One of the essential problems in the relationship between Catholic-Orthodox churches is the difference in the interpretation of the current forms of the primacy in the Church of the Bishop of Rome. Contemporary studies on the essence and on the method of accom-plishing this service on behalf of the universal Church’s unity assumed new dynamics after the publication of the ecumenical encyclical letter of John Paul II – Ut unum sint. The Pope addressed and requested the pastors and theologians to establish with him a “patient and fraternal dialogue” (see US 95-96), for both parties to strive to achieve “the forms in which this ministry may accomplish a service of love recognized by all concerned” (US 95). The contemporary Orthodox theologians, based on the results of historical studies, are con-vinced that the idea of the Roman primacy has been always presented in the theological awareness of the Christian East. The Eastern Churches do not negate the primacy of the Pope, as the Bishop of Rome, and as the first bishop of the whole Church. Recognizing the primacy of the Holy See as an incontestable historical fact, the Orthodox theologians see the crucial problem in the determination of its nature. They do not accept the primacy in the juridical sense.
On 7 April 1968 the Club of Rome was established. In 1972 D.H. Meadows, D.L. Meadows, J. Randers and W.W. Behrens published The Limits to Growth as the first report to the Club of Rome – describing various scenarios for world development to 2100. Since that time the Club of Rome has developed in the world wide apolitical movement.
This article examines the recent developments in the prosecution of international crimes committed in the Palestinian Territory, focusing mainly on the role of the International Criminal Court. The author analyses the Palestinian accession to the Rome Statute and the declarations issued pursuant to Art. 12(3) in order to verify whether it is possible to bring justice to Palestine through the prosecution of atrocities committed by both parties. The article pays great attention to the most recent events, such as the Prosecutor’s report on the Mavi Marmara incident and the subsequent decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber. Issues related to the Palestinian statehood are taken in account in relation to the interplay between international criminal justice and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The feature that most attracts private parties from different states to referring their dispute to an arbitral tribunal is the flexibility of the procedure. However, the differences between arbitration and court litigation are not only procedural, but they concern the substance of the parties’ cases. This is because in the realm of international arbitration the law applicable to the merits of the case is determined according to other provisions than the statutory conflict of laws rules. Depending on the arbitration law of the seat, the entire private international law statute can be captured in a single provision – “absent the parties’ choice, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the rules of law which it determines to be appropriate”. It follows that arbitral tribunals, unlike state courts, are not bound by the conflict of laws rules of the forum. What’s more, the merits of a dispute submitted to arbitration may be governed not only by some national body of law (e.g. the Polish Civil Code) but also by a non-state, nonnational set of provisions – “rules of law” (e.g. the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts). The aim of this article is to analyze how the parties and tribunals may make use of their autonomy in determining the law applicable to a dispute. Furthermore it examines whether there are any limits thereto in light of the Rome I Regulation.
The main topic of this article is retroactive application of procedural criminal law. In this text the question will be posed – and answered – whether the application of a new procedural provision that entered into force in the course of an ongoing proceeding should in that proceeding be considered as retroactive and in what scope or/and under what conditions can such retroactivity be allowed for. As will be shown the solutions in national jurisdictions differ according to the common law – continental law states divide. This problem will be discussed in the light of a decision in the ICC Ruto and Sang case. In this case the ICC Appeals Chamber had to answer several questions pertaining to the temporal application of new procedural provisions. Firstly, the Chamber had to decide whether a general ban on the retroactive application of substantive law should also apply to procedural criminal law. Secondly, the ICC Appeals Chamber had to analyze the criteria according to which it would evaluate whether the change of rules of criminal procedure in the course of an ongoing trial was to be considered as having a retroactive effect, and whether the change in the rules of admission of evidence could be considered detrimental to the accused. Thirdly, it will be shown that the ICC Appeals Chamber has chosen the common law concept of “due process rights” rather than the idea of “intertemporal rules” known from the continental doctrine, and why it chose to do so.