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The Understanding of Conceptual Constructions in Medieval Jainism. Prabhācandra's Perspective*

Abstract

This paper concerns the philosophical reflections of Prabhācandra (11th c. CE), contained in the *Prameya-kamala-mārtanḍa*, a commentary on Māṇikyanandin's *Parīkṣāmukha*, and to a lesser extent in the *Nyāya-kumuda-candra*, a commentary on Akalaṅka's *Laghīyastaya*, on that which is expressed by the term “*kalpanā*” or “*vikalpa*”. This problem appears as part of a discussion with Buddhists and representatives of the Advaita Vedānta on construction-filled (*savikalpaka*) versus construction-free (*nirvikalpaka*) cognition. Prabhācandra's criticism is mainly directed at the issue of construction-free cognition. The paper also contains insights into Western attitudes towards this problem in the field of philosophy and other disciplines, such as cognitive linguistics and psychology, and in the field of artificial intelligence, as well as the general philosophical overview of the problem. The paper asks if – and posits answers to – the question of whether the problem of concepts or conceptual constructions is connected – and to what degree – with the problem of meaning? References are made to other Jaina thinkers who have considered this issue, such as: Akalaṅka, Haribhadrasūri, Sidharṣigaṇin, Samantabhadra and Amṛtacandrasūri.

Keywords: meaning, Jainism, Prabhācandra, construction-filled cognition, construction-free cognition

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1. Introduction

This paper concerns the philosophical reflections of Prabhācandra (11th c. CE)¹, the Digambara thinker, contained in the *Prameya-kamala-mārtanḍa* (PKM), an extensive and intricate commentary on Māṇikyanandin's *Parīkṣāmukha* (9th c. CE), in PKM 1.5, 69.4–70.6, and to a lesser extent in the *Nyāya-kumuda-candra* (NKC) commentary on Akalaṅka's *Laghīyas-traya* (8th c. CE), on the meanings of the term “*kalpanā*” – or “*vikalpa*”.² These terms are usually translated by scholars of Jaina and Buddhist philosophy as “concept”, “conception”, “conceptual construction” or “mental construction”. Renditions such as: “conceptualized notion”,³ “imaginative construction”,⁴ and “generalized image”⁵ also appear. The choice of the right word in the language into which the relevant terms are translated and simultaneously its disambiguation are significant, not only because they affect the comprehension of an issue in a given, original, context, but also because such an interpreter inevitably enters into a new discourse of terms and concepts in the language into which they are translated. The discussion around the meaning of “idea”, “concept” and “notion” can serve as an example.⁶

The term “construction” itself indicates a certain mental superstructure or ideation as opposed to experiencing raw sensory data. Bimal Krishna Matilal stresses the following:

With the possible exception of what we may call our ‘bare acquaintance’ of the ‘given’, our cognitive acts always involve some kind of ‘construction’ or ‘manipulation’. This manipulation or construction may have an objective basis, an objective referent to which it is directed, but it certainly eludes a one-to-one correspondence with any object in the real or objective world.⁷

¹ All dates in this article are according to: Dalsukh Malvania and Jayandra Soni (eds.), *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, Vol. 10: *Jain Philosophy* (Part 1), New Delhi 2008, and Piotr Balcerowicz and Karl H. Potter (eds.), *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, Vol. 14: *Jain Philosophy* (Part 2), New Delhi 2013.

² The translations of the PĀ, PKM and NKC are mine. In the case of other texts, I clearly indicate when the translation is by someone else. I would like to thank Dr Jo Harper for proofreading my article.

³ Marco Ferrante, ‘Studies on Bhartṛhari and the Pratyabhijñā: The Case of *svasamvedana*’, *Religions* 8/145 (2017), p. 9. Ref. to *vikalpa*.

⁴ Bimal Krishna Matilal, ‘Buddhist Logic and Epistemology’, in: *Buddhist Logic and Epistemology. Studies in the Buddhist Analysis of Difference and Language*, eds. Bimal Krishna Matilal and Robert D. Evans, Boston, Lancaster, Tokyo 1986, p. 17; Sławomir Sikora, ‘Logika Dignāgi – problemy interpretacji. Dignāga’s Logic – problems of interpretation’, *Investigationes Linguisticae* XXV (2012), p. 141.

⁵ S.R. Bhatt and Anu Mehrotra, *Buddhist Epistemology*, London 2000, pp. 23, 28. Bhatt and Mehrotra realise: ‘A generalized image is a mental construction (*kalpanā*) having no objective existence.’ (Ibidem, p. 23).

⁶ See Wayne A. Davis, *Meaning, Expression and Thought*, Cambridge 2002; Dinara Khairullina, ‘Concept vs Notion and Lexical Meaning: What is the Difference?’, *Journal of History Culture and Art Research* 7/5 (2018), pp. 303–313; Tatiana Tyurneva et al., ‘Dialectics of Mental Entities: Notion vs Term’, *SHS Web of Conferences* 50, 01191 (2018), pp. 1–5; S.N. Kocherov, ‘What is the Difference Between Philosophical Ideas and Concepts?’, *Vestnik of Minin University* 9/4 (2021). Cf. Nagib Callaos, *The Notion of Notion*, Viewed 23 December 2024, <https://www.iis.org/Nagib-Callaos/The-Notion-of-Notion/The%20Notion%20of%20Notion.pdf>.

⁷ Bimal Krishna Matilal, *Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis*, ed. Jonardon Ganeri, New Delhi 2005, p. 2.

The above statement clearly shows that conceptual constructions are both an expression of certain human abilities and the reflection of the fundamental limitations of the human mind. Matilal adds language and verbal activity to his considerations – to the two elements he distinguished: “data” (i.e. “given”) and “construction” – acknowledging that it is an inevitable factor in communicating knowledge about one own’s inner states and constructs, hence this mental superstructure is limited by the specificity of the individual mind and is concurrently expanded at the level of reconciling various separate individual constructs.⁸

2. Western Opinions on the Problem of Conceptual Cognition

Western philosophy and other disciplines, such as cognitive linguistics and psychology, or the field of artificial intelligence⁹, clearly show how complex the problem of concepts is, how difficult it is to have an agreed definition and how often each field has its own, unique understanding.¹⁰ Cognitive difficulties in this case include: understanding of the term in the context of the philosophy of the user of the term, as well as an understanding of this term for a similar phenomenon on a different ground, understood in a different context. Eric Margolis and Stephen Laurence note that “disputes about concepts often reflect deeply opposing approaches to the study of the mind, to language, and even to philosophy itself.”¹¹ Jesse J. Prinz points out the richness of human conceptuality and sees a unidirectional view of one aspect of it as the reason for the radically different positions taken by researchers and for the substantial incommensurability of positions.¹² This plurality of positions and approaches, which use incompatible vocabularies, makes an important

⁸ Ibidem, p. 3.

⁹ See Michael Freund, ‘On the notion of concept I’, *Artificial Intelligence* 172 (2008), pp. 570–590.

¹⁰ In his review of Edouard Machery’s book *Doing Without Concepts*, Xiang Chen realizes: “For psychologists, a concept is a body of knowledge stored in long-term memory and used in the process underlying a higher cognitive competence. For philosophers, however, the same notion refers to capacities for having propositional attitudes. Putting these two chapters together, we should see that psychologists and philosophers are talking about different things while using the same term.” (Xiang Chen, ‘Edouard Machery: Doing Without Concepts’, *Science & Education* 22/5 (2013), p. 1253; E. Machery, *Doing Without Concepts*, New York 2009). Therefore, it is necessary to explore this issue within the framework of a single discipline, in this case philosophy, which itself touches upon many levels of understanding, otherwise, one would have to refer to the level of meta-theory, which would take us away from exploring issues in one area in greater depth. I outline this general context in order to show the complexity of the problem, the impossibility of making unambiguous generalizations and the need to focus on the most appropriate tools. In this paper, I carry out the descriptive analysis of the selected passages of the Sanskrit philosophical treatises.

¹¹ Eric Margolis and Stephen Laurence, ‘Concepts’, in: *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, eds. Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman, Viewed 06 December 2024, <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2023/entries/concepts/>.

¹² Jesse J. Prinz, *Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis*, Cambridge 2004, p. 3. Prinz characterizes this diversity in the following way: “We have concepts of readily observable states within ourselves, like PAIN; theoretically derived concepts, such as ELECTRON; and seemingly formal concepts, such as NUMBER. We have concepts of natural kinds, such as FROG; artifacts, such as BOAT; and social kinds, such as MOTHER or DEMOCRACY. This diversity cannot be neglected. Some theories are particularly adept at handling one kind of concept and embarrassingly poor at dealing with others.” (Ibidem, p. 3).

point clear: that consideration should be taken to a basic level and start by reflecting on fundamentals, such as the very nature of thought and human mental processes. This was done, for example, by José Bermúdez¹³, who addressed, among other things: the question of “the language of thought” and “the epistemology of thought without language”,¹⁴ “rationality without language”¹⁵ or limitations of nonlinguistic thinking¹⁶. Such reflections should also address the relationship between the perception of the world and its representation in the human mind, the role of memory (and individual idiosyncrasies) in the storage of such representations and the creation of new ones, and subsequently the distinction (as well as the assumed causal dependence) between imagination and mental imagery, which is a direct response to a sensory stimuli¹⁷, together with a reflection on the relationship of each of these with language¹⁸. (Do the meanings of words refer to reality or its representation in the mind?; How is the meaning of a word displayed in the mind and how is it superimposed on the image of the real object experienced? etc.). The latter issue is part of the broader problem of so-called “inner speech,”¹⁹ which requires multidirectional study. Reflecting on the nature of thought, in turn, takes us to a consideration of metacognition, including “a sense of agency for thought”²⁰, as well as of epistemic feelings.²¹

The state of research indicates that the relationship between concepts and meaning is equivocal and evasive. Janina Buczkowska expresses this ambiguity in the following way:

The question of meaning in relation to linguistic expressions, as well as concepts or signs in general, is one of the more frequently addressed questions in both semiotics and the philosophy of language, as well as in

¹³ José Bermúdez, *Thinking Without Words*, Oxford 2003, pp. 13–30. Prinz also emphasises the aspect of thinking, as concepts are “thought constituents” and the need for “a theory of thoughts” (Prinz, *Furnishing the Mind*, p. 2).

