order to illustrate that, consider the following Listening Scenario:

The Listening Scenario presented in *Table 3* is a modification of Matusz's (2020: 93-94) Watching Scenario, wherein similar processes operate in relation to the visual modality. In accordance with that, the Listening Scenario requires a sentient human being X to willingly and intentionally listen to the object of listening Y. Y is assumed to carry a certain message or piece of information that can be decoded, understood and acquired by X. The three dots in parentheses signify any further unspecified preparatory conditions, potentialities and

Table 3. The Listening Scenario

	The Listening Scenario
1. The Before	• There is a person, story, programme, (etc.) Y available to listen for X. • X is a sentient individual capable of listening to Y. • Y has a certain message or some information that can be decoded, understood and acquired by X. • X wants to listen to Y. • (...)
2. The Core	• X comes into auditory contact with Y. • X hears Y. • X engages in listening to Y. • X terminates listening to Y.
3. The Effects	• X has decoded, understood and acquired the message or information carried by Y. • X has the experience of listening to Y.
4. The After	• X shares his/her experience of Y with other individuals. • (...)

motivations in the Before stage, like X's cognitive potential to acquire the information or lack of external factors preventing X from listening to Y.

In the Core of the scenario, X comes into contact with Y. This contact is auditory in nature: X starts to perceive the auditory stimuli sent by Y. At this point the stage of auditory perception is activated (X hears Y). Subsequently, X engages in voluntarily listening to Y for a period of time in order to acquire appropriate information. Finally, after the appropriate informational threshold has been reached, X terminates listening to Y. The necessary Effects of the scenario include decoding, understanding and acquiring the information carried by Y, and having the experience of listening to Y. The After stage consists of any non-necessary consequences of the scenario, which may include e.g., X sharing the experience of listening to Y with other individuals.

Another SAS, motivating PART FOR WHOLE metonymic shift in samples (17) – (19), is the Learning Scenario, in which acquiring certain knowledge happens a result of a sentient human being X engaging with the source of information Y through the sense of hearing.

In the Learning Scenario the knowledge of Y is important for X in a given context. Thus, X is willing to engage in Y and is unimpeded in their attempts to do so (the Before stage). In the Core of the script, X comes into auditory contact with Y and the stage of auditory perception is activated. X, subsequently, engages in listening to Y and acquires appropriate knowledge in the process before the learning processes are terminated. As a result of the procedure X has acquired the knowledge of Y (the Effects) and may e.g., expand on his/her

Table 4. The Learning Scenario

	The Learning Scenario
1. The Before	• There is a certain proposition, message, sign, or piece of information Y, the knowledge of which is important for X in a given context. • X is a sentient individual capable of acquiring knowledge of Y. • X intends to acquire the knowledge of Y. • X is unimpeded in his/her acquisition of the knowledge of Y. • (...)
2. The Core	• X comes into auditory contact with Y. • X hears Y. • X acquires the knowledge of Y. • X terminates learning Y.
3. The Effects	• X has acquired the knowledge of Y. • (...)
4. The After	• X expands his/her knowledge of Y further. • (...)

knowledge in the future (the After). The script shown in *Table 4* is a modification of the Learning Scenario presented by Matusz (2020: 98), in which learning is discussed in relation to seeing. This script appears to be highly productive for the visual activity. Without going into details here, it is worth mentioning that the conceptual link between visual perception and understanding or acquiring knowledge appears to be one of the most important conceptual relations (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 48, Malim 1994, Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 354-355, Kövecses 2013: 81-83). However, as follows from the above discussion, the link between the modality of hearing and learning appears to be a significant cognitive pattern as well.

Finally, dictionary samples (20) – (22) appear to represent a metonymic transfer in which auditory perception of another person is a core stage of the following Contacting Scenario *Table 5*:

In the Contacting Scenario person X and Y come into auditory contact with each other in order to exchange some important information. This contact may come in the form of telephone conversation, audio internet connection, or face-to-face conversation in which the sense of hearing mediates the information transfer. In order to exchange important information, X comes into auditory contact with Y. X and Y hear each other and, after exchanging appropriate information, the contact is terminated by either party. In effect, X and Y have exchanged important information.

