The Third Maritime Safety Package, also known as Erica III, consists of 7 pieces of European Union legislation adopted by the Parliament and the Council in 2009. The EU member states are to implement them by bringing into force law, regulations and administrative provisions.

The level ofcommitment on the part of Commission of the EU to the issues surrounding safety packages is measured by the amount of actions brought before the Court of Justice for states’ failures to comply with them. Currently the Commission has delivered a reasoned opinion under the Article 258 of the Treaty concerning failure to implement Directive 2009/16/EC of 23 April 2009 on port State control by Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Poland, Portugal and the United Kingdom.

In 1851 the US Congress passed a bill limiting liability in relation to maritime claims. This legislation has remained in force almost unchanged until today. However, the institution of limitation of liability owes its development mainly to US judicial decisions. In comparison to the 1957 and 1976 international conventions relating to the limited liability of the owners of sea-going vessels, the range of the US legislation is relatively narrow. The author argues that - because of their too low limits - neither of the acts she discusses ensures satisfactory damages to those making claims. US courts seem to realize this because they frequently refuse the right to limited liability.

The author of this article has previously addressed the topic of what constitutes a vessel in American jurisprudence based on the case of Willard Stewart v. Dutra Construction Company (Prawo Morskie, vol. 21, 2005). The text discusses the verdict of the Supreme Court of the United States of America, which was faced with deciding whether the dredger on which Willard Stewart worked was a vessel or not. The initial and appellate court verdicts declared that the dredger was not a vessel. The Supreme Court of the United States came to a different verdict. The "Super Scoop ” dredger was declared to be a vessel. This was because this device was used to transport the crew and tools over water to the worksite, where the device was anchored to the bottom and left there to drill a tunnel. It was also able to navigate waters. In this case, the Supreme Court laid out the widest possible definition of a vessel as well as a very wide definition of sailor. The court's decision is undoubtedly advantageous for many employees.

Marine engineer Willard Stewart filed suit against the Dutra Construction Company in the US District Court of Massachusetts, USA. He was suing for compensation for a work-related accident. Stewart based his claim on the Jones Act and the principles of maritime law. Responsibility is based on the principle of risk in the Jones Act and applies to seamen employed on vessels. In order to obtain compensation, Stewart had to prove that the dredge on which the accident occurred was a vessel. I f proved, he would be regarded as a seaman since he worked on it. The district court declared that a dredge was not a vessel. Stewart appealed and the appellate court upheld the first verdict. Stewart fs case was appealed to the Supreme Court in order to define the idea of vessel* in the Jones Act and to decide if a dredge can be regarded as a vessel. The Supreme Court has yet to hand down a verdict. The author believes that the Jones Act should be interpreted narrowly and should not be applicable to all workers at sea, even those who work on immobile platforms in ports. The concept of 'vessel' in the Jones Act must be interpreted in a narrow sense.

In her introduction, the author points to the institution of a global limitation of liability relating to maritime claims for damage caused by oil pollution at sea. Compensation cannot be greater than the equivalent of a sum calculated on the basis of the tonnage of the vessel involved. This maximum sum is not always sufficient to cover all claims. After the kind of accident that the tanker "Torrey Canyon" suffered in 1967, the international community understood that the traditional limitation of liability on the part of the owners of the vessel made it impossible to cover the cost of the enormous damage which a tanker can cause if it is involved in an accident at sea. The convention on civil liability for damage caused by oil pollution at sea (CLC), which was concluded in 1969, establishes that the owner of the vessel is responsible for damage done on the basis ofrisk. The convention introduced a limit of that liability, but the owner lost his right to that limit if the damage was the result of his culpable actions. Under those circumstances his responsibility became unlimited. A protocol of 1992 supplemented the CLC Convention, as did the Convention of 1971 which created the Compensation Fund for Damage Caused by Oil Pollution. The USA recognised that a ratification of the CLC Convention does not provide sufficient protection for the environment, and, in connection with this, the US Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) in 1990. This legislation established the Compensation Fund for Oil Damage. Responsibility for damage was linked with the principle of risk. Higher limits of responsibility were accepted than in the CLC Convention, and it is easy to lose the privilege of limitation of liability.

In the nineteenth century a clause concerning civil liability was attached to insurance documents in maritime transport. Concretely, this confirmed the insurer's acceptance of three-quarters of the liability for any collision. The ship owner accepted one quarter of the liability. Ship owners, wishing to spread the material risk of damages connected with the collision of vessels, began to join together in so-called mutual insurance clubs. Thirteen of the largest mutual insurance clubs formed a society called the International Group of P and I Clubs. This insures and reinsures more than 90% of world tonnage (and almost 100% of the cargo of European tonnage). The author discusses the decision of the European Commission (1999/329/WE) which grants the International Group of P and I Clubs exemption from the prohibition of cartel collusion and from two agreements: the International Group Agreement and the International Pooling Agreement, to both o f which it exclusively applies. The first agreement limits competition between clubs and the possibility of bringing a ship owner insured in one club into another club by offering him a lower rate. The second agreement concerns the spreading o f the risk o f liability for claims among members of the Group.

The author writes about an important problem of maritime commercial law. She draws attention to the possibility of exploiting a form of understanding among ship owners (called line conferences), even on the basis of European law. This will be a matter of importance from the perspective of the interests of Polish ship owners after Poland's accession to the European Union. At the same time the author draws attention to the OECD report which indicates that this specific feature of maritime transport already belongs to the past, and that one can be certain that liberal tendencies will also extend to the business of ship owning. The future will show if the member states of the OECD will adapt to this tendency. It appears that the reform of shipping legislation in the USA in 1988 began a new era of the gradual opening of the shipping-line sector to free competition. Reform will also take this direction in the European Community, although the process will certainly not be speedy.

In 2001 and 2002, a number of inquiries concerning state aid for firms providing services of general economic interest in ports were directed to the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg. These inquiries pertained specifically to the definition of such aid. An answer was anticipated to the question of whether supplying partialfunding from state resources to firms providing services of general economic interest is, in fact, such aid or simply remuneration for services provided. Since the opinions of the European Court of Justice to date have been contradictory, clarification is necessary. One of the cases submitted to the tribunal regarded aid granted to firms which manage rechnical equipment in Italian ports.