¹⁴ Ibidem, pp. 22–30.

¹⁵ Ibidem, pp. 109–132.

¹⁶ Ibidem, pp. 165–188.

¹⁷ Term “mental imagery”, the definition of its character and indication of the importance of this problem after Bence Nanay, ‘Mental Imagery’, in: *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Viewed 06 December 2024, <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2021/entries/mental-imagery/>. Nanay shows how imagination differs from mental imagery: “Imagination is (typically) a voluntary act. Mental imagery is not.” Cf. Bence Nanay, *Mental Imagery: Philosophy, Psychology, Neuroscience*, Oxford 2023, <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198809500.001.0001>.

¹⁸ See Bence Nanay, *Mental Imagery*.

¹⁹ As Daniel Gregory and Peter Langland-Hassan explain, the phenomenon of inner speech is important, because the attempt to understand it engages reflection on “language, consciousness, thought, imagery, communication, imagination, and self-knowledge [...]” (Daniel Gregory and Peter Langland-Hassan, ‘Inner Speech’, in: *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, eds. Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman, Viewed 23 December 2024, <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2024/entries/inner-speech/>).

²⁰ Joëlle Proust, *The Philosophy of Metacognition: Mental Agency and Self-Awareness*, Oxford 2013; online, Oxford Academic, 23 Jan. 2014, <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199602162.001.0001>, pp. 207–226.

²¹ See Santiago Arango-Muñoz and Kourken Michaelian, ‘Epistemic Feelings and Epistemic Emotions’ (Focus Section), *Philosophical Inquiries* 2/1 (2014), pp. 97–122; E. Vogl, R. Pekrun and K. Loderer, ‘Epistemic emotions and metacognitive feelings’, in: *Trends and prospects in metacognition research across the life span: A tribute to Anastasia Efklides*, eds. D. Moraitou and P. Metallidou, Cham 2021.

the interdisciplinary sciences of cognition. At the same time, the concept of meaning is one of the most ambiguous philosophical concepts. We speak of meaning in universal (social) and individual, general and contextual terms, of concepts as meanings of words and meanings of concepts as their cognitive content. The word ‘content’ is similarly ambiguous; and so we have cognitive content, linguistic content, the content of concepts and the content of linguistic expressions, content as extension and as intension, etc.²²

Many researchers have recognized the close relationship between concepts and meaning. Tyler Burge, attempting to characterize the “traditional” approach, which originated with Aristotle, thoroughly considers this link.²³ Gisela Harras concludes that there are two main currents in modern semantics: the first, which she calls “the post Saussurean view”, according to which: “Linguistic expressions encode concepts as their semantic content cut out of the conceptual pool which is universal, i.e. independent of any existing language”; and the second, according to which “linguistic forms are immediately related to concepts without any intermediate level of semantic content.”²⁴ Lawrence Barsalou et al., in opposition to those who “believe that concepts and meanings are at least roughly equivalent, with the meaning of an expression being its conceptual representation in human knowledge,”²⁵ postulate the following solutions:

perceptual symbols represent concepts; concepts are models for types of individuals in world models; concepts are contextualized and local in scope to situations; word meanings use concepts but are not concepts.²⁶

²² Janina Buczkowska, ‘Znaczenie językowe a wiedza o świecie: analiza pojęcia znaczenia w kontekście poznawczych funkcji języka [Linguistic meaning vs. knowledge of the word: Analysis of the concept of meaning in the context of the cognitive functions of language]’, *Studia Philosophiae Christianae* 44/2 (2008), p. 5. My own translation from Polish to English. Original quotation is as follows: „Pytanie o znaczenie w odniesieniu do wyrażen językowych, a także pojęć czy znaków w ogóle, jest jednym z częściej podejmowanych pytań zarówno w semiotyce i filozofii języka, jak i w interdyscyplinarnie pojmowanych naukach o poznaniu. Jednocześnie pojęcie znaczenia należy do najbardziej wieloznacznych pojęć filozoficznych. Mówimy o znaczeniu w sensie uniwersalnym (społecznym) i indywidualnym, ogólnym i kontekstowym, o pojęciach jako znaczeniach słów i znaczeniach pojęć jako ich treści poznawczej. Podobnie wieloznaczne jest słowo treść; i tak mamy treść poznawczą, treść językową, treść pojęć i treść wyrażen językowych, treść jako ekstensję i jako intensję itd.”

²³ Tyler Burge, ‘Concepts, Definitions, and Meaning’, *Metaphilosophy* 24/4 (1993), pp. 309–325.

²⁴ Gisela Harras attributes to the first group such researchers as: Manfred Bierwisch, Ewald Lang, Dieter Wunderlich, Monika Schwarz; and to the second group: Ray Jackendoff, George Lakoff, Gilles Fauconnier, Ronald Langacker (Gisela Harras, ‘Concepts in Linguistics – Concepts in Natural Language’, in: *Conceptual Structures: Logical, Linguistic, and Computational Issues*, eds. Ganter Bernhard and Guy W. Mineaz, Berlin, Heidelberg, p. 14, https://doi.org/10.1007/10722280_2).

²⁵ Lawrence W. Barsalou et al., *Concepts and Meaning*, p. 1, Viewed 03 January 2025, https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Lawrence-Barsalou/publication/2547035_Concepts_and_Meaning/links/00b495167f5887f4c7000000/Concepts-and-Meaning.pdf.

²⁶ Ibidem, p. 1.

Keith Devlin has taken a different point of departure, propounding the view that conceptual structure is “a feature that arose naturally during the course of human evolution, and indeed, played a pivotal role in the acquisition of language.”²⁷ There are thinkers who recognize “nonconceptual mental content”²⁸, which recognition raises multifaceted doubts in philosophers’ and scholars’ minds, as well as the urge to resolve this question, evoking associations that should not be overlooked, and encourages one to study this problem anew, based on new developments and discoveries in the field of mind research. These studies clearly show how complex the issue is and how unobvious conclusions can be drawn.

3. Prabhācandra’s View on the Problem of the Construction-free Cognition and Its Intellectual Background

The Prabhācandra provides an interesting example – dating from centuries past – of reflection on the subject of conceptual constructions and construction-free cognition.²⁹ The intellectual background against which his idea flourished is quite variegated. There are concise references to concepts or conceptual constructions – considered for example as grouped and categorized into larger wholes, internally structured, and those differentiated into dyads – that appear occasionally in the works of Jaina authors prior to Prabhācandra, such as Samantabhadra (7th c. CE) and Amṛtacandrasūri (10th c. CE). In the *Āpta-mīmāṃsā*, Samantabhadra posits that mutually exclusive concepts can provide an area of reflection and analysis for someone who understands the theory of viewpoints (*naya-vāda*) (ĀM 1.23).³⁰ In the *Laghu-tattva-sphoṭa* (LTS) 10.7 [232] (p. 83), Amṛtacandrasūri refers to the nature of the Jina, providing an interesting example of a description of the non-conceptual state, in which all constructions – even the most fundamental ones from the field of ontology or meontology – are eradicated, and therefore the state in which conceptual constructions disappear in boundless consciousness, the idea thus resembling the philosophy of the Advaita Vedānta. For Amṛtacandrasūri states:

²⁷ Keith Devlin, ‘The Role of Conceptual Structure in Human Evolution’, in: *Conceptual Structures: Logical, Linguistic, and Computational Issues*, eds. Ganter Bernhard and Guy W. Mineaz, Berlin, Heidelberg, p. 1, https://doi.org/10.1007/10722280_1.

²⁸ See José Bermúdez and Arnon Cahen, ‘Nonconceptual Mental Content’, in: *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, eds. Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman, Viewed 23 December 2024, <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2024/entries/content-nonconceptual/>.

²⁹ An interesting systematization of Indian thought on the subject of perception and conceptions is provided by Monima Chadha in ‘Perceptual Experience and Concepts in Classical Indian Philosophy’, in: *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2024 Edition), eds. Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman, Viewed 23 December 2024, <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2024/entries/perception-india/>.

³⁰ ĀM 1.23, p. 28: *ekāneka-vikalpādāv uttaratrāpi yojayet | prakriyām bhaṅginīm enām nayair naya-viśāradaḥ ||* “One proficient in [the theory of] viewpoints should apply this method of modal description through [the exposition of] viewpoints also in what follows with regard to the concepts of one and many, etc.” Shah’s translation: “While following our subsequent treatment of the contrasted characters – e.g. the characters ‘one’ and ‘many’ – one well-versed in the doctrine of *naya* (i.e. the Jaina doctrine of conditional assertion) should himself apply the technique of multi-formed assertion by offering suitable arguments”.

