Abstract
Paul Ricoeur claims that while John Rawls seeks to present his theory of justice as a purely procedural conception, which remains axiologically neutral, it is in fact entangled in certain presuppositions with ethical overtones. In order to bring those presuppositions out we need, according to Ricoeur, to consider that, contrary to appearances, its justification is not inherently linear but undesirably circular. This circularity of the justification of the theory of justice manifests itself in Rawls’s postulate to strive for a ‘reflective equilibrium’, which should reconcile accepted principles of justice with ‘our considered convictions’.
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