Nauki Humanistyczne i Społeczne

Central European Journal of Economic Modelling and Econometrics

Zawartość

Central European Journal of Economic Modelling and Econometrics | 2015 | No 3

Abstrakt

When considering tax reporting, taxpayers have an individual attitude towards the risk of being caught evading taxes by the tax authorities. This attitude is interdependent with how this inherent risk is perceived. We propose to analyse this phenomenon through a risk perspective by adding a risk attitude and corresponding perceived probability of being caught evading. In this paper, we study the dynamics of tax evasion under risk perception and attitude, and the consequent propensity of imitators to evade or to comply. Under this proposal, we conduct our experiments through a multi-agent based simulation. Simulation results suggest first that the risk attitude, in conjunction with perceived risk and its consequences are the main reasons to guarantee a low level of tax evasion. Secondly, results also demonstrate a non-linear impact of tax rate, investment interest rate and fines which is especially interesting and non-intuitive.

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Autorzy i Afiliacje

Nuno Trindade Magessi
Luis Antunes

Abstrakt

In case of the private procurement auctions the entrepreneurs are not forced to limit themselves to the standard auction rules, and in practice one can observe many hybrid or quasi-auction mechanisms spontaneously introduced. The paper analyzes two of them, which start as a first-price sealed-bid auction, followed by a run-off in a form of an English auction, and which differ by the transparency of rules concerning the initiation of the second stage. The focus of the paper is on the analysis of the price and allocative efficiency of these mechanisms, in order to determine whether they can serve as an alternative to the standard auction rules. Theoretical analyses are followed by the laboratory experiments, which demonstrate that the mechanisms under study are characterized by both high price and allocative efficiency, and therefore could be considered an interesting substitute of the standard auction rules.

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Autorzy i Afiliacje

Paweł Kuśmierczyk

Abstrakt

We discuss the notion of the financial cycle making a clear indication that the thorough study of its empirical properties in case of developing economies is still missing. We focus on the observed series of credit and equity and make formal statistical inference about the properties of the cycles in case of Polish economy. The non-standard subsampling procedure and discrete spectral characteristics of almost periodically correlated time series are applied to make formal statistical inference about the cycle. We compare the results with those obtained for UK and USA. We extract the cyclical component and confront empirical properties of the financial cycle for small open economy with those established so far in case of developed economies.

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Autorzy i Afiliacje

Łukasz Lenart
Mateusz Pipień

Instrukcja dla autorów


The Central European Journal of Economic Modelling and Econometrics bases on a fully electronic editorial system available at cejeme.com, cejeme.org, cejeme.eu or cejeme.pl. This web-based editorial tracking software enables a paper-free operation of the key editorial functions of the Journal. Papers are submitted for publication electronically via electronic system (see the link "Submit article"). Also the system provides free access to the electronic form of each issue. In the review process the Central European Journal of Economic Modelling and Econometrics obeys the double blind policy. Authors submitting articles to the Central European Journal of Economic Modelling and Econometrics must follow the guidelines available at: http://www.cejeme.com/submissionguidelines.aspx. Any manuscript which does not conform to instructions will be rejected.


Submission Guidelines and Instructions for Authors of accepted papers please visit: http://cejeme.org/submissionguidelines.aspx

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