Making even our whole web of concepts (*vikalpa-jāla*), such as ‘non-being’ (*abhāva*), ‘being’ (*bhāva*), etc., disappear, this expanded (*sphuṭa*) nature of yours solely appears ($\sqrt{\text{nullas}}$), floating on the nectar (*sudhā*) of consciousness (*bodha*) spreading all over ($\text{sam}+\text{ud}+\sqrt{\text{śal}}$).³¹

The issue of conceptual constructions and construction-free cognition, to which Prabhācandra devotes a relatively large amount of space, is tackled by him in the context of a polemic with the Yogācāra³² Buddhists, especially Dīnnāga (5/6th c. CE) and Dharmakīrti (7th c. CE), on “construction-filled” (*savikalpaka*) and “construction-free” (*nirvikalpaka*)³³ perception,³⁴ as well as in the context of a discussion with the Vedānta (he refers to Advaita Vedānta, Bhedābheda Vedānta). The former approach was already adopted by Akalaṅka in *Nyāya-viniścaya* 1.5³⁵ and *Siddhi-viniścaya* 1³⁶ or Haribhadrāsūri in *Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya* 10³⁷ or Siddhārṣiṅgaṇin in the *Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti* 4³⁸ commentary on Siddhasena Mahāmāti’s *Nyāyāvatāra*; the latter – for example by Vidyānanda (9th c. CE), whose works contain numerous references to conceptuality and non-conceptuality³⁹.

In an attempt to determine the essence of the first polemic, it is necessary to quote Dīnnāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s definition of perception. Dīnnāga’s definition is as follows:

³¹ LTS 10.7 [232], p. 83:

*abhāva-bhāvādi-vikalpa-jālaṃ | samastam apy astamayam nayan naḥ |
samucchalaḍ-bodha-sudhā-plavo ’yaṃ | svabhāva evōllasati sphuṭas te ||*

Jaini’s translation: “You lay to rest the entire net of distinctions (that we normally make) between existence, non-existence, etc., (by giving us a glimpse of infinite consciousness). Your manifest own-being itself shines forth, immersed within the nectar of knowledge that rises on all sides.”

³² Szanyi Szilvia, “Yogācāra”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, eds. Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman, Viewed 25 August 2025, <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2024/entries/yogacara/>.

³³ Mark Siderits uses the term: “indeterminate perception” and explains that it is “a kind of bare sensory awareness” in Mark Siderits, *Indian Philosophy of Language: Studies in Selected Issues*, Vol. 46, Dordrecht 2012, p. 124.

³⁴ PKM 27.15–36.12, 69.4–70.6; NKC 39.13–20, 45.23–52.25, 167.3–19, 206.3–207.6, 285.17–23, 393.26–27, 395.3–15; 414.9–17, 417.1–14, 426.16–428.2, 470.11–471.7, 477.4–478.9, 525.2–529.22, 543.9–15, 559.10–560.15, 565.14–566.5, 595.14–596.11, 678.1–13, 679.16–681.17, 682.2–685.20, 770.5–771.11, 791.11–792.6.

³⁵ NV 1.5–7, p. 30:

*sad-asaj-jñāna-saṃvāda-visaṃvāda-vivekataḥ | savikalpāvinābhāvī samakṣēṭara-sampluvaḥ ||
ekatra-nirṇaye ’nanta-kārya-kāraṇate kṣaṇe | atad-dhetu-phalāpohe kutas tatra viparyayaḥ?||
abhilāpa-tad-aṃśānām abhilāpa-vivekataḥ | apramāṇa-prameyavatvam avāśyam anuśajyate ||*

³⁶ See SVṭ pp. 1–119 (*pratyakṣa-siddhi*) and pp. 120–173 (*savikalpa-siddhi*).

³⁷ ŚDS 10, p. 19:

*pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntaṃ tatra budhyatām |
tri-rūpāl liṅgato liṅgi-jñānaṃ tv anumāna-saṃjñitam ||*

³⁸ NAV pp. 358–366. The whole commentary to the *Nyāyāvatāra* 4 (p. 358):

*aparokṣatayārthasya grāhakaṃ jñānaṃ īdṛśam |
pratyakṣam, itaraj jñeyam parokṣam grahaṇēkṣayā ||*

³⁹ AS 74.12, 75.10, 121.26, 122.1, 123.15–17, 124.1, 17, 129.23, 141.11f, 147.20, 168.20, 169.2, 7, 170.5, 246.8f; ŚSP 3.26–4.9, 20.3–10, 22.1–5, 28.16–22; TAŚVA 185.26, 186.14, 17–18, 187.10–12, 221.32, 222.5–6, 429.26; YAṭ 2.7, 5.6, 8f, 10, 6.7, 6.13–14, 65.22. Searched (terms and bibliographic description) via ‘Digital Corpus of Vidyānandin’s Works’, Viewed 09 October 2025, <https://dipal.org/cgi-bin/dipal.cgi?nav=1001>.

pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham (“Perception is free from conceptual construction”) alongside the addendum that the concept is “the association of name (*nāman*), genus (*jāti*), etc. [with a thing perceived, which results in a verbal designation of the thing].”⁴⁰ Matilal displays what Dinnāga meant by this link between the name and the thing in the process of conceptualisation or construction:

Construction [...] is nothing but our associating any name, viz., a proper name or a class name or a quality-name or an action-name or a substance-name, with the datum. In other words, it is an imposition of our constructed forms upon the ‘given’.⁴¹

On the other hand, Dharmakīrti’s definition of perception reads as follows: [...] *pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham abhīrāntam*⁴² (NB 1.4, p. 7).⁴³ “Perception is that in which concepts have been abolished [and which is] free from error.” Further, he defines “*kalpanā*” as “the clear apprehension (*prāpti*) of the representation (*pratibhāsa*) capable of being associated with expression (*abhilāpa-saṃsarga*)” (NB 1.5)⁴⁴. A comparison of the two positions reveals that both Buddhist philosophers imply that conceptual constructions are not mere mental images or figments of imagination, inexpressible in any way, but they are associated with naming and more complex linguistic processes (C k. 3d.⁴⁵, NB 1.5).

⁴⁰ Transl. (and supplement in square brackets) after Masaaki Hattori (transl., ann.), *Dignāga, on Perception, being the Pratyakṣapariccheda of Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya from the Sanskrit fragments and the Tibetan versions*, ed. D.H.H. Ingalls, Vol 47, Cambridge 1968, p. 25 (C. k. 3c.; k. 3d.). Other associative properties are: *dravya*, *guṇa*, *karman*. See Masaaki Hattori, *Dignāga, on Perception*, p. 25; S.R. Bhatt and Anu Mehrotra, *Buddhist Epistemology*, pp. 23, 28. Amar Singh explains the difference in the understanding of terms “*kalpanā*” or “*vikalpa*” in the teachings of different Buddhist schools: “The first term, or concept, ‘*kalpanā*’, as defined by Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti, is also in conformity with the Sautrāntikas. *Kalpanā* or *vikalpa* is used in the sense of conceptual formation, or imagination in the Sautrāntika Abhidharma tradition. In Vijñāna-vāda, ‘*kalpanā*’, is used in a specific sense of *grāhya-grāhaka kalpanā* (object-subject imagination), which is different from the sense of Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti” (Amar Singh, *The Heart of Buddhist Philosophy: Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti*, New Delhi 1984, pp. 105–106).

⁴¹ Bimal Krishna Matilal, *Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar*, p. 12. As Matilal realises, Dinnāga agrees with Bhartṛhari’s position that “conceptualization and verbalization, construction and language, are just two aspects of the same process.” Ibidem, p. 12.

⁴² Element not present in Dinnāga’s definition. See Masaaki Hattori, *Dignāga, on Perception*, pp. 25, 82–83 (Notes to page 25). Cf. S.R. Bhatt and Anu Mehrotra, *Buddhist Epistemology*, pp. 27–28, 33–36.

⁴³ Ref. to the *Nyāya-bindu*, On perception in the thought of Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti see Coseru Christian, ‘Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on Perception and Self-Awareness’, in: *The Buddhist World*, ed. John Powers, Abingdon, Oxon, New York 2016, pp. 526–537.

⁴⁴ NB 1.5 (p. 8): *abhilāpa-saṃsarga-yogya-pratibhāsa-pratītiḥ kalpanā*. See Harold G. Coward and K. Kunjunn Raja: “Words produce conceptual constructions, and conceptual constructions produce words.” In: Coward Harold G. and Raja K. Kunjunn, ‘Historical Résumé’, in: *The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, Vol. 5: *The Philosophy of the Grammarians*, eds. Coward Harold G. and K. Kunjunn Raja, Princeton 1990, p. 27, Viewed 14 August 2025, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv3hh4bs>. Johannes Bronkhorst realizes that Bhartṛhari, 5th-century grammarian and philosopher of language, adopted in the *Vākya-paṭīya* similar distinction to the Buddhists. In Johannes Bronkhorst, ‘Bhartṛhari in his time and in ours’, *The Journal of Oriental Research Madras*, Vols. LXXXVIII–XC (2017), p. 53.

⁴⁵ Masaaki Hattori, *Dignāga, on Perception*, p. 25.

