My current considerations concern the way in which the category of animals is present in contemporary philosophy, especially if it occurs in the context of moral philosophy and the theory of cognition and mind. These are, I suppose, the areas of inquiry inspiring wide interest, even if we focus on the narrow question of the place of animals in the domains of morality, cognition, and consciousness. Although John Rawls himself approaches these issues with caution, and his interest in these types of problems is marginal, they deserve some philosophical attention. There is a close relationship between the belief that non‑personal living entities such as animals are capable of feeling pain and pleasure on the one hand, and the human sensitivity or social sentience, on the other. We should face the question of what kind of society we want to live in: effective or sensitive. Ethical utilitarianism is in favor of an effective society. It may seem that there is no place for social sensitivity in it, and consequently that public interest is postulated in its place instead. However, I believe that an effective society is more sensitive to the harm done to or the plight suffered by non‑personal subjects than a sensitive society, if the latter is understood as Rawls frames it. Thus, we come to a specific paradox – which I shall refer to as the blunted sentience paradox – that the utilitarian, efficient society criticized by Rawls is in fact more morally sensitive than the egalitarian society he postulates. The paradox of the blunted sentience has its source in Rawls’s egalitarianism, for this egalitarianism is offered only to the chosen. It does not extend to those members of society who extend their care to those creatures whom Rawls denies subjectivity, but whose unhappiness constitutes an important factor in the social life of humanity. I propose to look at the fate of animals in modern society, and if we do so, we will notice some flaws in Rawls’s theory of justice that can perhaps be amended by espousing some aspects of emotivism. This proposed approach avoids what I have called the blunted sentience paradox.

Roman Ingarden’s work is widely taken as promoting a philosophical anthropology in which considerations from philosophy of ecology, that is, ecophilosophy, have no secure place. I think this contention is too hasty, even though Ingarden himself did not undertake reflections on the responsibility of humans for their natural environment. It is true that here and there he was giving explicit expression to his conviction of the unimportance of biological origins of humans, and was putting a strong emphasis on culture and other intentional creatures of humanity. In my paper I have tried to trace and describe Ingardenian understanding of humans in relation to their environment, and especially to nature. I have made an attempt to show how free human actions are possible, which in turn enforces on humans some responsibility for their actions, including those that impinge upon the nature around them.