The paper aims to justify the need for a philosophical reflection concerning the concept of cognitive artifact, as it is used in situated cognition, and, first of all, for conceptualize and defining them. I tentatively call this area “the epistemology of cognitive artifacts”. The paper forms the problem of reification of the cognitive artifacts and the problem of amplification in describing the cognitive impact of the artifacts. Additionally, the article discusses the issue of nonrepresentational artifacts and singles out a new class of artifacts which I call metacognitive artifacts.

The aim of this paper is to indicate the preliminary conditions that should be met by the concept of extended knowledge. Cognitive artifacts undoubtedly affect human cognition and knowledge. Research on knowledge should therefore take into account significant technological changes. In this paper, I make use of the concept of the Extended Mind, and in epistemological research, I use the reliabilist theories of justification. The effect of this combination is the analysis of the phenomenon of extended knowledge on the examples of extended perception and extended memory. Research conducted in the field of extended epistemology and telepistemology provides a significant support.

The paper demonstrates a close relationship of post-truth to pragmatic truth as William James put it. As such post-truth cannot be treated—as it is commonly perceived— as a falsehood in the sense given it by the classical idea of truth. Post-truth is not a classical cognitive value, but a means of action, more concretely, a means of realizing interests of its operator by using the method of cognitive camouflage; it means that post-truth is disguised as a truth in its classical (correspondence) sense, but it only seemingly communicates in the objective way (i.e., impartially and nonsubjectively) real facts. In my view, the present eruption of post-truths is an effect of the spreading of the pragmatic system of values and infecting by it the whole public sphere and, in consequence, also individual principles and norms of action.

In the paper I address the problem of consolidation of the borders of the world of science by scientific institutions—in this case, Polish scientific societies of various fields. Basing on the analysis of the statutes of selected societies, I formulate a list of research questions that concern the role of scientific societies in distinguishing between what is considered scientific and what is not. These questions can be used in a more in-depth research. I adopt a constructivist perspective, focus on the ways in which science is produced and separated from pseudoscience, and do not address the (in)accuracy of claims rejected by the scientific world.

The article presents conclusions from research on changes in the practice of creating knowledge in the social sciences and humanities, resulting from research cooperation with the socio-economic environment. The research focused primarily on the impact of such collaboration on the advancement of scientific knowledge in these fields. The theoretical framework adopted in the analysis is the concept of science as an autopoietic, social system, derived from the sociological theory of Niklas Luhmann (presented in his Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. 1990).
According to the results of the study, the cooperation of the science system with other social subsystems in its environment significantly affects both the practices of creating knowledge and its ultimate character. Such knowledge, under certain conditions, can become an element of scientific communication, but there are some limitations that are associated with differentthat rationalities of cooperating subsystems. An important barrier is the subordination of the research process to the needs of external systems, which, combined with the high selectivity of the science system, means that knowledge generated in cooperation, mainly of an operational nature, is not accepted by the science system. However, there is a great potential for this type of practice because the knowledge thus generated, after an appropriate translation into the system code of science and embedding it in its wider context, can significantly enrich it, among others, with otherwise inaccessible empirical data and different points of view that may become a basis for further scientific research. Research shows that for many representatives of the social sciences and humanities this potential is effectively used.

The article attempts to establish the role that may be presently played by Merton’s concept of scientific ethos, and especially his norm of “communism” in describing and explaining the mechanisms of modern science’s functioning. Merton introduces scientific ethos’ norms as ethical and technological, and therefore truly regulating the practice of research. In this context especially important is the role played by the norm of “communism,” which orders to share research results with all research community and society. This article presents two visions of research community’s functioning alternative to Merton’s concetion: Pierre Bourdieu’s conception of ” le champ scientifique,” and Bruno Latour’s and Steve Woolgar’s conceptions of conversion of capital within the “cycle of credibility.” None of these concepts feature research practice as organised by “communism.” The consideration of roles of historically evolving models of practicing science (amateur, academic, professional, post-academic) is crucial for a precise description of the rules of functioning in science. Abiding by the rule of communism is possible only in the academic model, whereas modern researchers increasingly often function either within corporations (professional model), or remain in the academia while operating on private funds (post-academic model). Following the rule of communism, even as a moral guideline, is not possible in these circumstances.

In this article, I reflect on recent discussions of the methodological status of scientific knowledge within and outside the Academy. I draw attention to the problem of declining public trust in science (risk and fear society) and the phenomenon of post-truth. In the context of these issues, I present three positions whose authors define the relationship between official academic science in relation to other forms of knowledge (lay people) and forms of knowledge use outside the Academy (politics). The first position termed “elective modernism” was formulated by Harry Collins and Robert Evans in the context of discussions of the third wave of science disputes. Elective modernism defines the way in which policy decisions are made on the recommendations of scholars who have a methodological self-awareness of the possibilities and limitations of scientific knowledge. The second position is Steve Fuller's proposal of protestant science as a form of science in the context of posttruth conditions. In this view, knowledge can be produced by anyone, but it must meet certain specified scientific criteria. The third position is the view of expert knowledge proposed by Mark R. Brown, as a representation of various worldview or cultural options, whose representatives commission experts to make appropriate recommendations for certain political decisions.