What is more, there is a certain dialectic or negation inherent in these processes. Matilal put it this way that *vikalpa* or *kalpanā* is:

a means for identifying and distinguishing the percept or the ‘representation’ of the object in perception. This distinguishing activity is performed with the help of words (or concepts, if one wishes). Conception, for the Buddhist, is a negative act. It is the exclusion or rejection of the imagined or supposed possibilities.⁴⁶

Therefore, it is not possible to formulate any description of the world without the presence of concepts or conceptual constructions accompanying convoluted and heterogeneous thought processes directed at acknowledging phenomena (“percepts”, “given”, “data”).

In NV 1.147–150, Akalaṅka⁴⁷ unequivocally rejects Dinnāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s definition of perception:

Is the real thing (*vastu*) not conceived (*kalpyate*) as conventional (*sāṃvṛta*) as in the case of a situation (*sanniveśa*), etc., when all actions (*samagra-karaṇa*), etc., are seen (*darśana*) otherwise (*anyathā*)? Because all cognitive subjects (*ātman*) are without divisions (*niraṃśa*), the grasping [of the real thing] (*grahaṇa*) would be complete. One [who is] not disoriented (*vibhrānta*) while being on a vessel trip (*nauyāna*), etc.⁴⁸, does not observe (*paśyati*) from the outside (*bāhyatas*). And it is not that this form (*ākāra*) does not exist due to the connection (*anuśaṅga*) with the form of cognition (*jñānākāra*). Therefore, not all properties of the entity that is seen are seen (*drṣṭa*). [The statement]: ‘Perception is that in which concepts have been abolished’ has been rejected (*nirākṛta*). Let that which really is (*sat*), whose nature is manifold (*anekātmaka*), be proved by perception (*adhyakṣa*) and the inferential sign (*liṅga*).⁴⁹

⁴⁶ Bimal Krishna Matilal, ‘Buddhist Logic and Epistemology’, pp. 17–18. Similarly, Bhatt and Mehrotra underline that for Dinnāga the concept of a thing, unlike *svalakṣaṇa*, is definable, because “conception” should be understood as “a negative correlate of its counterpart.” (S.R. Bhatt and Anu Mehrotra, *Buddhist Epistemology*, p. 25). The term *svalakṣaṇa* is conceptualized as “direct sensory data” (Sławomir Sikora, ‘Logika Dignāgi’, p. 141: „bezpośrednie dane”) or “unique particular” (Coward Harold G. and Raja K. Kunjunni, ‘Historical Résumé’, p. 27; Mark Siderits, *Indian Philosophy of Language*, p. 124).

⁴⁷ Akalaṅka’s critique of Dharmakīrti’s thought was reported in detail by Nagin J. Shah, *Akalaṅka’s criticism of Dharmakīrti’s Philosophy. A Study*, Ahmedabad 1967, pp. 218–234.

⁴⁸ Ref. NB 1.6 (p. 10): *tayā rahitaṃ timirāśubhramaṇa-nauyāna-saṃkṣobhādy-anāhita-vibhramaṃ jñānaṃ pratyakṣam*. “Perception is cognition which is not an illusion effected by partial blindness, excessive vacillation [of an object], being on a vessel trip, mental agitation, etc., deprived of this [conceptual construction].”

⁴⁹ NV 1.147–150 (p. 49): *sanniveśādivad vastu sāṃvṛtaṃ kin na kalpyate? | samagra-karaṇādīnām anyathā darśane sati || sarvātmanāṃ niraṃśatvāt sarvathā grahaṇaṃ bhavet | nauyānādiṣu vibhrānto na na paśyati bāhyataḥ || na ca nāsti sa ākāraḥ jñānākāre ’nuśaṅgataḥ | tasmād drṣṭasya bhāvasya na drṣṭaḥ sakalo guṇaḥ || pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpōdhaṃ pratyakṣādi-nirākṛtaṃ | adhyakṣa-liṅgataḥ siddham anekātmakam astu sat ||*

Siddharṣiṅgaṇin (10th c. CE), philosopher later than Akalaṅka, explains the position of the Buddhists with regard to the causes of non-conceptual perception, from which there is a complete impossibility of any association with language (*śabda-saṁśleṣa*) in a consciousness (*vijñāna*) that grasps the object, hence providing a unique insight – from the Jaina perspective – into the complexity of the Buddhist argumentation:

[...] this [perception] arises due to the efficacy of an object, because it grasps an object [that is] proximate [and that is] capable of efficient action. And no linguistic units are [to be found] in an object, because [linguistic units] are produced by other causes different from causes of this [object]; and therefore this [object,] having occurred close [to the perceiver] produces – while generating a sensation the domain of which is this [very object itself] – the likeness of its own form [within the cogniser].⁵⁰

Siddharṣiṅgaṇin realises that for the Buddhists (Yogācāra-Sautrāntika)⁵¹ two conditions must be met for there to be perception: (1) an object has to be “proximate” (*sannihita*) to the perceiving subject in order to evoke in him or her “a sensation” (*saṁvedana*) associated with “itself” (*sva*) and (2) it has to be “capable of efficient action” (*artha-kriyā-samartha*) manifested in causing the perceiving subject to imitate or represent (*√anukṛ*) internally, at a mental level, its “own form” (*svākāra*). This takes place without the mediation of language. No sound or word (*dhvani*) can be “in an object” (*arthe*), and the causes (*hetu*) of sounds or words, as well as the causes of the object, vary in character (*vilakṣaṇa*). Therefore, it is the stage preceding conceptualisation. Siddharṣiṅgaṇin provides a critique of this approach, arguing that this reasoning has serious flaws (NAV: 4.4, pp. 360–362⁵²).

Prabhācandra, undertaking a similarly lengthy polemic – although less focused on explaining the nuances of his opponent’s position than Siddharṣiṅgaṇin, and more on details that can serve as anchor points for his own deliberation and rebuttal – starts in the PKM with Māṇikyanandin’s (9th c. CE) definition of perception:

Perception (*pratyakṣa*) is that which is clear (*viśada*). Clarity (*vaiśadya*)⁵³ is the representation of [an object] (*pratibhāsa*), as that for which there

⁵⁰ NAV: 4.3, p. 359: [...] *idam artha-sāmarthyenōdīyate, sannihitārtha-kriyā-samarthārtha-grāhakatvāt. na cārthe dhvanayaḥ santi, tad-dhetu-vilakṣaṇa-kāraṇāntara-janyatvāt, tataś cāsāv upanipatya sva-gocaram saṁvedanam utthāpayan svākāram anukārayati*. Trans. after Piotr Balcerowicz, *Jaina Epistemology in Historical and Comparative Perspective: Critical Edition and English Translation of Logical-Epistemological Treatises: Nyāyāvatāra, Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti and Nyāyāvatāra-ṭippaṇa with Introduction and Notes*, New Delhi 2008, p. 32. In the case of this particular publication, I refer to Piotr Balcerowicz, *Jaina Epistemology in Historical and Comparative Perspective*, when I focus on Balcerowicz’s translation of the NAV, and if I refer to a place in the original text, I use the siglum “NAV”.

⁵¹ The supplement of Piotr Balcerowicz in *Ibidem*, p. 32.

⁵² Translation (or understanding) of the terms and the entire presentation of the problem in this paragraph is based on *Ibidem*, pp. 33–35.

⁵³ Akalaṅka first used this term “clarity” (*vaiśadya*) with reference to perception, see LT 1.3, p. 1: *pratyakṣam viśadam jñānam mukhya-saṁvyavahārataḥ | paroḥṣaṁ śeṣa-vijñānam pramāṇe iti saṅgrahaḥ* || 3 ||.

is no other cognition [to intervene] (*pratīty-antarāvyavadhāna*) or as that which is directed at specific qualities (*viśeṣavat*).⁵⁴

Prabhācandra's discussion with the Buddhists takes up much of the text (PKM 28.1–38.11, com. on PĀ 1.3), covering many aspects, such as whether construction-filled and construction-free cognition could be similar at some level, what could this similarity (*sādrśya*) consist of and in what form would it occur (how it could be grasped; what is the relation between their scopes); he asks if there is the possibility of subordination (*abhibhava*) of one type of cognition to another and what such predominance (*balīyastva*) would be due to; and also whether there is an erroneous transferring (*adhyāropa*) of one into the other. Prabhācandra focuses on Dharmakīrti's definition from *Pramāna-vārttika* 2.123–124⁵⁵ (quoted in reversed order), especially on the formulation “a concept is associated with a name” (*vikalpo nāma-saṁśaya*). He is interested in the origin of concepts (*vikalpôtpādaka*) and the awakening (*prabodhaka*) of innate impressions that create concepts (*vikalpa-vāsana*),⁵⁶ which he considers to be linked with seeing (*darśana*) directed at an object. Anantavīrya, another commentator on the *Parīkṣāmukha* and also dwelling on the issue of conceptualisation (e.g. *vikalpa-buddhi*, PĀLV 3.23–24, 26, pp. 154–155, 158–159; 4.1, p. 262; *nirvikalpaka-bodha*, 4.1, p. 262), uses the same term “innate impressions [that create] concepts” (*vikalpa-vāsana*) (PĀLV 4.1, p. 262; see PĀLV 3.95, pp. 217–218), with which he indicates his awareness that concepts are not formed without being grounded in previous experience, and therefore are an effect of the recognition of snippets of previously experienced reality. Siddharṣigaṇin himself shows precisely in the NAV 1.13 (pp. 344–345) the role of latent impressions in the processes of “the cognition of recognition” (*pratyabhijñā-jñāna*) and memory or recollection (*smṛti*, *smaraṇa*), which – together with induction (*ūha*) – comprise the varieties of the indirect

