@ARTICLE{Schetz_Adriana_The_2019,
 author={Schetz, Adriana},
 number={No 4},
 journal={Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria},
 pages={331-339},
 howpublished={online},
 year={2019},
 publisher={Komitet Nauk Filozoficznych PAN},
 publisher={Wydział Filozofii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego},
 abstract={For P.F. Strawson self is an embodied agent. The aim of my paper is to discuss those fragments of Strawson’s philosophical work which directly refer to the concept of self. I try to show that Strawson’s view on the nature of self and self-reference is distinct and different from L. Wittgenstein’s nihilism and from the modest nihilism advocated by G.E.M. Anscombe.},
 type={Artykuły / Articles},
 title={The embodied I: P.F. Strawson’s philosophy of self},
 URL={http://journals.pan.pl/Content/114351/PDF/P.Filoz.%204-19%2020-A.Schetz.pdf},
 doi={10.24425/pfns.2019.130929},
 keywords={self, I, subject, self-reference, embodiment, P.F. Strawson, L. Wittgenstein, G.E.M. Anscombe, J.H. McDowell},
}