Admittedly, the scenarios presented above in *Tables 3-5* raise certain problems and inadequacies. Firstly, the scripts constitute significant oversimplifications of the events and processes they are meant to represent. The

Table 5. The Contacting Scenario

	The Contacting Scenario
1. The Before	• There is a certain person Y that X can contact. • X is a sentient individual capable of contacting Y. • X intends to contact Y. • X and/or Y have certain information they want to exchange. • (....)
2. The Core	• X comes into auditory contact with Y. • X hears Y. • X and Y exchange information. • X/Y terminates the contact.
3. The Effects	• X and Y have exchanged information. • (...)
4. The After	(...)

scripts for listening and contacting do not aspire to adequately present the complexity related to coming into contact and listening to a source of information. Similarly, it is well beyond the scope of this paper to adequately present the processes related to learning and acquiring information. One conspicuous problem is the fact that in the Learning and Contacting Scenarios the information transfer occurs as a result of X's actively *listening* to the source of information. Thus, a more comprehensive explanation of the processes operating there would require a composite script including the stages from the Listening Scenario as well.

Secondly, the SASs presented above appear to be dynamic in nature. They share certain elements and it may well be that certain database samples feasibly fall within more than one script. Thus, the scenarios appear to exhibit a degree of flexibility where a change of certain stages allows for a more adequate representation of certain dictionary samples. For instance, sample (33), representing the event of a human being contacting the divine, may be analysed as a specific variation of the Contacting Scenario. Sentence (32) could be analysed as a specific subset of the Discussing Scenario where the point of the discussion relates to different aims and goals of the interlocutors (argument). Satisfactory representation of all of those cases by means of SASs would require not only a much more representative database, but also a huge number of different scripts in their possible variations.

Nevertheless, I believe that the scenarios presented above are sufficient for the presentation of their PART FOR WHOLE metonymic shifts and that they provide an argument in favour of the significance of propositional metonymic patterns in the polysemy of the verb *hear*.

5. *Hear* and metonymy-metaphor interaction

Although PART FOR WHOLE appears to be a highly productive pattern for the polysemy of *hear*, certain dictionary samples cannot plausibly be explained as simple propositional metonymic shifts. Consider again samples (17) – (22). In those sentences, the stage of X's auditory perception of Y is a salient part of their respective scenarios, thus providing PART FOR WHOLE metonymic pattern. Now, consider the following:

- (34) Many people haven't heard of reflexology. (CCAED)
- (35) Police want to hear from anyone who has any information. (LDCE)
- (36) If you would like to join the committee, we would love to hear from you (TNODE).
- (37) I look forward to hearing from you. (LDCE).

In sentence (34) *hear*, in accordance with the Learning Scenario, may refer to acquiring the knowledge of reflexology as a result of auditory perception on the part of the learner. However, the sentence can also be interpreted in a way in which learning requires no auditory contact of the subject. Acquiring appropriate knowledge may come as a result of e.g., reading about reflexology, or witnessing the procedure being performed, which mostly seems to employ the visual, not the auditory modality. Examples (35) – (36) are similarly ambiguous. They can be interpreted in accordance with the Contacting Scenario, in which the contact between the two parties is realised by means of auditory perception of spoken language. However, in an alternative reading, no auditory input may be required, as the transfer of information may come about in form of a note, a letter, an e-mail, etc. What is more, phrase (37) appears to be mainly used in the context of formal written correspondence, not face-two-face spoken communication.

Therefore, a propositional PART FOR WHOLE metonymic mapping does not appear to be a fully adequate explanation of such cases. In their interpretation which does not require the mediation of hearing, (34) – (37) appear to transcend the domain of auditory perception. Thus, I believe that in order to account for such cases, the issue of metonymy-metaphor interaction must be addressed.

The problem of relation between metonymy and metaphor has been extensively studied in contemporary cognitive linguistics (c.f. Barcelona 2000, Grady and Johnson 2002, Kövecses 2010, 2013, Kövecses and Radden 1998, Radden 2002, Radden and Kövecses 1999). Kövecses (2013), for instance, cites the processes of schematization and generalization as the mechanisms for deriving correlation metaphors via the stage of metonymy. He claims that UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING metaphor emerged as a result of abstracting the original metonymic relation between visual perception and intellectual

comprehension (parts of the same conceptual structure) into a more conceptually distant metaphoric relation (Kövecses 2013: 81–83).

A study of interplay of metaphor and metonymy for the conceptualization of linguistic expressions in English was first proposed by Goossens (1990 [2002]). His term *metaphonymy* covered cases wherein metaphoric expression retains some degree of its original metonymic motivation. Consider (38) below:

(38) “Oh, dear,” she giggled, “I’d quite forgotten.”