⁵⁴ PĀ 2.3, pp. 216, 219: *viśadaṃ pratyakṣam* || 3 || *pratīty-antarāvyavadhānena viśeṣavattayā vā | pratibhāsanam vaiśadyam* || 4 ||. I refer to this definition in: Małgorzata Glinicka, “The boundaries of scriptural cognition. The examination of *śruta-jñāna* in its relation to *matī-jñāna* on the basis of *Tattvārtha-sūtra-rāja-vārttika* by Akalaṅka”, *Folia Philosophica* 41 (2019), p. 66; and “On how to Speak about Universals and Particulars in the Jaina Philosophical Literature of the Classical Period (5th–10th c. CE)”, *Rocznik Orientalistyczny* 73(2) (2020), p. 123; and See. PKM 216.14–17: *viśadaṃ spaṣṭam yad vijñānam tat pratyakṣam | tathā ca prayogaḥ: viśada-jñānātmakam pratyakṣam pratyakṣatvāt, yat tu na viśada-jñānātmakam tan na pratyakṣam yathānumānādi, pratyakṣam ca vivādādhyāsitam, tasmād viśada-jñānātmakam iti* |. Sometimes I use different punctuation than that found in Śāstri's editions (this applies to both editions of the PKM and the NKC).

⁵⁵ PV 2.123–124, p. 56:

*pratyakṣam kalpanāpodham pratyakṣeṇaiva sidhyati |
praty-ātma-vedyaḥ sarveṣāṃ vikalpo nāma-saṁśrayaḥ ||
saṃhṛtya sarvataḥ cintāṃ stīmitenāntarātmānā |
sthito 'pi cakṣuṣā rūpam īkṣate sāksajā matih ||*

⁵⁶ Siddharṣigaṇin distinguishes between two types of impressions: *vikalpa*, translated by Balcerowicz as “past impressions” and *saṃskāras*, as those “whose province is the universal speech designation (*abhilāpa-sāmānya*), that emerges in the moment of [grasping] the linguistic convention (*saṅketa*)” (trans. after Piotr Balcerowicz, *Jaina Epistemology in Historical and Comparative Perspective*, p. 34). NAV: 4.4, p. 362: [...] *saṅketa-kāla-bhāvūtābhilāpa-sāmānya-viṣayātma-saṃskāra*°.

cognition (*parokṣa*).⁵⁷ The process is similar in both cases: the latent impression (*saṃskāra*) deposited (*√ādhā*) in the cognitive subject (*ātman*) by seeing the object (*artha-darśana*) regenerates upon contact with an object of the same kind (*tādṛśa*) or “by the afterthought” (*ābhoga*).⁵⁸ This process gives rise to a categorisation of the objective world in terms of the similarity or identity of the nature of objects, which is in line with the Jaina concept of diachronic (*ūrdhva*) and synchronic (*tiraścīna*) homogeneity (*sāmānya*) as an original voice in the discussion of universals (cf. PĀ 4.1–6, pp. 466–520). There is no possibility of recollecting such a thing, if it is not seen (*adr̥ṣṭa*) and the perception of which has not occurred (*asañjāta*) (NAV: 1.13, p. 344/pp. 19–20). In addition, Siddharṣigaṇin defines memory or reminiscence (recollection) as characterised by “the non-loss of the [previously] experienced thing” (*anubhūta-viṣayāsampramoṣa*).⁵⁹ It is in this awakening of latent impressions that Prabhācandra seeks the origin of concepts.

Once the author of the PKM has finished the dialogue with the Buddhists, he immediately launches into a polemic against the Śābdādvaitins, who argue that all acts of cognition (*nikhila-pratyaya*) are construction-filled exclusively due to fact that they are pervaded by words (*śabdānuviddhatva*) (PKM 1.3, 39.1–44.15).⁶⁰ However, the direct question itself about the nature of concepts, what they are, is only asked many paragraphs later, on the occasion of a new discussion oriented towards Bhedābheda Vedānta (Bhāskara’s⁶¹) and Advaita Vedānta understanding of construction-free awareness (PKM 1.3, 64.7–67.2; 67.3–77.6).⁶²

Karl H. Potter, in his summary of the philosophy of the Advaita Vedānta, illustrates the significant difference in approach thus: “[...] Advaita elevates the distinction to new heights by identifying construction-free awareness with reality, Brahman”.⁶³ A Jaina author who addresses the problem of construction-free cognition in response to the ideas of Advaita Vedānta, and whose position supports Potter’s words, is Vidyānanda. In *Satya-śāsana-parīkṣā* 17, he summarizes the position of this school:

[...] only perception is efficient in proving (*sādhaka*) the Supreme Absolute (*parama-brahma*), immediately after the eye twitching (*akṣi-visphālanā*),

⁵⁷ After Balcerowicz translates “*smṛti*” as “reminiscence”, and “*saṃskāra*” as “subliminal impression” (NAV: 1.13, p. 344).

⁵⁸ The translation of terms and the outline of the problem after Ibidem, pp. 19–20 (NAV: 1.13, p. 344).

⁵⁹ Translation after Ibidem, p. 20 (NAV: 1.13, pp. 344–345). The translation of the terms and the outline of the whole passage concerning diachronic and synchronic homogeneity and the impossibility of recollecting of a thing that has been not seen after Ibidem, pp. 19–20.

⁶⁰ I rise this issue in Małgorzata Glinicka, ‘Is Our Perception Wordstained? The Analysis of *Prameya-kamala-mārtanda* 1.3. and 1.10’, *Folia Philosophica* 39 (2018), pp. 145–168.

⁶¹ The suggestion of Śāstri (footnote 10) in PKM (p. 64).

⁶² This problem has been discussed in many Advaita Vedānta works such as: Śaṃkara’s *Viveka-cūḍāmaṇī* (p. 336), *Sarva-vedānta-siddhānta-sāra-saṃgraha* (pp. 342–343) and *Laghu-vākya-vṛtti* (p. 345); Sureśvara’s *Bṛhad-āraṇyakōpaniṣad-bhāṣya-vārttika* (p. 498) and *Mānasōllāsa* (pp. 553, 556). After Potter Karl H. (ed.), *The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, Vol. 3: *Advaita Vedānta up to Śaṃkara and his pupils*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1998.

⁶³ Karl H. Potter, *The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, p. 92.

because the construction-free cognition (*nirvikalpaka*) originates inasmuch as its scope of action is that of which only being is predicable (*san-mātra*) and because being (*sattā*) has the nature (*svarūpa*) of the Supreme Absolute.⁶⁴

Vidyānanda proves that for the Advaita Vedānta such ‘Absolute’ cannot be perceived in its unmanifest form,

[...] because that of which only being is predicable, which is deprived of all properties (*sakala-viśeṣa-rahita*), [existing] at all times (*sarvathā*), eternal (*nitya*), indivisible (*niravayava*), [all-]pervading (*vyāpaka*), whose nature has been described minutely (*upavarṇita*) by others (*para*), is indeed not to be experienced (*ananubhava*) at all (*jātu-cid*); because the universal of being, etc. (*sattādi-sāmānya*), is directly perceived (*sākṣāt-karaṇa*) only when distinguished (*viśiṣṭa*) by special properties (*viśeṣa*) such as: being adjusted to the particular situation (*pratiniyata*), space (*deśa*), time (*kāla*), the state of being seen (*draṣṭavyatva*), etc., only immediately after the eye twitching, because not having a second, [the Self], (*ananya*) which sees (*draṣṭṛ*), which is not located in any specified place (*apratiniyata-deśa*), is not seen (*adarśana*), since otherwise there would be the undesired consequence [in the form of] the denial of knowledge (*pratīty-apalāpa*); because the condition (*avasthāna*) of the universal (*sāmānya*) and particular (particular properties) (*viśeṣa*) is inexpressible (*anupapatti*) due to mutual exclusion (*anyōnya-parihāra*) like [in the case of] a stick, an earring, etc. and the one that has the shape of the first (e.g. a stick), [a person] wearing an earring (*daṇḍa-kuṇḍalādyā-kāra-kuṇḍalinor*), and because when the one is not, also the other is absent.⁶⁵

In Vidyānanda’s description of Advaita Vedānta’s position, construction-free cognition is best illustrated by the metaphor of “eye twitching”, which the philosopher uses to highlight its instantaneousness. The non-conceptual state may be interpreted in two ways: as a way of existence of the Supreme Absolute itself and as cognition whose scope is “that of which only being”, i.e. the Supreme Absolute – at the moment of conditioned manifestation – “is predicable”. Vidyānanda gives a specific meaning to the term “experience” (*anubhava*), when he suggests that although the Supreme Absolute can be proved – under certain conditions – by perception, it “is not to be experienced

⁶⁴ SŚP 17, p. 3: [...] *pratyakṣam eva parama-brahma-sādhakam, akṣi-visphālanānantaram nirvikalpakasya san-mātra-vidhi-viśayatayōtpatteḥ, sattāyāś ca parama-brahma-svarūpatvāt.*

⁶⁵ SŚP 17, p. 4: [...] *sakala-viśeṣa-rahitasya sarvathā nityasya niravayavasya vyāpakasya san-mātrasya parōpavarṇita-svarūpasya jātu-cid apy ananubhavāt | akṣi-visphālanānantaram api pratiniyata-deśa-kāla-draṣṭavyatvādi-viśeṣa-viśiṣṭasyaiva sattādi-sāmānyasya sākṣāt-karaṇāt; apratiniyata-deśasya draṣṭur ananyasyādarśanāt, anyathā pratīty-apalāpa-prasaṅgāt | daṇḍa-kuṇḍalādyākāra-kuṇḍalinor iva sāmānya-viśeṣayor anyōnya-parihāreṇāvasthānānupapatteḥ, anyatarasyābhāve 'nyatarasyāpy abhāva ca.*

(*ananubhava*) at all (*jātu-cid*)”, which seems to be counterintuitive. This apparent paradox indicates and emphasizes the uniqueness of the way in which it can be recognized and cognitively affected.

