Following upon Merlin Donald’s claim that human specificity emerges in history, and not exclusively in evolutionary time, it will be suggested that the diversified means of producing semiosis created by human beings account for the spread of empathy and altruism not only beyond the kin group, but to humankind in general. This amounts to treating other cultures as different from us, but still able to enter into communication with us (as an Alter), as opposed to treating these cultures as being part of nature, and thus only susceptible to being communicated about (as an Alius). Starting out from the theory of bio-cultural evolution defended by Peter J. Richerson and Robert Boyd, as well as from the multi-level selection theory of Elliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson, we try to lay bare the way in which semiotic structures play a role for transforming cultural evolution, contrary to biological evolution, into human history. We inquiry into what makes the existence of Alter-culture possible, if, as Sober and Wilson have claimed, armed with game theory, an altruistic society (an Ego-culture in our terms), is only possible in opposition to another group in relation to which group egoism rules (that is, in our terms, an Alius-culture). We will follow Michael Tomasello in arguing for the primacy of games of cooperation, rather than competition, while adding an historical dimension, which serves to explain how such cooperation can be extended beyond the primary group (our Ego-culture). However, we will insist on the importance of multiple semiotic resources for the boot-strapping of empathy and altruism, as well as on the genesis of this process in cultural encounters, as reflected in the spirit of the Enlightenment.

The subject matter of this article constitutes the semiotic mapping of human of knowledge which results from cognition. Departing from the presentation of human subjects as world-model-builders, it places epistemology among the sciences of science and the sciences of man. As such the understanding of epistemology is referred either to a static state of knowledge or to a dynamic acquisition of knowledge by cognizing subjects. The point of arrival, in the conclusive part of a this article, constitutes the substantiation of the two understandings of epistemology, specified, firstly, as a set of investigative perspectives, which the subject of science has at his/her disposal as a knower on the metascientific level, or, secondly, as a psychophysiological endowment of a cognizing subject who possesses the ability of learning and/or knowing a certain kind of information about cognized reality.

This paper aims at elaborating the concept of linguistic self with regard to its twofold existence modes, namely as a physical person and as a mental subject, being shaped by external and internal dialogs in interpersonal and intersubjective communication. These dialogical encounters, constantly changing the reality of everyday life, are based, on the one hand, on the observable multitextuality of narratives, and on the other, on the multi-voicedness of opinions. As such, it lays emphasis on the need for a holistic approach to human beings as a psychosomatic unity, taking part in cognition with their minds and bodies, and developing itself both in-and-with the physical and logical domains of their surrounding ecosystems. In view of the private and public character of the self, the author postulates to consider in future studies the achievements of personal and social constructivism.

This article first surveys the current, somewhat unproductive state of research into potential universals of translation. Then it considers in specific the “first translational response universal” (Malmkjær 2011), suggesting that it may be rooted in the cognitive mechanism of priming. Empirical evidence for this is next sought in the analysis of a set of 34 novice translations of the same short passage from Swedish into Polish, which are shown to exhibit the effects of priming to a considerable extent. Overall, the objective is to illustrate a possible way of investigating postulated translation universals: first identifying a cluster of cognitive mechanisms to motivate the universal, then determining the linguistic structures that are concrete manifestations of such mechanisms in languages meeting in translation. The proposed research procedure thus proceeds from a cognitive process to a detailed language structure, allowing for the examination of phenomena observed in the “third code” on the supra-cultural level.

This paper addresses an interesting issue in name theory, specifically the relationship between toponyms and spatial representations, as well as the cultural differences manifesting themselves in connection with these. Studies have shown that the name model (a general knowledge of names) created based on the mental representation of names is partly language and culture dependent. Thus, the knowledge of the speaker on how reliably the toponyms correlate with the actual features of the landscape or whether they should only be considered as labels identifying an area is culturally determined. This, in turn, influences the extent to which name-users may rely on them in structuring space and in creating a cognitive map.

The growing popularity of so-called cognitive enhancement technologies raises questions about their impact on the sphere of individual legal responsibility. This article examines the issue of whether, in a situation where a surgeon, prone to making a fatigue-related medical error, refuses to undergo a safe cognitive enhancement before surgery, the surgeon can be attributed liability for damages. The answer to this question is negative, however, as indicated in the article, the impossibility of attributing damages is a result of (1) the lack of professional guidelines requiring doctors to undergo cognitive enhancement; (2) the lack of scientific evidence that the use of such measures results in the elimination of fatigue and reduces the risk of error. As a result, the negative answer to the analyzed question is not determined by the solution of the model of liability for damages adopted in Polish law, but rather by the current state of research on cognitive improvement. This gives the analysis a universal character and makes it possible to relate the method adopted in it to new results of research on means of cognitive enhancement if any.

The philosophical tradition defines the subject as a reflective being, in principle aware of its agency which makes it capable of making free decisions and taking responsibility for them. Agency, understood in this way, is clearly attributed only to people. However, the technological development of artificial cognitive enhancements and of increasingly autonomous artificial intelligence, that has been taken place in last few decades, casts doubts whether such an approach is not too anthropocentric. This doubt is indicated by some proponents of extending cognitive processes beyond the human brain; they argue for the need of appropriate extension of the subject as well. Moreover, there is an increasing number of proposals attributing agency to artifacts. In the first part of the article, I refer to the two most commonly used philosophical criteria distinguishing the subject of cognition from all information processing systems: being a reflective system, and being the subject of intentional stance. Next, I assess, from such a perspective, the attempts to attribute agency to both one-person extended cognitive systems and artificial systems, such as relatively autonomous computer programs. I argue that the gap between conceptions of the extended subject and the artificial subject, and the standard approach incline toward the usage of the term “agent” designating this phenomenon. The term is already widely used in cognitive science to designate any relatively autonomous information processing system performing a cognitive task. The need of the clear distinction between “the subject” (“subjectivity”) and “the agent” (“agency”) is especially noticeable in Polish, where the difference in meanings of these concepts is not so evident as in English. The awareness of the applying in cognitive science these two different notions of agency prevents against a conceptual misuse which could lead to erroneous explanations and predictions.

The complexity of the phenomena associated with the course of the cognitive processes that determine an efficient learning, excludes the possibility of collecting knowledge in other ways than neuronal-information. It excludes also possibilities of interpreting it, in other ways than with use of respectively formalized cognitive models. The presented paper is a kind of summary of the latest achievements in this field.

The present article is concerned with the notion of ‘guilt’ as understood by the legal sciences and in the context of psychology and culture studies. Although legal connotations are unavoidable, ‘guilt’ is a term emotionally related to other feelings like ‘shame’, ‘fear’, ‘sadness’ etc. The analysis shall take a closer look at legal definitions of ‘guilt’ and ‘culpability’ at work in the American, Polish and German legal systems and refer the equivalents existing in these languages (wina,Schuld) to the concept of guilt understood as an emotion. As it turns out, legal definitions do not account for conceptual dimension of meaning and as such, they can only serve as departure points for further analysis to be complemented with cognitive analysis. ‘Guilt’ is a culturally determined and complex emotion that may be ‘dissected’ into several more basic emotional states. The underlying assumption is that there are differences in the understanding of the concept ‘guilt’ across languages which must be taken into account by the translators who deal with translational equivalents.