The article attempts to establish the role that may be presently played by Merton’s concept of scientific ethos, and especially his norm of “communism” in describing and explaining the mechanisms of modern science’s functioning. Merton introduces scientific ethos’ norms as ethical and technological, and therefore truly regulating the practice of research. In this context especially important is the role played by the norm of “communism,” which orders to share research results with all research community and society. This article presents two visions of research community’s functioning alternative to Merton’s concetion: Pierre Bourdieu’s conception of ” le champ scientifique,” and Bruno Latour’s and Steve Woolgar’s conceptions of conversion of capital within the “cycle of credibility.” None of these concepts feature research practice as organised by “communism.” The consideration of roles of historically evolving models of practicing science (amateur, academic, professional, post-academic) is crucial for a precise description of the rules of functioning in science. Abiding by the rule of communism is possible only in the academic model, whereas modern researchers increasingly often function either within corporations (professional model), or remain in the academia while operating on private funds (post-academic model). Following the rule of communism, even as a moral guideline, is not possible in these circumstances.

Odpierając zarzuty polemistów, autor artykułu zwraca uwagę na dużą rolę jasności i precyzji pojęć w prowadzeniu polemik naukowych oraz wyjaśnia bronione przez siebie wcześniej stanowisko umiarkowanego konstruktywizmu w socjologii. W konkluzji przypisuje swym krytykom nie w pełni wyartykułowany irracjonalizm, który wynika, jego zdaniem, zarówno z fascynacji myślą społeczną Brunona Latoura, jak i z powierzchownej interpretacji Maksa Webera.

The number of publications inspired by Bruno Latour’s social thought has significantly grown in Poland over the last decade. Among them there are theoretical analyses, research programms as well as projects of social engineering. This situation makes it urgent to examine the credibility of Latour’s vision of science and society. The present article claims that the premises as well as arguments of the French thinker are not only fallacious but also dangerous. A number of absurdities following from the actor-network theory become evident in the works of the Polish followers of Latour. Thus the article focuses on selected examples of them. In the conclusion the author indicates certain advantages for Latour’s readers and formulates several hypotheses about the possible reasons for Latour’s growing popularity.