Prabhācandra raises a question about the reasons for considering a single essence to be the core of everything (PKM, 67.10–69.3): Is there a cognitive criterion that proves (*sādhaka-pramāṇa*) the cognition of non-differentiation (*abheda*) or is the cognition of differentiation falsified (*bādhita*) by a cognitive criterion? Further: Is reality (*tattva*) understood as a manifestation of oneness (*eka-vyakti*), a manifestation of diversity (*aneka-vyakti*) or simply a manifestation (*vyakti-mātra*)? The author of the PKM analyses these alternatives thoroughly and states that oneness (*ekatva*) “dwells in the manifestation of many” (*aneka-vyakty-āśrita*), whereas the nature of difference (*bheda*) is “manifestation particular for each case” (*pratiniyata-vyakti*) (PKM 68.22–25). Closing this paragraph, he concludes:

If oneness is ascertained (*pratipanna*) only by perception, but is distinguished (designated) (*vyavahriyate*) by conceptual cognition (*kalpanā-jñāna*) as reliant on the other (*anyāpekṣa*), [i.e. difference,] as something that has an adherent form (*anuyāyi-rūpa*), then also difference that is ascertained by perception (*adhyakṣa*) is distinguished by conceptual cognition (*vikalpa-jñāna*) as reliant on the other, [i.e. oneness,] as something that has a form of exclusion (*vyāvṛtti-rūpa*), so be it.⁶⁶

In the approach of both Bhedābheda Vedānta and Advaita Vedānta, the problem of construction-free and construction-filled cognition is closely linked to this dichotomy: difference (or in a more active sense, differentiation) (*bheda*) and non-difference (*abheda*). The primary distinction refers to the nature of reality, and then to the way in which the cognitive subject cognizes – perceives, reacts mentally to, names, describes – the world. In both these approaches something distinct is meant and this distinction enforces incompatible views on the issue of conceptual constructions. According to Prabhācandra, difference as well as non-difference can become – under certain conditions – the subject of conceptualization.

4. Prabhācandra’s Attempt to Define Conceptual Constructions

Immediately after this lengthy discourse on the position of the Bhedābheda Vedānta and Advaita Vedānta, and after diverse attempts to define the problem related to the possibilities of conceptual-free cognition, Prabhācandra asks a pivotal question: “And

⁶⁶ PKM 1.5, 68.25–69.3: *athaikatvaṃ pratyakṣeṇaiva pratipannam, anyāpekṣayā tu kalpanā-jñānenānuyāyi-rūpatayā vyavahriyate, tarhi bhedo 'py adhyakṣeṇa pratipanno 'nyāpekṣayā vikalpa-jñānena vyāvṛtti-rūpatayā vyavahriyate ity apy astu.*

what then is this concept or conceptual construction (*kalpanā*)?". He suggests possible alternatives:

And what is this concept? [Would it be:] [a] The coming into being (*bhāvitva*) of cognition that emerges immediately after recollection or [b] the state of being pervaded by (*anuviddhatva*) the form of a word (*śabdākāra*), or [c] the clear appearance (*ullekha*) of a class (*jāti*) etc., or [d] something the scope of which is a non-existent object (*asad-artha*), or [e] the accurate determination (*avadhāraṇa*) of the nature of the object by reliance on the other (*anyāpekṣa*), or [f] the mere figurative expression (metaphor) (*upacāra*) due to the impossibility (*asambhava*) of other kinds (*prakārāntara*).⁶⁷

In the NKC, he poses the same question, but suited to a different – Buddhist – context, which results in a different formulation of alternatives:

what is this concept in that case? [Would it be:] [a'] representation (*apratibhāsa*) like expression (*abhilāpa*), [b'] fixed opinion (*niścaya*), [c'] the clear appearance (*ullekha*) of a class (*jāti*), etc., [d'] the state of having indistinct form (*aspaṣṭākārātā*), [e'] indifference (*nirapekṣatā*) to the proximity of an object (*artha-sannidhi*), [f'] the state of being the source (*prabhavatā*) of nonsensual perception (*anakṣa*) or [g'] the imposition of other properties (*dharmāntarāropa*)?⁶⁸

This discrepancy demonstrates that Prabhācandra, entering into polemics with representatives of two different schools of thought, looks at the issue of concepts and non-conceptual cognition from two different perspectives. It is difficult to determine unequivocally whether conducting the analysis in this way is a result of deliberate intention arising from knowledge of the nuances of the opponent's philosophy, or rather an expression of the degree of interest in the subject, the state of deepening his own reflections on the hypothetical phenomenon of the construct that is non-conceptual perception.

Addressing the first [a] possibility, Prabhācandra shows the implications of this suggested assumption: such subtle cognition – escaping all definitions – as the cognition of the lack of difference (*abheda-jñāna*) between Brahman and all that exists, including the nature of man, can be the result of understanding the nature of reality on the basis of the recollection (*smaraṇa*) of the traces of previous experience (such as the human experience of oneness with all that exists), and therefore, it would also be conceptual.

⁶⁷ PKM 1.5, 69.4–7: *kā cēyaṃ kalpanā nāma: jñānasya smaraṇānantara-bhāvitvam, śabdākārānuviddhatvaṃ vā syāt, jāty-ādy-ullekho vā, asad-artha-viṣayatvaṃ vā, anyāpekṣatayārtha-svarūpādvadhāraṇaṃ vā, upacāra-mātraṃ vā prakārāntarāsambhavāt?*

⁶⁸ NKC, 47.15–17: [...] *tatra kēyaṃ kalpanā – abhilāpavat pratibhāsaḥ, niścayaḥ, jāty-ādy-ullekhaḥ, aspaṣṭākārātā, artha-sannidhi-nirapekṣatā, anakṣa-prabhavatā, dharmāntarāropa vā?*

Māṇikyanandin himself defines memory or recollection (*smṛti*), which is a kind of indirect cognition (*parokṣa*), in the following way: “Memory, taking the form of ‘[it] is that’, has the evocation of latent impressions (*saṃskāra*) (i.e. psychic dispositions) as its basis”,⁶⁹ and – as Prabhācandra explains – latent impression is the same as retention (*dhāraṇā*) in conventional perception (*sāṃvyavahārika-pratyakṣa*) (PKM 335.14) and is a result of the processing of what is acquired first in sensation (*avagraha*), and is therefore grounded in experience. The author of the PKM writes:

The first alternative, to begin with, is not [adequate], because of the undesired consequence that also the cognition of non-difference [of all that exists]⁷⁰ would be the conceptual construction due to comprehension (*upalambha*) [gained] immediately after the recollection (*smaraṇānantaram*).⁷¹

Prabhācandra does not elaborate further on this argument. Focusing now on the second [b] of the proposed options, which is discussed by him with particular meticulousness, he expounds the arguments:

And the state of being pervaded by the form of a word has been counteracted (*prativihita*) in cognition just a while ago (=PKM 39.1–44.15). However, [if someone says:] ‘All (*sakala*) representation of difference (*bheda-pratibhāsa*) is preceded by an expression (*abhilāpa*)’, then, there would be the absence also of the representation of difference, when there is no such [expression]. And it is not the case, because the succession (*uttaratva*) of concepts (*vikalpa*) and expression (*abhilāpa*) has been established as the relation between cause and effect (*kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva*). Or, let it be, but then is the representation of difference born out of a word (*śabda-janita*), or is a word born out of the representation of difference?

According to the first standpoint, is the representation of difference [born] exclusively out of a word, or is it only that [representation of difference] that is [born] out of that [word]? If the representation of difference [born] exclusively out of a word is accepted, there would be the undesired consequence in the form of non-generation (*anutpatti*) of the cognition of a colored cloth, etc., whose scope is difference (*bheda-viśaya*), immediately after the first contact through eye (*akṣa-sannipāta*), because the word born out according to the order (*krama*), arising from linguistic convention (*saṃketa*), recollection (*smaraṇa*), intention (*vivakṣā*), endeavour (*prayatna*), the palate (*tālu*), etc., immediately after non-conceptual experience (*nirvikalpakānubhava*), is absent in the

⁶⁹ PĀ 3.3, p. 335: *saṃskārôdbodha-nibandhanā tad-ity-ākārā smṛtiḥ*.

⁷⁰ “Indeed, all is Brahman”, “I am that” – comm. Śāstri in PKM, p. 69, fn. 5.

