Contrary to a widespread thesis about the non-cognitive character of religious beliefs, I argue that it is beneficial to highlight and not marginalize the place of religion in the epistemic sphere. At least some religious beliefs (especially theism) can be qualified as true or false. Holding them as true is usually based on the evidence which is not widely accepted. This, however, does not entail that these beliefs are not true. If they are true, then holding them to be true should be seen as rational, despite of the fact, that the supporting evidence does not seem to be strong in the light of current epistemic standards of justification. It does not mean, however, that such beliefs can be hold with the highest assertion if they evoke serious doubts. Changes in religious doctrines and religious pluralism do not constitute a sufficient reason for excluding religion from the epistemic sphere, as a similar situation concerns many academic disciplines, such as philosophy, or psychology.
The article aims to analyse the context in which the phrase “historical truth” is present in the Polish public discourse regarding recent history. The author intends to show the ways and aims of the usage of historical truth in the competition to obtain and maintain power. Referring to the assumptions of the Web 2.0. paradigm, in the conclusion the author puts forward the thesis that the historical truths present in the public sphere do not only attempt to answer social expectations of what historical truth Poles need but they are also co-created by potential recipients.
The judgments delivered by the European Court of Human Rights in Al-Nashiri v. Poland and Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland highlight the potential tension that may arise between states’ broad reliance on national security grounds to withhold disclosure of secret files and compliance with their obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights. The present article examines the above-mentioned judgments, focusing, in particular, on how (and to what extent) the withholding of secret information may infringe on the right to the truth and, as far as proceedings before the European Court of Human Rights are concerned, the state’s duty to cooperate with it.
The main goal of this article is to characterise and compare some aspects of Hilary Putnam’s referential theory of meaning and Robert B. Brandom’s inferential theory of meaning. I will do it to indicate some similarities and differences in these theories. It will provide an opportunity for a deeper understanding of these theories and for a more adequate evaluation of how they describe and explain the process of meaning acquisition of linguistic expressions. In his theory of meaning Putnam emphasises the importance of reference understood as a relationship which connects linguistic expressions and extra-linguistic (empirical) reality. Brandom acknowledges inference as a main category useful in characterising the meaning of expressions used in premises and a conclusion of inference. But his theory of meaning is criticised for minimalising the role of an empirical component (demonstratives etc.). He tries to defend his standpoint in the anaphoric theory of reference. Putnam like Brandom claimed that we – as cognitive subjects – are not in a situation in which we learn about the extra-linguistic reality in a direct way. It is the reality itself as well as our cognitive apparatus that play a role in a cognitive process.
Axiological chaos and unsustainable man’s acting in a contemporary world has led him to a total confusion. He constantly acts toward environmental and cultural degradation. Also in social dimension a permanent and “general” crisis dominates. The crisis is rooted on multi-category stratification and based on post-truth models of interpersonal communication in traditional and virtual realities. Neoliberal model of economical conquest, in turn, effects unsustainability in economic sphere. Thus, in common reception – for the most people in the world – such situation has become unbearable. So, it is the educators’ duty to look for – with the intention to put into practise – such concepts and pedagogies, which could prepare the whole global society to real – not declaratory false – co-creation of its life in the world, understood as an actual and common home. Taking such perspective, the theory of Argentinian philosopher – Ernesto Laclau becomes an interesting proposition. The time of mono-dimensional – protestant and neoliberal – interpretation of values comes to the end. Now the time has come to accept the equality of different – having their roots in various cultures – value understanding. Possibility of local and particular interpretation of values – along with maintaining the rule of common good – gives the chance to update the education according to real, thus multidimensional humanistic ideal. Such a standpoint presents a way to cure/reform intercultural education, which nowadays is at an impasse. Mainly it uses stiff schemes and repeated patterns, so it has become imitative and conservative. In its contemporary formula intercultural education is not able to respond to present challenges of multicultural and global society. The need to implant into its structure the concept of sustainable development emerges as a must.