Simplification of a shape of a coastline is one of the best-described issues of quantitative generalisation. Schematisation of a coastline shape is a process, which may be relatively easily described by means of an algorithmic formula. However, the majority of algorithms consider only geometric aspects and river and road networks are generalised by means of the same parameters. Many described methods of direct transfer of subjective ways of manual generalisation to computer systems have turned out to be ineffective. Application of fractal analysis is an attempt aiming at objective implementation of a process of automated cartographic generalisation by means of selection of parameters of algorithms of simplification of lines, preceded by analysis of local geometric features of modelled objects. The, so-called mono-fractal dimension of objects, commonly used in cartometric analysis, DJ, specifies the averaged level of filling of available space only. The multi-fractal dimension of analysed objects, as, for example of a coastline, determined by means of a method proposed by the author, specifies the multi-fractal spectrum of dimensions, D(q). The range of obtained values of the parameter DJ( l .05-e- 1.42) allows for assumption that the coastline has multi-fractal properties. In this paper the author proposes development of new descriptive and research tools, which may be used for investigation of local geometric features of objects presented on a map, as well as for simplification of shapes of objects in the process of cartographic generalisation.

According to the usual, simplified picture of the Meinong‑Russell controversy, Meinong’s semantics is structurally amazingly simple but ontologically very expensive, while Russell’s theory contains some counter‑intuitive syntactic complica-tions, but to make up for this expense it releases us from almost all ontological troubles. Now the reality is much more complex. On the one hand it appears that the alleged ontological innocence of Russell’s solution has been highly exaggerated. In particular it assumes a Platonic ontology of universal properties. At the same time, if we look a bit closer, also Meinong’s theory turns out to be much more complicated than it looks at the first sight. It involves a hierarchy of objects exhibiting different degrees of completeness and in the later period of Meinong’s thought the structure of intentional reference takes a form very similar to that which has been proposed by Russell in his On Denoting.