⁷¹ PKM 1.5, 69.7–8: *na tāvad ādya-vikalpaḥ, abheda-jñānasyāpi smaraṇānantaram upalambhena kalpanātva-prasaṅgāt*.

state of the first act of cognition [that is] non-conceptual (*avikalpaka-prathama-pratyaya*). [The sentence:] ‘Only the representation of the state of difference (*anekatva*) is [born] out of the word’ is also said to be not correct, because of the necessary consequence that there would be no cognition of non-difference (*ekatva-pratipatti*) on the basis of the scriptural authority (*āgama*), when it would occur that the formulation: ‘The form of the Supreme Absolute is one’, etc., generates the act of cognition of difference (*bheda-pratyaya*).

And when [the second standpoint:] ‘The word is [born] out of the representation of difference’ is accepted, there is a vicious circle: the representation of difference [born out of] a word, the word [born] out of the representation of difference.⁷²

Prabhācandra refers to another place in his text just before this argumentation, where he enters into a polemic with the followers of Bhartṛhari, during which he negates the possibility that cognition as such is permeated by the word.⁷³ He notes that in order to be able to speak of accompanying words, there must be a cause and effect relationship, either one way or the other – between the appearance of the word in the mind, which is tantamount to knowing or recognizing the word (that has a concrete visual and sound form, and is endowed with meaning, which manifests itself at a certain moment of contact between the mind of the cognitive subject and the word), and the representation of difference – after which he rejects each of the possibilities in turn: (1a) If only from the word came cognition, the scope of which is difference, it would not be possible to register any other difference, grasped, at least at first sight, solely by the senses, such as the composition of contrasts achieved by a diverse color spectrum, etc.; (1b) If only the cognition of difference results from the word, then the canonical scriptures, as a written source of knowledge, could not become the cause of the cognition of that which, according to its inherent nature, is one and indivisible, that is the oneness of the Supreme Absolute (Brahman) and all that exists. Prabhācandra also recognizes the vicious circle (2) when attempting to derive the following: For a word to be born out of the representation of difference (the way the word is used stems from the order, convention, intention, etc., and therefore results from a diversity of factors), this representation of difference had to

⁷² PKM 1.5, 69.8–21: *śabdākārānuviddhatvaṃ ca jñāne prāḡ eva pratīvihitam. nanu sakalo bheda-pratibhāso 'bhilāpa-pūrvakas tad-abhāve bheda-pratibhāsasyāpy abhāvāḥ syāt, tan na, vikalpābhilāpayoḥ kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvasya kṛtōttaratvāt. astu vāsau, tathāpi kiṃ śabda-janito bheda-pratibhāsaḥ, taj-janito vā śabdaḥ? prathama-pakṣe kiṃ śabdād eva bheda-pratibhāsaḥ, tato 'sau bhavaty evēti vā? śabdād eva bheda-pratibhāsābhyupagame prathamākṣa-sannipātānantaram citra-paṭy-ādi-jñānasya bheda-viśayasyānutpatti-prasaṅgaḥ, nirvikalpākānubhavānantaram saṃketa-smaraṇa-vivakṣā-prayatna-tālv-ādi-parispanda-krameṇōpajāyamāna-śabdasyāvikalpaka-prathama-pratyayāvasthāyām abhāvāt. śabdād anekatva-pratibhāso bhavaty evēty apy ayuktam uktam; “ekam brahmaṇō rūpam” ity-ādi-śabdasya bheda-pratyaya-janakatve sati āgamāt tasyaikatva-pratipatter abhāvānuṣaṅgāt. bheda-pratibhāsāc chabde (bdo) 'stīty abhyupagate ca anyonyāśrayatvam: śabdād bheda-pratibhāsaḥ, bheda-pratibhāsāc chabda iti.*

⁷³ See Małgorzata Glinicka, ‘Is Our Perception Wordstained?’.

come from somewhere. The Jaina author suggests this originating factor should be the word itself. However, he does not analyze this problem in depth. What else can be gleaned from the passage quoted above is that he clearly distinguishes this moment of the very first act of cognition, in which experience deprived of concepts (*avikalpaka-prathamapratyaya*) occurs, which shows that the Jaina thinker had some idea of the uniqueness and the potentiality of construction-free awareness.

As for the third [c, c'] alternative, Prabhācandra reflects on it in both PKM and NKC and it is the only similar standpoint that can be found in these treatises:

If the representation of difference [in the form of the sentence:] ‘This is a pot, this is a piece of cloth, etc.’ is the concept, for the reason that it is the clear appearance (*ullekha*) of a class (*jāti*), etc., there would be the necessary consequence that also the cognition of non-difference would be a concept, because also this [cognition of non-difference] is the clear appearance of the universal of existence, etc. (*sattādi-sāmānya*).⁷⁴

Prabhācandra demonstrates that realising the difference requires mentally dividing the objects of reality into categories grouping entities of the same kind into a class, and therefore evoking universals. If one considered such an attribution to be a concept, then everything else – including what the Advaita Vedānta claims is purely non-conceptual and empty in terms of mental constructions and objective properties, i.e. the cognition of the identity of Brahman with all that exists – would be construction-filled in nature, because we extract with our minds the very core of this identity, which is associated with existence as universal property; earlier Prabhācandra writes about the universal form of existence (*sattā-sāmānya-rūpa*) contained in many manifestations (*aneka-vyakti-gata*, PKM 1.5, 67.21–68.2). He clearly focuses on the ontology of the universals and the particulars – and an epistemic approach to the diversity of the world – without making it the basis for consideration in the philosophy of language.

In the NKC, at the end of the first paragraph on page 50.8–9, in which he analyses conceptual and the non-conceptual cognition, as well as the relation between the diversity of objects (*artha-bheda*) and the diversity of names or notions (*saṃjñā-bheda*), he formulates the constatation:

[The statement:] ‘The concept is the clear appearance of a class’ is also not contradictory, because the fact that the ascertainment (*avasāya*) of a class, etc. – that is to be differentiated through qualifying (*viśeṣaṇa*) and that is the ultimate truth (*paramārtha*) – is a concept is expressible due to the removal (*viccheda*) of uncertainty (*vyāmoha*).⁷⁵

⁷⁴ PKM 1.5, 69.22–24: “ghaṭo ‘yaṃ paṭo ‘yam” ity-ādi-bheda-pratibhāsasya jāty-ādy-ullekhitvāt kalpanātv abheda-jñānasyāpi kalpanātvānuṣaṅgaḥ, tasyāpi sattādi-sāmānyōllekhitvāt.

⁷⁵ NKC 1.5, 50.8–9: “jāty-ādy-ullekhaḥ kalpanā” ity apy aviruddham, jāty-ādīnāṃ viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhūtānāṃ paramārtha-satāṃ vyāmoha-vicchedenāvasāyasya kalpanātvōpapatteḥ.

In the next paragraph, he refers to the contrast between this conceptual form, whose nature is different from the union (*saṃyojana*) of forms differentiated through qualifying, and cognition that has arisen from the direct perception of an object (*artha-sākṣāt-karaṇa-pravṛtta*), relating to his earlier statement (NKC 1.3, 47.6–9), in which he argues that this difference is similar to the difference between acts of cognition directed towards different sense data.⁷⁶ Further, he questions the nature of this form that is “differentiated through qualifying”, whether it is the reflected image (*pratibimba*) or the clear appearance (*ullekha*), and then rejects these two possibilities.⁷⁷ The analysis in the NKC provides a more complete picture of the relationship between the concept and the class – or rather shows more interpretative possibilities – which is associated with the preceding disquisition, much more complex than the one in the PKM.

The fourth [d] issue, considered in the PKM, addresses the broad problem of the status of non-existent objects:

And for the representation of difference the fact that the scope [of a conceptual construction] is a non-existing object is unproved, because the object (*artha*) that is the real thing (*vastu*), that does the efficacious action (*artha-kriyā*), appears (*pratibhāsana*) here (i.e. in this case). The state of being erroneous (*viśaṃvāditva*) and the state of being subverted (*bādhyamānatva*), that are the characteristics of a conceptual construction (*kalpanā-lakṣaṇa*), are thereby contradicted, because the fact that there is another object is impossible, since this is [that cognition] whose scope is the non-existing object.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ Ref. to NKC 1.3, 47.6–9: *prayogaḥ: yad yad artha-sākṣāt-karaṇa-pravṛtta(itam) jñānam tat tat-svarūpa-vyatirikta-viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyākāra-tat-saṃyojanāsvabhāva-kalpanākāraṇa na bhavati, yathā rūpādy-ākāra-pravṛtta-cakṣur-ādi-jñānam aviśayī-kṛta-gandhādi-viśeṣaṇa-yojanākāraṇa na bhavati, tathā ca sarvaṃ sva-viśaya-pravṛttam jñānam iti.*

⁷⁷ NKC 1.5, 50.10–14: *yad apy uktam: “yad yad artha-sākṣāt-kāra-pravṛttam jñānam” ity-ādi, tatra ko ’yaṃ viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyādy-ākāro nāma yo ’rtha-sākṣāt-karaṇa-pravṛtte jñāne pratiśiddhyet – pratibimbam, ullekho vā? pratibimbaṇ cet, siddha-sādhyatā, jñāne tat-pratiśedhasya asmābhir apy abhyupagamāt, sakala-jñānānām nirākāratva-pratijñānāt. atha ullekhaḥ; tan-niśedho ’nupapannaḥ, pramāṇasya yathāvasthitārtha-svarūpodyotakatvāt, tat-svarūpaṇ ca jāty-ādi-viśiṣṭam “gauḥ” “śuklaḥ” “carati” ity-ādi-pratyayāt prasiddham.* “Similarly, what has been said: ‘Which cognition is arisen from the direct perception of an object’, with regard to this [we ask:] what is then this so-called form that is to be differentiated through qualifying, etc., which could be rejected in cognition that arises from the direct perception of an object: the reflected image or the clear appearance. If the reflected image, then it is based on [an argument] in which the probandum [is treated as] already proved (*siddha-sādhyatā*), because the rejection of that [form] in cognition is also accepted by us, since there is agreement that all cognition (*sakala-jñāna*) is without form (*nirākāra*). If the clear appearance, the negation of that [form] is inexpressible, because cognitive criterion is enlightening (*udyotaka*) as to the nature of an object (*artha-svarūpa*), and the nature of this [object], characterised by the class, etc., is well-known due to the acts of cognition (*pratyaya*), such as: ‘cow’, ‘white’, ‘goes’.” The term “*pramāṇa*” is rendered by me as “cognitive criterion” after Piotr Balcerowicz, *Jaina Epistemology in Historical and Comparative Perspective*, pp. 139–144 n. 4.

