The author argues in favor of a claim concerning a version of radical skepticism that he calls ‘dubitative’. Unlike the radical skepticism once described by Jan Woleński that consists in the skeptic’s total refraining from making any definite statements, ‘dubitative skepticism’ consists in the skeptic’s expression of his/her doubt as regards to whatever he/she is presented with, including his/her own putative statements. ‘Doubt’ equals ‘lack of having a justification’ for a given definitive statement. This attitude is incontrovertibly possible for both a relevant p and a not-p. But ‘doubt about having a justification for p’ is incompatible with ‘doubt about not having a justification for p’. Whatever choice is made in the end, it is contained in the skeptic’s actual statement to the effect that he/she has knowledge concerning something, i.e. a knowledge that concerns his/her state of mind plus the knowledge that he/she has expressed it in the statement itself (and so on, ad infinitum). This extirpates radicalism from the skepticism of a dubitative skeptic, who, as it appears, by no means denounces any commitment to making a statement or to having knowledge. The article closes with an appropriate formal argument expressed in standard terms.

The author develops a non‑literary, theistic Weltanschauung. It is based on the acceptance of the role of ‘did’ and ‘knows’ as non‑empirical conceptual (indefinable) ‘primes’. The basic argument of this paper is derived from a detailed linguistic observation of the idiosyncratic behaviour of the concepts ‘why’ and ‘because’ vis‑à‑vis other questioners and the functor ‘can’. The item ‘because’ presupposes a conjunction with a clause indicating an obligatorily altogether different state of affairs than one that is given in ‘a because ...’, as an expression patterned on * ‘a because a’ that constitutes a case of one of the most extreme linguistic deviances. Such a putative phrase cannot belong to any natural linguistic code, nor can it be its real product (that is no other than a quip in a purely perlocutionary utterance in J.L. Austin’s sense). Similarly, a generalized version of ‘did’ or ‘knows’ ( someone did / knows something without any specification) cannot be positioned in such a conjunction on pain of engaging in a destructive infinite regress, unless they are coupled with some further, different concept (i.e. a concept other than ‘did’ resp. ‘know’) in a concatenation with ‘because’. According to the author, this shows that precisely the two indicated concepts are conceptual ‘primes’, or the fundamental synthetic a priori’s whose denotata underlie the whole of the reality. The author tries to show that it is unacceptable to reduce Reality to a single and unique empirical universe conceived of as an effect of ‘doing’. He claims that Ockham’s idea of multiplicity of universes represents a logical necessity. But he rejects the mystical höheres in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus as including „pure logic”, ethics and aesthetics. All the three areas, he claims, belong to the created natural realm of speaking beings. Reality, grasped by logic, is broader than that realm.