The thrust of this article is to examine a contemporary international arbitration process in commercial and investment cases, specifically the interplay of common law and civil law elements in the taking of evidence. It begins with a survey of the provisions of the most popular international arbitration instruments, including international arbitration rules and IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration. Following the discussion of some relevant examples of international arbitration instruments, the author tries to answer the question whether these instruments, in their current form, support the popular thesis that the international arbitration process has become largely harmonized. In trying to verify this thesis, the article also goes beyond the text of international arbitration instruments and considers the influence of the cultural biases of international arbitration actors.
In the article the author discusses peculiarities of three areas of psychologists’ professional activity: conducting scientific research, educating new generations of psychologists, and having a private practice. He particularly stresses the significance of empirical testability of theories for correct and ethical assessment practice (according to Evidence-Based Assessment standard) and therapeutic practice (according to Evidence-Based Practice in Psychology standard). The author also explores the cultural immersion of psychological activity.
This article provides an overview of the approach taken by the International Court of Justice and its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, to questions of municipal law. Beginning with an outline of the theoretical framework, it discusses the conventional position that domestic law is a factual issue for the Court, before considering the ways in which the two Courts have utilised municipal law. It also considers to what extent the Court employs domestic law in ascertaining international legal rules.
The main topic of this article is retroactive application of procedural criminal law. In this text the question will be posed – and answered – whether the application of a new procedural provision that entered into force in the course of an ongoing proceeding should in that proceeding be considered as retroactive and in what scope or/and under what conditions can such retroactivity be allowed for. As will be shown the solutions in national jurisdictions differ according to the common law – continental law states divide. This problem will be discussed in the light of a decision in the ICC Ruto and Sang case. In this case the ICC Appeals Chamber had to answer several questions pertaining to the temporal application of new procedural provisions. Firstly, the Chamber had to decide whether a general ban on the retroactive application of substantive law should also apply to procedural criminal law. Secondly, the ICC Appeals Chamber had to analyze the criteria according to which it would evaluate whether the change of rules of criminal procedure in the course of an ongoing trial was to be considered as having a retroactive effect, and whether the change in the rules of admission of evidence could be considered detrimental to the accused. Thirdly, it will be shown that the ICC Appeals Chamber has chosen the common law concept of “due process rights” rather than the idea of “intertemporal rules” known from the continental doctrine, and why it chose to do so.