⁷⁸ PKM 1.5, 69.24–70.2: *asad-artha-viśayatvaṃ ca bheda-pratibhāsasyāsiddham, artha-kriyā-kāriṇo vastu-bhūtārthasya tatra pratibhāsanāt. viśaṃvāditvaṃ bādhyamānatvaṃ ca kalpanā-lakṣaṇam etena pratyuktam, tasyāsad-artha-viśayatvād arthāntaratvāsambhāvāt.*

In Jaina thought, there have been different positions on what indicates that a thing is real. Hemacandra – as Shamani Shashi Prajñā notes – claims that what is real is “capable of performing a function”⁷⁹. Akalaṅka already realizes that “the mere knowledge of venom does not lead to death” (NV 69a), which means that the very image in the mind does not have an effect in reality, therefore it is not real, as opposed to the external object (*bahir-artha*, NV 69b)⁸⁰. However, some Jainas were of a different opinion. Siddharṣigaṇin considers that “efficient action is not the characteristic of the real thing” (*na cārtha-kriyā vastu-lakṣaṇam*) (NAV 2.1, p. 354), but rather they are “origination, annihilation and continued existence” (*utpāda-vyaya-sthiti*) (NAV 31.3–31.6, pp. 478–482).⁸¹ Prabhācandra seems to regard efficient action (*artha-kriyā*) as a prejudicial characteristic of reality and he clearly states that in order for a representation of difference to be made, a real entity that has this capability of efficacy is necessary. If we assume that the scope of a conceptual construction is a non-existing object, then we have to face the fact that no intellectual, particularly linguistic, differentiating operation would be possible, and for the Jainas, construction-filled cognition is crucial in the acquisition and storage of knowledge, therefore this alternative must also be rejected.

Addressing the fifth [e] possibility, Prabhācandra briefly criticizes the very formulation of this alternative, without referring to clarifications regarding the nature of a concept, and indicates the optics according to which one should view the mechanism of reliance on other factors (*anyāpekṣatā*): it is action, doing, performing (*vyavahāra*), that requires dependency, not the accurate determination, ascertainment or emphasis (*avadhāraṇa*) of the nature of anything. He says:

And the accurate determination (*avadhāraṇa*) of the nature of the object (*artha-svarūpa*) – which is really immediate (*anantara*) – by being reliant on the other has been refuted, because only action happens as reliant on the other, not the accurate determination of the nature.⁸²

Referring to the last, sixth [f], alternative, Prabhācandra explains that conceptual construction cannot be considered in terms of figurative application or metaphorical transference (*upacāra*):

⁷⁹ Shamani Shashi Prajñā, *Applied Philosophy of Anekanta*, Ladnun 2012, p. 46.

⁸⁰ NV 69, p. 39:

na hi jātu viṣa-jñānaṃ maraṇaṃ prati dhāvati |
asaṃś ced bahir-arthātmā prasiddho 'pratiṣedhakaḥ ||

⁸¹ Translation after Piotr Balcerowicz, *Jaina Epistemology in Historical and Comparative Perspective*, pp. 27, 127–131; see also: fn. 220, p. 198. Cf. NAV 29.26, p. 468: *na cārtha-kriyā vastu-lakṣaṇaṃ, śabda-vidyutpradīpādī-carama-kṣaṇānāṃ kṣaṇāntarānārambhakatvenāvastutva-prāptes, tad-avastutve punar upāntya-kṣaṇasyāpi vastuni vyāpārābhāvād; evaṃ yāvat sarva-kṣaṇānāṃ saṅkalikayā vastutvam. atha kṣaṇāntarānārambhe 'pi sva-gocara-jñāna-janakatvam artha-kriyā parikalpyeta, tathā saty atīta-bhāvi-paryāya-paramparāpi yogi-jñāna-gocarātāṃ yātīti vastutvaṃ svī-kuryāt. tan nārtha-kriyā vastu-lakṣaṇam, api tūtpāda-vyaya-dhrauṇya-yuktatā, pramāṇa-pratiṣṭhitatvāt.*

⁸² PKM 1.5, 70.2–70.4: *anyāpekṣatayārtha-svarūpādvadhāraṇaṃ cānantaram eva pratyākhyātām; yato vyavahāra evānyāpekṣatayā pravartate na svarūpādvadhāraṇam.*

Also for the representation of difference, the state of being a conceptual construction does not have a form of the figurative expression, because when a literal [meaning] (*mukhya*) is not possible, also this [figurative expression] is not seen (*adarśana*), like in the case of the metaphor of a lion (*simha*), etc., in ornament (*māṇavaka*). And for the propounder of non-difference (*abheda-vādin*) the literal [meaning] is not the acceptance (*abhyupagama*) of difference due to the undesired consequence in the form of the statement opposed to the settled dogma (*apasiddhānta*).⁸³

Prabhācandra argues that such a figurative expression must grow out of a different semantic core and have the foundation in the literal meaning. When reviewing this last position out of six, he again (after b) clearly associates the issue of conceptual constructions with language understood as a tool for differentiating. It is interesting that the author of the PKM underlines that other possibilities have been exhausted – although in the NKC he suggests other options – and proposes looking at the transference of meaning as a source for understanding what concepts, the nature of which is difficult to define, are.

The alternatives analyzed in this section are obviously associated with the terminology of the Bhedābheda Vedānta and Advaita Vedānta, such as difference and non-difference, and the means of their representation.

5. Conclusions

An analysis on how Prabhācandra approached the problem of concepts or conceptual constructions in the PKM and the question of the possibility of the construction-free cognition and its definition, as well as examination of the direction he intends to follow in the NKC (the difference in defining the problem between both texts depends on the place these two analyses take in the disquisition), reveals the intricacy of the problem and a strong reaction of the Jaina philosopher to the worldview of the opponents, the Buddhists and representatives of the different traditions of the Vedānta.

Prabhācandra seeks clarification of the issue of conceptual construction in linguistic and extralinguistic sphere, without favouring any option. Unlike the Buddhists and the Śabdādvaitins, he does not accentuate the probable linguistic aspect of concepts (the aspect of meaning) very strongly – linguistic associations are to be ascertained only in the case of the alternatives [b], [f], [a'] and [b'], but it is sufficient evidence of the importance of language (and the meaning of linguistic units) in the phenomenon of the mind encountering the percept.

On the one hand, it can be realised that he pays more attention to the consistent juxtaposition of the two types of cognition – construction-free and construction-filled –

⁸³ PKM 1.5, 70.4–70.6: *nāpi bheda-pratibhāsasyōpacāra-rūpaṃ kalpanātvam, mukhyāsambhave tasyāpy adarśanān māṇavake simhādy-upacāravat. na cābheda-vādinō mukhyaṃ bhedābhyupagamo 'sty apasiddhānta-prasaṅgāt.*

without sufficiently defined terminology, instead of looking more closely at the nature of conceptual constructions itself, before tackling the interpretation of the respective representatives of other Indian philosophical schools. On the other hand, his efforts in presenting and analysing this subject and in understanding his opponents, taking into account so many elusive subtleties, including those connected with language, should not be underestimated.

Prabhācandra adopts a broad perspective and within its framework, he conducts a phenomenological analysis of the specific epistemic experience as it is viewed in various systems. Formulating so many questions about the nature of the conceptual constructions, he demonstrates that in the case of no position this nature can be clearly inferred.

Abbreviations and References

- ĀM = *Āpta-mīmāṃsā* (Samantabhadra), Shah Nagin J. (trans., gen. ed.), *Samantabhadra's Āptamīmāṃsā. Critique of an Authority [Along with English translation, Introduction, Notes and Akalaṅka's Sanskrit Commentary Aṣṭaśatī]*, Sanskrit-Sanskriti Granthamālā 7, 1999.
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- AS = *Aṣṭa-sahasrī* (Vidyānanda), *Aṣṭasahasrī Vidyānandasvāmīnā nirmitā Vaṃśīdhareṇa saṃśodhya... sampādītā*, Nirṇayasāgara, Bombay 1915.
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