In this paper, I present a short 10-point characteristics of the classical conception of truth. Subsequently I point to the importance and comprehensive usefulness of this truth, among others, to the possibility of applying it in some virtual environments, e.g., in those which include virtual objects of types A and C. I also emphasize that—independently of views of promotors and creators of the “post-truth era” (e.g. the will of politicians, propagandists and the authors of conspiracy theories)—truth as it is grasped in the classical theory is in principle non-withdrawable from social discourse, including its philosophical and scientific fields.

Twenty five years ago John Ziman formulated the thesis that academic science and industrial science merge into one system of post-academic and at the same time post-industrial science, in which the Mertonian norms of academic science expressed by the acronym CUDOS ( communism, universalism, disinterestedness, organized scepticism) give way to the norms of industrial science expressed by the acronym PLACE ( proprietary, local, authoritarian, commissioned, expert). In this article, I defend the thesis that this system has evolved into a system of academic industrial science, the norms of which can be expressed with the acronym PRICE: patron relevant, innovative, competitive, econometrical. Thus, reforming academic science is also its re-norming in terms of both ethics and the organization of research. The ethics of scientific research is transformed into the ethics of knowledge production. Scientific institutions are seen as producers of knowledge which is an “epistemic commodity.” A particular of knowledge is needed when it satisfies the needs of “consumers.” Scientists are then „elements” of the knowledge production process, and the process itself is subject to market calculations. This does not undermine the epistemic value of a given research project and its results, but it leads to controversial consequences, including fragmentation and aspectualization of knowledge, linking research directions with the interests of social powers, and ignoring transformative criticism. As a result, sometimes what was treated in the Mertonian science as a threat or an offense against the ethos of science turns out to be the rational behavior of an entrepreneur operating on the market of epistemic goods and services. Academic industrial science is also unable to fulfil non-instrumental roles in society (shaping worldviews, supporting social rationality, providing independent experts) that academic science performed. Attempts to prevent these problems or threats will be doomed to failure in advance, because countermeasures are based on a different understanding of knowledge itself.

In recent years, interest in the problem of expert knowledge has intensified among social scientists. One of the topics more frequently addressed in this context is the relationship between experts and laypeople. This paper examines this issue from the perspective of the concept of epistemic dependence formulated by John Hardwig. I argue that this concept poses a severe challenge to the vision of scientific inquiry dominant in the scientific literature and to the democratic idea of politics. I examine three strategies encountered in the literature for responding to this challenge: individualist, institutional, and epistocratic. Alvin Goldman advocates the first one, as he presents strategies at the disposal of a layman facing two conflicting expert opinions. The second is the belief in the scientific community’s potential to resolve all controversies and protect non-specialists from confronting them. The third is to eliminate epistemic dependence by including only those with sufficient practical experience in expert discussions. In the end, I conclude that the problem of epistemic dependence has no suitable solution. We should place our hopes only with strategies for circumventing it rather than confronting it.

This article presents Nick Bostrom’s considerations of the future included in his book Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies. Bostrom studies such issues as determining the hypothetic ways of attaining superintelligence, its nature and different aspects of this technology. He shows threats regarding such powerful systems, as well as constructing strategies of preventing undesirable activities of superintelligent beings. Bostrom’s input is an important part of present discussion concerning the development of artificial intelligence and its ethical problems.

The aim of the text is to consider Gianni Vattimo’s claim that hermeneutics needs to be more rational due to its criticised relativism and aestheticism. From this perspective, the author considers the projects proposed by Bartosz Brożek and Chrysostomos Mantzavinos, based on the assumption that the cognitive phenomena underlying the understanding of human behaviour and the resulting artefacts can be described using naturalistic methods. Finally, the question is considered whether these attempts, coming from outside the hermeneutic movement, offer hope for eliminating the flaws of hermeneutics mentioned by Vattimo, and what are the prospects for further research on this issue.

