Analyzing Don Quixote from the perspective of the main character's madness has a long history backed by a well-entrenched critical tradition. The latter was recently revisited by Marcin Rychter in his article 'Don Kichote i szaleństwo' [Don Quixote and madness] ( Przegląd Filozoficzny, N.S., 2017 (2), pp. 121–133). Although Rychter eschews psychiatric terminology in his descriptions of Don Quixote's state of mind, he cannot help using the term 'psychosis' and assumes that the reactions of Cervantes' protagonist are delusions and hallucinations. This article steers clear of any psychoanalytical or psychiatric interpretations of Don Quixote and suggests instead that he represents a metaphorical projection of self-estrangement which has reached the point of not being able to interact with the outside world. The very creation of such a character dramatizes the problem of incongruity between self-expression and the rules of communication with other people and the basic assumptions which make understanding and being understood possible. In effect Don Quixote may be seen as an exemplary figure typifying both autism and cognitive distortions. He personifies the Other, i.e. someone who is separate and estranged from the community and its norms and, at the same time, valiantly grapples with that condition trying again and again to transcend it.

W ciągu ostatniej dekady znacznie wzrosła ilość osób ze zdiagnozowanym „spektrum zaburzeń autystycznych”. Na podstawie szacunkowych danych można określić, iż w Polsce jest ponad. 30 tys. osób chorych na autyzm, w związku z powyższym liczba osób, których dotyczy ten problem wynosi ponad 100 tys. w Polsce. Rosnące zapotrzebowanie na obiekty i przestrzenie publiczne dostosowane dla potrzeb tej grupy osób wymaga usystematyzowania wiedzy zakresie projektowania architektonicznego uwzględniającego wymagania osób ze spectrum zabużeń autystycznych. W artykule przedstawiono podstawowe zasady kształtowania tzw. Pokoi wyciszeń” coraz częściej lokalizowanych w obiektach użyteczności publicznej.

The article presents conceptions and theories of expert knowledge, as well as discussions on the epistemological status of expert knowledge, cognitive competences falling within the scope of expertise and expert authority. They are treated as a kind of extra-institutional knowledge, referring only to a small extent to the scientific knowledge and academic circles. The positions of Alvin Goldman, Harry Collins and R. Evans, Z. Majdik and W. Keith, T. Burge and J. Shanteau on the validity of expert knowledge and methods of its justification are presented. The paper points to the problematic nature and certain limitations of the traditional perspective on the credibility of expert knowledge and expert authority. On the example of the phenomenon of the autism spectrum and traditional judgments about it—in particular, expert opinions issued about people covered by it, as well as common opinions and stereotypes— the discussion on the changes taking place in this field of knowledge and social practice is presented. Conceptions of expertise by experience in the subject of autism are discussed, including the so-called self-advocacy and self-advocacy scientists. These new cognitive attitudes and social functions of autism spectrum experts are also analyzed from the point of view of the epistemological credibility of this type of knowledge and competence.