Ethicists have thus far not paid much attention to uncertainty, very often concentrating on highly idealized hypothetical situations where both empirical (e.g. the state of the world, the spectrum of possible decisions and their consequences, the causal connections between events) and normative (the content of norms, value scales) matters were clearly defined and well-known to the decision-maker. In this article, which stems from a project on different types of decisions under uncertainty related to the rapid progress in biomedical research, I analyze some situations of normative uncertainty, cases when an agent must make a decision, but does not know which choice is correct, for example, because he/she has contrary intuitions about the permissibility of available decisions. The view termed comparativism claims that in such cases the appropriate decision depends not only on the credences that one assigns to different norms, but also on how much possible decisions are worth taking in the light of these norms. I analyze a few cases of normative uncertainty, and a specific counter-argument against the current versions of comparativism, showing that under normative uncertainty this view imposes risk neutrality, although it permits us to have different risk attitudes under empirical uncertainty. I also argue that a precautionary approach to situations of normative uncertainty is overly simplistic.

This contribution points out the most important aspects to consider in the ethical (in) acceptability of aesthetic operations. Starting from the value of the human body seen from a biblical perspective, it introduces the reader to the essential magisterial statements concerning aesthetic surgery, among which the speech of Pope Pius XII occupies a particular position. It also refers to ethical principles, especially the principle of double effect and totality, and outlines the basic argumentative positions of selected bioethics committees. There is also a brief introduction to the positions of several contemporary bioethicists. In conclusion, the author presents his point of view and briefly explains what the patient should take into account and what the aesthetic surgeon should look for to avoid ethically wrong actions

Observing current trends in moral theology, especially in the field of bioethics, has long raised both the methodological and meritorious problem of obscuring or even removing the boundaries between good and evil. Divergence and contradiction have become a strange scientific standard in theological-moral discourse in the derivation of Hegel’s synthesis on fundamental moral questions. Depositum fidei morale, which is based on the Decalogue, Lex aeterna, and lex naturalis, seems to be giving way to post-Christian Wittgenstein language-games, in which the clear line between good and evil (including truth and falsehood), determined by the transcendent Authority of God, has been relativized. The reflection of the relationship between the norm and conscience, as well as the relationship between good and evil, in the light of the Thomistic philosophical-theological patrimony, seeks to point to the need of accepting an adequate logical re-examination of the ethical analysis of a human act. Without this, it is impossible to continue not only in Traditio, but also in finding a universal reference point for distinguishing between good and evil in the complicated world of contemporary bioethics, which responds to revolutionary biotechnologies in the field of biomedicine.

Artykuł składa się z części krytycznej oraz pozytywnej. Część krytyczna stanowi polemikę z dwoma najbardziej rozpowszechnionymi uzasadnieniami na rzecz utożsamienia całkowitej niewydolności mózgu (tzw. śmierci mózgowej) ze śmiercią człowieka. Zgodnie z jednym z nich, śmierć ma miejsce wtedy, gdy dochodzi do somatycznej dezintegracji organizmu. Natomiast drugie uzasadnienie, zaproponowane w 2008 r. przez President’s Council on Bioethics, utożsamia śmierć z utratą zdolności do samozachowania. W części zawierającej pozytywną argumentację autor przedstawia alternatywną koncepcję, według której śmierć, w znaczeniu, jakie jest istotne z perspektywy praktyki medycznej, jest tożsama z nieodwracalną utratą cech stanowiących o tym, że dana istota posiada status moralny. Nowa koncepcja pozwala utożsamić stan całkowitej niewydolności mózgu ze śmiercią człowieka oraz daje podstawę do opracowania bardziej precyzyjnych medycznych kryteriów śmierci.