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Abstract

This article examines the idea of cross-currents in international law, which was proposed almost a century ago by Ludwik Ehrlich. First the theoretical background of this idea is provided, with the focus on Albert Venn Dicey’s assumption that there are fundamental differences in public opinion influencing the legislative process. The development of the crosscurrents concept is given through the prism of the evolution of Ehrlich’s ideas. The article illustrates some aspects of his legal philosophy, which describe the scholar as broad-minded, innovative, and deep-thinking. Four dimensions of cross-currents in international law are discussed: (1) the existence of norms originating from different periods; (2) variations between states in their recognition and interpretation of them; (3) fulfillment of abstract norms; and (4) inconsistencies of theory and practice. They contribute to approximating a fully coherent international law serving as the ideal in comparison to a heterogeneous, contradictory, fragmented one, as is frequently observed at the present time. The idea of cross-currents might be helpful in accepting the view that some of the incompatibilities between the rules and principles of international law are inevitable and do not cause harm to international legality.
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Authors and Affiliations

Andrii Hachkevych
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Ph.D., Associate Professor of the Department of International Information, Lviv National Polytechnic University (Ukraine)
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Abstract

This article is an attempt to identify the essence of new positivism, described by Ludwik Ehrlich as a method of interpretation of international law. The evolution of his views on international law is examined with respect to the place of this method from the beginning of 1920s until his retirement in 1961. The article expounds on both the theoretical and methodological aspects of new positivism, according to which judicial decisions should be taken into account in addition to international treaties and customs for the determination of international law. The question of the obligatory force of international law is discussed as being related to the principle of good faith, which is at the core of Ehrlich’s views on international law. The article offers suggestions on how the method of new positivism might be used and what tasks it can fulfil today. It also makes an attempt to critically analyse Ehrlich’s method and to characterize it both in general and in the context of the theory of international law.

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Authors and Affiliations

Andrii Hachkevych
ORCID: ORCID

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