The aim of this article is to present the author’s opinion about possible underwater natural gas pipeline monitoring using Polish Navy resources. Due to the bathymetrical characteristics of the pipeline equatorials the high efficiency and safe for the deck operators systems are expected to support the bottom survey and gas line monitoring. Time and engaged resources reduction are crucial factors in this kind of mission together with high probability of possible dangerous objects detection. The paper describes main threats for the underwater transportation line as a state energetic independence vital object (supplies diversification). An example of a threat caused by lost unmanned platform technologies near Nord Stream was presented and analyzed as well. The rapid development of unmanned maritime technologies (aerial, surface and subsurface) observed in the last decade creates new possibilities in maritime security/surveillance applications. The Polish mine counter measures assets which were equipped with sophisticated AUV’s as a part of the Polish Navy modernization process (new minehunters Kormoran IInd class deployable). The presented autonomous underwater vehicles (AUV) are equipped with advanced sonars and create new possibilities in the issue of effective threats detection/classification/ identification and neutralization. The main advantages of such solutions were pointed in the article with the crucial one based on time reduction as well as human – deck operators threats constraints. The first successes in the operational use of unmanned systems were reached during the military exercises (historical ordnance disposal) conducted on historical mine laying areas. This creates good possibilities to train the unmanned system operators in live objects activity which improves skills and knowledge. Moreover, the double use applications of unmanned technologies both in defense and maritime security has been observed.
The article presents the author’s considerations on the significance of the investment package diversifying natural gas supplies as part of the Northern Gate in ensuring Poland’s energy security. Data found in literature concerning the possibilities of importing the raw material by sea (terminals, gas pipelines) includes investments at various stages of concept development and construction. However, these documents lack cohesive information about a full investment package being implemented. The author has thus attempted at creating variants concerning the diversification capacities of the Republic of Poland in reference to several key offshore and onshore projects. A problem has therefore been formulated: To what extend will the Northern Gate investment package increase Poland’s energy security as a result of increased supply of natural gas from the sea? To answer this questions, researchers were forced to verify their working hypothesis which assumed that Northern Gate investments including a comprehensive package of projects had the potential of significantly improving the level of energy security in Poland by extending the possibility of importing natural gas. To solve the problem and verify the hypothesis, the researchers applied systemic analysis, deduction and variant analysis, which were used to estimate the possible import capacities of the raw material by sea. As a result of the works, the researchers created four variants including various investment projects assuming the import of 7.75 m3 to 30,95 B m3 of natural gas a year by sea. The variant which was adopted as the most probable indicates the possibility of importing 17.75 through 22.75 B m3 of gas a year, which is 111% of the average annual demand in Poland.