Consciousness was the guiding thread of Edmund Husserl's phenomenological investigations. He understood it as a critique of experience and the metaphysics and science based on it. Phenomenology is a critique of cognition, a method of investigation and questioning. In his later writings Husserl defined consciousness as a “system of intentional functions,” a “system of intentional operations.” Its correlate is a coherent and regularized world. One of the most important aspects of the system of intentional functions are habitualities—patterns, mental representations which arise in the process of “typification” and henceforth guide our ordinary thinking and acting. Thanks to them, the type of object, its features and properties are predetermined and, in principle, the ways of knowing it are determined. My task is to characterize the broad context of habituality formation, that is, the stream of consciousness and the possibilities of feeling and movement of the bodily subject. I will discuss in turn the temporal structure of experience and its dependence on the movement and action of the bodily subject, and then characterize the form of general intimacy with the world. It is in this context of “indeterminate reality” that the constitution and evocation of the deposited sense, the anticipation of the type of object and its qualities play out. In conclusion, I will make some remarks about habituality as a source of empirical concepts.

This paper attempts to demonstrate that the conviction about the harmony and order of the world was a fundamental metaphysical principle of the Pythagoreans. This harmony and order were primarily sought in the structures of arithmetics, yet following the discovery of incommensurable magnitudes (irrational numbers, as we now call them), the Pythagoreans began to see geometrical structure as a fundamental part of the world. On the example of the Pythagoreans’ metaphysics and science, the paper shows the mutual relations between metaphysics and science. It demonstrates— on the one hand—the necessity of the first as a guide for the latter, and—on the other—how our scientific research can change its basic metaphysical principles when these are found to be inappropriate. The paper also tries to show the need for a realistic approach in our scientific research by means of the same example of the Pythagoreans, that is, the need to discern something which is below the surface appearance.

The article presents conceptions and theories of expert knowledge, as well as discussions on the epistemological status of expert knowledge, cognitive competences falling within the scope of expertise and expert authority. They are treated as a kind of extra-institutional knowledge, referring only to a small extent to the scientific knowledge and academic circles. The positions of Alvin Goldman, Harry Collins and R. Evans, Z. Majdik and W. Keith, T. Burge and J. Shanteau on the validity of expert knowledge and methods of its justification are presented. The paper points to the problematic nature and certain limitations of the traditional perspective on the credibility of expert knowledge and expert authority. On the example of the phenomenon of the autism spectrum and traditional judgments about it—in particular, expert opinions issued about people covered by it, as well as common opinions and stereotypes— the discussion on the changes taking place in this field of knowledge and social practice is presented. Conceptions of expertise by experience in the subject of autism are discussed, including the so-called self-advocacy and self-advocacy scientists. These new cognitive attitudes and social functions of autism spectrum experts are also analyzed from the point of view of the epistemological credibility of this type of knowledge and competence.

The paper critically considers Alfried Längle’s view presented in his book Gdy rodzi się pytanie o sens. Praktyczne zastosowanie logoterapii [ When the Question of Sense Arises. The Practical Application of Logotherapy] (Warszawa 2016). It invites to reflection focused on the problem of the sense of existence.

In the first part of the article, I reconstruct the philosophical thoughts of Czesław Białobrzeski, a Polish philosophizing physicist. In the second part, I outline his biography and contribution to the development of physics. Philosophical reflections of Białobrzeski formed based on the leading issues in physics of the late 19th and mainly 20th century. He carried out his considerations in close connection to his scientific practice. The activity of the Polish scientist takes place in the formation and development period of quantum mechanics. Białobrzeski, similarly to many other physicists of the time, was well aware of the necessity of coherent explanation of the fundamentally new phenomena of the quantum mechanics. His take on the subject is rather original—he referred to the classical, philosophical theory of categories and proposed its ontological interpretation.

The text considers the concept of engaged philosophy of health protection. The recognized precursor of this philosophy is Julian Aleksandrowicz, a Polish doctor and humanist. Moral problems of the contemporary world, developed in the aspect of ultratechnology and information, are a discursive background of the presented analysis. The paper highlights a need of revaluating the neopositivitist legacy and systemic projects of pro-health methodology. The methodology includes the ideas of health protection at the individual’s level as well as of implementing order and peace in global society. According to this concept the aim can be achieved through integrating the scientific–technical revolution with the humanistic one and with the holistic interpretation of health. Health is defined in the category of emergent, dynamic and vital whole, reached as a synergic effect. In the model of the engaged philosophy the idea of self-creation assumes the value of „subjective health,” its counterweight is “objectified disease.” It is not indifferent to the ethical dimension of choice between life or death, determined in the character of an exclusive alternative. The study uses the method of qualitative research. The basic theses of engaged philosophy , defined in the light of the health care problem have been justified.

