Wasteful spending of public funds, leading to the creation of “ghost airports”, is often described as a regulatory failure and a major deficiency in European State aid control. It is pointed out that decisions to build or upgrade an airport are often ill-conceived, poorly implemented, and without economic justification. This raises the question whether European law, namely its State aid control system, contains inherent flaws or whether the European Commission’s decision-making process can be improved by increasing reliance on objective economic reasoning under the existing legal framework. This article provides an analysis of the decision-making problems leading to failed aid efforts; of the role of the economic approach in State aids; and of the standard of economic assessment required in State aid cases. The article concludes with de lege ferenda postulates.

In this study we evaluate the distortion of the ratio of non-performing loans (NPL) caused by rapid credit growth to show that the bias in this ratio (caused by the prolonged credit boom) may indeed be significant. Next, we discuss an adjustment to the NPL ratio based on a theoretical model of a loan portfolio. This adjustment is robust for credit booms and busts; therefore, it can be used to compare credit quality ratios across distinct portfolios and banks as well as to simulate future NPL ratio developments. Our estimates of the portfolio of housing loans in Poland show that the new adjusted index of non-performing loans is robust to different model specifications.