Sentence (38) is ambiguous, since it may be read as PART FOR WHOLE metonymy where the feature of giggling may have been a part of the speaker’s utterance. Alternatively, the speaker may have uttered the words *as if* she were giggling (i.e., in a light-hearted, perhaps slightly silly manner). This reading seems to be a case of metaphor where the features of non-verbal communication are mapped on the domain of human verbal communication. However, the metonymic reading is still present there, in the form of the kind of speech exemplified in (38); the speaker’s utterance is characterised precisely by the kind of light-heartedness and silliness which characterizes giggling, and some physical qualities of giggling may even be present there. Goossens (1990 [2002]) calls such examples *metaphor from metonymy*, that is, metaphors that emerge from and are motivated by metonymic relations and in which the metonymic reading is still a valid interpretation of the utterance.

Ruiz de Mendoza and collaborators (Ruiz de Mendoza 2000, Ruiz de Mendoza and Díez Velasco 2002, Ruiz de Mendoza and Otal Campo 2002) have elaborated on Goossen’s theory. They consider Goossen’s metaphor from metonymy category to be instances of metaphoric transfers wherein the source domain has undergone metonymic domain expansion. To illustrate the process, consider Ruiz de Mendoza and Díez Velasco’s (2002: 518–520) analysis of *to beat one’s breast*.

The phrase *to beat one’s breast* refers to an open show of sorrow about a certain unfavourable situation. The basis for the scenario is the physical act of beating one’s breasts, which itself is a part of the religious practice of penance. Thus, the act of beating one’s breasts provides the source of metonymic mapping for the whole scenario in which a person beats their breast in order to show sorrow about a certain situation. While Ruiz de Mendoza and Díez Velasco’s (2002) term for this process is domain expansion, in accordance with the discussion above in section 3, this can be analysed as propositional PART FOR WHOLE metonymy, since the physical beating of one’s breast constitutes a salient stage of the whole repentance scenario. The target of the metonymic mapping is subsequently used to metaphorically access the script of an open show of sorrow where the physical act of beating one’s breasts is no longer required. This conspicuous act of regret may in fact be performed as a pretence, in order to manipulate somebody or to achieve certain goals or aims.




Figure 6. *To beat one's breast* (Ruiz de Mendoza and Díez Velasco 2002: 519)

It seems that a similar line of enquiry can be applied to explain dictionary samples (34) – (37). Consider the *Figure 7*, which is a modification of Matusz's (2020: 102-103) discussion of KNOWING IS SEEING metaphor.




Figure 7. KNOWING IS HEARING metaphor

The diagram shown in *Figure 7* is aimed at explaining KNOWING IS HEARING metaphor, as exemplified in sample (34). The convention of naming different elements of the diagram is based on the Learning Scenario presented in *Table 4* above, wherein X is a sentient human being and Y is the medium of information carrying certain knowledge that is important for X in a given context. The source of the metonymic mapping is X hearing Y, a core stage of the Learning Scenario. This stage metonymically stands for the whole scenario in which X acquires the knowledge of Y as a result of their auditory perception. This phenomenon of domain expansion is congruent with propositional PART FOR WHOLE metonymic shift shown in (17) – (19). The target of the metonymic mapping subsequently provides metaphoric access to the scenario of X acquiring knowledge of Y where no auditory input is necessary for the transfer of the knowledge. As demonstrated in (34), the transfer of knowledge may come about as a result of other human modalities, irrespective of the sense of hearing.

Although the process is metaphoric in nature, it emerges as a result of metonymic domain expansion within the source of the metaphoric mapping.

A similar line of enquiry can be proposed for dictionary samples (35) – (37). Consider the following:




Figure 8. EXCHANGING INFORMATION IS HEARING metaphor

Figure 8 represents EXCHANGING INFORMATION IS HEARING metaphor, as exemplified by the metaphoric reading of (35) – (37). The source of the metaphoric mapping is the metonymic domain expansion congruent with propositional PART FOR WHOLE metonymic shift presented in the Contacting Scenario in Table 5. The stage of X's auditory perception of Y metonymically stands for the whole Contacting Scenario in which appropriate information is exchanged between the two parties by means of auditory contact, e.g., in form of telephone conversation, face to face contact or online audio communication. Subsequently, the target of the metonymic mapping provides access for the metaphoric shift wherein X and Y exchange information without the requirement of auditory contact, e.g., in the form of written correspondence, as shown in (35) – (37). It is worth stressing again that while (35) and (36) are ambiguous – that is, they can be interpreted as PART FOR WHOLE metonymy or a metaphor emerging from the metonymic expansion of its source domain – (37) is used virtually exclusively in the context of formal written correspondence, which enforces the metaphoric reading of the utterance.