The aim of the article is to reconstruct the cardinal theses and assumptions of the materialistic-dialectical ontology in the post-Stalinist Marxist scientific philosophy, often described as "Eastern Marxism". Basing on the source literature covering the works of the most eminent Polish (Stefan Amsterdamski, Stanisław Butryn, Helena Eilstein, Władysław Krajewski, Jan Such, Wiesław Sztumski and others) and Soviet (Fedosseyev, Konstantinov, Szeptulin, Rubinshtajn, etc.) philosophers which studied the links between dialectical materialism and natural sciences, I claim that postwar Marxist scientism clarifies the concise intuitions of the classics of Marxism regarding the nature and assumptions of dialectical materialism, especially the dialectic of nature. Contrary to the current interpretations of the sources of dogmatism in Marxism as the dominant ontological assumption of dialectical and natural materialism, according to these findings, it turns out that after its post-war modernization, the dialectical ontology was cleared of numerous dogmas and misunderstandings. Moreover, it turns out to be consistent with the general assumptions of the anti-Stalinist Marxist social and political philosophy.

Computational modeling plays an important role in the methodology of contemporary science. The epistemological role of modeling and simulations leads to questions about a possible use of this method in philosophy. Attempts to use some mathematical tools to formulate philosophical concepts trace back to Spinoza and Newton. Newtonian natural philosophy became an example of successful use of mathematical thinking to describe the fundamental level of nature. Newton’s approach has initiated a new scientific field of research in physics and at the same time his system has become a source of new philosophical considerations about physical reality. According to Michael Heller, some physical theories may be treated as the formalizations of philosophical conceptions. Computational modeling may be an extension of this idea; this is what I would like to present in the article. I also consider computational modeling in philosophy as a source of new philosophical metaphors; this idea has been proposed in David J. Bolter’s conception of defining technology. The consideration leads to the following conclusion: In the methodology of philosophy significant changes have been taking place; the new approach do not make traditional methods obsolete, it is rather a new analytical tools for philosophy and a source of inspiring metaphors.

The paper tries to defend the thesis that it is impossible to decide upon moral issues without any references to the ontology of the world we live in. An illustrative example of the main argumentation line is the choice made by Cypher—a second plan character in the movie Matrix. Cypher decides to betray human rebels fighting against machines for freedom and, as a reward, accepts affluent life in the virtual reality. His choice seems to be superficially reprehensible because of the abandonment of the real world and authentic life. However, one can argue that the dichotomy between the real and virtual world is seeming. By choosing the virtual reality Cypher decided to act in a world which, like the real world, makes it possible to be a moral subject and enables authentic experience. The difference between both the worlds lies in the type of determination limiting any conscious subject. Cypher prefers to live in a world determined by the algorithm of Matrix more than in a world where his behaviour is determined by genes and other biological factors.

The article presents the phenomenon of increasing sharing in-formations for free on the Internet and the contemporary development of gift economy in the form of a movement most often called cybercommunism. The article points out two basic attitudes in treating information. According to the first one, information should be treated as a commodity to which property rights can be attributed and which is subject to market play. This involves such issues as copyright, fees, licenses and other ways of protecting the interests of market players. The second attitude is to treat valuable information as a common good, often with a moral imperative to share it (to varying degrees Open Source and Open Acces, the idea of copyleft, DIY, P2P network, YouTube, The Pirate Bay domain etc.). Since every concept or movement proclaiming a community of goods is called communism (in a broader sense of the word, in a narrower sense it is a specific political system, e.g. the Soviet Union), today we are dealing with digital communism on the Internet. Some researchers (Firer-Blaess, Fuchs) point to Wikipedia as an example. The Internet encyclopedia operates on the basis of principles that go beyond the capitalist way of production and represent an informational-communist way of production: in the subjective dimension, it is a cooperative work and in the objective dimension, a shared ownership of the means of production. The text also presents the division of ethics into an abstract and concrete one, applied to the behaviour of network users. If someone within the framework of an abstract ethics preaches the principle of “You will not pirate.” (copying and distributing illegally) is a corresponding principle of specific ethics that says “You will not pirate unless O1 or O2...or he.” In practice, concrete ethics push many Internet users to treat Internet resources as a common good, from which everyone can draw according to their own needs. Digital communism can be treated, on the one hand, as a partially implemented idea and, on the other, as a postulate. From an axiological point of view, this postulate would be connected with the Internet implementation of equality (access to resources for everyone) and freedom (access to all information).

The article focuses on selected problems which have now appeared and fall under the ideas “industry 4.0” and “society 5.0”, namely on anthropological issues. Changes in the relationships between man and technology based on trust lead to an increase of the role of the technological factor in these relations. Other aspects of the analyzed changes concern the new requirements of the responsibility and changes of human subjectivity and rationality. The future of man appears to be an area of uncertainty related to inter alia the conditions of functioning and living in the order of the post-digital world.

In the paper the phenomenon of big data is presented. I pay my special attention to the relation of this phenomenon to research work in experimental sciences. I search for answers to two questions. First, do the research methods proposed within the paradigm big data can be applied in experimental sciences? Second, does applying the research methods subject to the big data paradigm lead, in consequence, to a new understanding of science?