This article proposes an unconventional approach to the division of mining royalties between various administrative units affected by mining activities. Typically, a mining royalty is considered the own income of the units where the exploitation is performed and is usually calculated in relation to the tonnage (volume) of the extracted mineral or the value of the raw material produced. In the article, a different approach has been proposed in order to ensure a useful and fair division of the royalty wherein the unit levy calculation approach was combined with the income criterion using Aumann- Maschler bargaining sets. The case study of the Racibórz II-Reservoir 5 pebble deposit, located within three administrative units (districts) in southern Poland was considered. The exploitation of the deposit within each of the districts requires the separate consent of the local authorities, and in the analyzed case, it is currently conducted in two districts. In terms of income, achievable revenues from exploitation for various alliances of the districts that provide the deposit for mining were calculated. The feasible revenues were transformed into appropriate streams of the mining royalty distribution. It was pointed out that the solutions suggested by the Aumann-Maschler bargaining sets can be treated as a fair division. Proper royalty allocation can be an effective, flexible and important factor in encouraging the district authorities to consent to the exploitation. The adoption of solutions based on the Aumann-Maschler bargaining set will meet the requirement of the full use of mineral resources and is an example of externalities compensation resulting from mining activities.