6. Conclusions

The aim of this paper was to look at polysemy of the English verb *hear* in the light of propositional metonymy processes. For this purpose a small sample database was formed on the basis of Collins COBUILD Advanced Learner's English Dictionary (2005), Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English

(2005), and The New Oxford Dictionary of English (1998). As a starting point of the analysis, the primary meaning of *hear* was identified as the one of involuntary auditory perception. Then, dictionary entries for HEAR were consulted in order to distinguish those senses of the verb where the physical perception of sound is a part of the semantic description of *hear*. There appears to be a significant number of such senses, and in the paper I presented them as PART FOR WHOLE metonymic patterns. For a more detailed discussion of the metonymy, in accordance with Panther and Thornburg (1999), I proposed a number of State-of-Affairs Scenarios where the stage of auditory perception is a cognitively salient part, thus providing the basis for PART FOR WHOLE propositional metonymy. The scenarios are dynamic in nature and possess a degree of flexibility, which means that the elucidation of many specific senses of *hear* may require different scripts with slightly distinct elements and stages. Furthermore, the dictionary analysis revealed certain examples to be ambiguous between their metonymic and metaphoric reading. In their metonymic senses these samples constitute PART FOR WHOLE propositional metonymic patterns. In their metaphoric interpretation, in accordance with Ruiz de Mendoza and Díez Velasco (2000), I considered such cases to be instances of metonymic domain expansion within the source of a metaphoric transfer. The process of domain expansion can plausibly be identified with PART FOR WHOLE propositional metonymy, which points to the validity of research into metonymy-metaphor interaction processes for a fuller explanation of the polysemy of *hear*.

In general, therefore, the analysis shows that a significant portion of the polysemy of *hear* can plausibly be explained by propositional metonymic processes. There are, however, a number of questions that should be addressed for a more comprehensive picture of the role of metonymic processes in the polysemy of auditory perception terms.

Firstly, the database of *hear* constructed from a limited number of dictionary entries is largely artificial and considerably limited. A more representative picture could be attained by attempting more representative corpora studies with much more numerous samples. For a more complex view of the representation of auditory perception in language these studies should also refer not only on to different senses of *hear*, but also to other concepts related to auditory perception, including different verbs (e.g., *listen*, *discern*; *overhear*), expressions and idioms related to relevant body parts (e.g., *ear*; *ears*; *give ear to*; *lend an ear*) and different sound terms (e.g., *roar*; *scream*; *silent*; *loud*; *hum*).

Secondly, an extensive analysis like that would require a considerably more complex theoretical background and analytical tools. On the one hand, different SASs would have to be refined, elaborated on and presented in much more detail. The connection between the Listening Scenario and other scripts would have to be explained as well. Also, due to the flexible nature of the scenarios, the number of specific scripts underlying distinct senses of *hear* would have to be increased

for a more comprehensive representation of different PART FOR WHOLE metonymic patterns.

Thirdly, the present analysis has shown that certain data samples are subject to considerable grammatical and pragmatic restrictions. Such was the case with the negative form of sentences (30) – (32) and the exclusive use of (37) in formal written correspondence. It seems that a plausible way to explain such samples in more detail would be to refer to the approach of Construction Grammar within contemporary cognitive linguistics, as it was introduced by Goldberg (1995).

Fourthly, a worthwhile area of further analysis would be to place the discussion of metonymic patterns of *hear* on the background of conceptual processes operating in the polysemy of other verbs of sensory perception. The validity and productivity of PART FOR WHOLE metonymy and metonymy-metaphor interaction has been found to be relevant for *see* and *hear*. Therefore, it would be appropriate to establish whether other verbs like *smell*, *taste*, *touch* also are subject to similar processes. This could serve a step towards a more comprehensive picture of the role of metonymy in the representation of sensory perception terms and in English. It remains to be seen whether future metonymy studies will take this direction of research.

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