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Abstract

This paper aims at presenting a transcendental argument, so termed and constructed by John Rawls, as a justification of his theory of ‘justice as fairness’. The crucial stage in the chain of his reasoning is to establish the necessary condition of the political arrangement of the basic structure of society. This condition turns out to be acceptability of the publicly endorsed principles in the original position. However, the procedure of exercising free choice, as described by Rawls, presupposes a philosophical view of human nature, and consequently undermines the presumably purely theoretical basis for the principles of justice. The author discusses the impact of Kantian moral philosophy on Rawls’s theory of justification. He tries to show that the rejection of moral theory in favour of political philosophy was the result of a profound change in Rawls’s attitude to the idea of transcendentalism, as it is evidenced by his later thought.
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Bibliography

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Authors and Affiliations

Stanisław Jędrczak
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Uniwersytet Warszawski, Wydział Filozofii, ul. Krakowskie Przedmieście 3, 00‑927 Warszawa
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Abstract

Freedom and Resentment (1962) – reflecting the method and profoundness of descriptive metaphysics – has become perhaps the most commented and famous work by Peter F. Strawson. In this article I try to reconstruct the concept of responsibility, blame and punishment outlined in his essay. The text consists of three main parts: exhibition (subsections 2, 3), interpretation (4) and criticism (5). In the last part I argue that even if Strawson managed to repulse the pessimistic argumentation against compatibilism, his naturalistic position, as well as the traditional optimism, does not provide the right kind of ethical justification for reactive emotions and attitudes. The nerve of his reasoning is the premise that from the human point of view it is practically inconceivable to abandon them. Therefore, the succes of such argumentation depends on the meaning of practical inconceivability. One can distinguish its naturalistic (referring to the type- or token-naturalism) and transcendental interpretation. The latter, as I try to show, is unable to formally distinguish between the metaphysical and ethical content of Strawson’s position. On the other hand, the logical separation of both views is the main advantage of the interpretation in the spirit of type-naturalism. Consequently, its acceptance reveals both metaethical and anthropological allegations to which Strawson’s concept is exposed, without injuring the main part of his compatibilism.

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Authors and Affiliations

Stanisław Jędrczak
ORCID: ORCID

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