This paper attempts to find out what is the role of competitive environment in shaping the sensitivity of growth in banking to the business cycle. To answer this question, we apply a large set of individual bank level data including over 8000 banks operating in more than 100 countries. This study uses the growth of assets, loans, deposits and leverage as proxies of bank growth and Lerner index as a proxy for the competitive environment. The analysis shows that decreased competition is associated with increased procyclicality of bank growth. However, in a perfectly competitive environment the growth turns out to be countercyclical. This effect differs between high- and lowincome countries. A perfectly competitive environment is associated with countercyclical growth in high-income countries. The opposite result is found for low-income countries. Our results for Central Eastern European countries show that increased competition is associated with enhanced procyclicality of growth.

This paper attempts to find out whether better quality of investor protection matters for the effect of capital ratio on loan growth of large EU banks in 1996-2011. We focus on several measures of the quality of investor protection with a proven track record in the banking literature, i.e.: anti-self-dealing index, ex-ante-control and ex-post-control of anti-self-dealing indices, and creditor protection rights index. Our results show that better investor protection decreases the procyclical impact of capital on lending. This effect is statistically significant for the ex-post-control index. This is consistent with the view that better shareholders rights reduces bank risk-taking, in particular during economic booms, which results in weakened sensitivity of bank lending to capital ratios in economic downturns. This effect holds for both unconsolidated and consolidated data and is robust to sensitivity checks.