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Abstract

Due to the strength of Willlard V.O. Quine’s attack on the notion of analyticity, the reputation of this concept in philosophy has been considerably shaken. However, not everybody was convinced by Quine’s argument. Among those who decided to defend the dichotomy between analytic and synthetic sentences were two English ordinary language philosophers: Paul Grice and Peter Strawson. Their views are the main subject of the presented article. It consists of five parts. After outlining the basic distinctions connected with analyticity in Part One, the main elements of Quine’s critique of analyticity are delineated in Part Two. Part Three includes Grice’s and Strawson’s response to this critique. Part Four, perhaps surprisingly, describes some decisions by the Polish administrative courts, concerning the interpretation of the concept of ‘widow’ according to the article 20 paragraph 3 of the Act on the Combatant and Victimized Persons. In the final, Part Five, an attempt is made to establish the thesis that analytic sentences are not immune to criticism and may in fact be contested, though their effective abolition may require substantial argumentation and theoretical considerations. This opens a new possibility of using the notion of analyticity in conceptual analysis in jurisprudence.

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Authors and Affiliations

Michał Pełka

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