The idea of a Multilateral Investment Court seems to be one of the most prominent initiatives of the “multilateralization” of international investment law during this century. The creation of a new international, permanent court concentrated on settling investor – state disputes is an extraordinary challenge. Possible problems relate not only to the negotiations concerning the organizational and procedural aspects necessary to ensure the efficient operation of this type of body. It is also necessary to take into account the dynamics of the functioning of international adjudication as such, as well as the controversies surrounding the international legal protection of foreign investments.
This article concerns constitutional problems related to the implementation of EU directives seen from both the legal and comparative perspectives. The directives are a source of law which share a number of characteristic features that significantly affect and determine the specificity of Member States’ constitutional review of the directives as well as the legal acts that implement them. The review of the constitutionality of EU directives is carried out in accordance with the provisions of national implementing acts. Member States’ constitutional courts adopt two basic positions in this respect. The first position (adopted by, inter alia, the French Constitutional Council and German Federal Constitutional Court) is based on the assumption of a partial “constitutional immunity” of the act implementing the directive, which results in only a partial control of the constitutionality of the implementing acts, i.e. the acts of national law implementing such directives. The second position, (adopted, explicitly or implicitly by, inter alia, the Austrian Federal Constitutional Court, Czech Constitutional Court, Polish Constitutional Court, Romanian Constitutional Court and Slovak Constitutional Court) concerns the admissibility of a full review of the implementing acts. This leads to the admissibility of an indirect review of the content of the directive if the Court examines the provision as identical in terms of content with an act of EU law. Another issue is related to the application of the EU directives as indirect yardsticks of review. The French Constitutional Council case-law on review of the proper implementation of EU directives represents the canon in this regard. Nonetheless, interesting case studies of further uses of EU directives as indirect yardsticks of review can be found in the case law of other constitutional courts, such as the Belgian Constitutional Court or Spanish Constitutional Court. The research presented in this paper is based on the comparative method. The scope of the analysis covers case law of the constitutional courts of both old and new Member States. It also includes a presentation of recent jurisprudential developments, focusing on the constitutional case-law regarding the Data Retention Directive and the Directive on Combating Terrorism.
People appear in the courtroom when they engage in various disputes with others and have diverse problems of their own. The courts are supposed to provide them with a space where they can obtain justice, in accordance with the law. It is no less important, however, that while pursuing this goal the courts should deal with people’s problems in a way that makes the people willing to accept and comply with their decisions. The central issue defining the scope of this empirical study was the question of what element of the construct of procedural justice promotes behaviors associated with legitimacy and compliance with the law in the Polish judicial system. The author set out to investigate what identified procedural justice in Polish legal culture and what variables pertaining to the context of legal proceedings it was related to. The sample consisted of 115 individuals taking part in civil court proceedings conducted in civil divisions of district courts. Based on analyses performed on research results it can be concluded that behaviors associated with legitimacy and compliance with the law in the Polish judicial system is determined by the sense of fairness experienced in the courtroom, whose structure is built by experiences such as being given the opportunity to speak, being treated with respect, the judge’s impartiality, the comprehensibility of the language used and procedures applied in the courtroom, and the sense of influence on the final outcome of the proceedings.
The paper deals with a little-known translation of the Vulgate Psalter which was published anonymously in 1700 in Saint-Germain-en-Laye by the printer of the exiled court of King James VII of Scotland and II of England. The paper argues in favour of the originality of the translation in the face of the claim expressed in the literature that it represents a revision of an earlier English rendition made from the Vulgate published in 1610 as part of the Douay-Rheims Bible. The adduced data draw from history, life writing studies and linguistics, thereby offering multidisciplinary evidence in favour of the originality of the rendition.
Given the whole spectrum of doubts and controversies that arise in discussions about laws affecting historical memory (and their subcategory of memory laws), the question of assessing them in the context of international standards of human rights protection – and in particular the European system of human rights protection – is often overlooked. Thus this article focuses on the implications and conditions for introducing memory laws in light of international human rights standards using selected examples of various types of recently-adopted Polish memory laws as case studies. The authors begin with a brief description of the phenomenon of memory laws and the most significant threats that they pose to the protection of international human rights standards. The following sections analyse selected Polish laws affecting historical memory vis-à-vis these standards. The analysis covers non-binding declaratory laws affecting historical memory, and acts that include criminal law sanctions. The article attempts to sketch the circumstances linking laws affecting historical memory with the human rights protection standards, including those entailed both in binding treaties and other instruments of international law.
With the Act on the Polish Card Poland followed the pattern of some European states (mostly Central and Eastern European ones) of enacting specific domestic legislation conferring special treatment and benefits to persons who are recognized as its kin-minorities. The most important analysis of this phenomenon from the perspective of international law was the 2001 Venice Commission’s report entitled “Report on the Protection of National Minorities by their Kin-State.” The Polish legislation was adopted in 2007, so for obvious reasons it was not considered by the Venice Commission. However, a rather unexpected and unusual examination of the Polish kin-state legislation from the perspective of international law came from Belarus. The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Belarus (CCRB) conducted a comprehensive examination of the Act on the Polish Card in 2011. The main aim of this article is to present and comment on the reasoning of the CCRB. Beginning with the broader context, this article starts with a presentation of the origins and a short description of the Act on the Polish Card, followed by a discussion of why the Polish Card and other kin-state legislation instruments are topics of concern in international law. The main part of the article is devoted to the presentation and assessment of the 2011 CCRB decision on the Act on the Polish Card. The author’s assessment confirms at least some of the concerns put forward by the CCRB, i.e., that both the Act on the Polish Card and the practice based on it contradict some norms and principles of international law, namely the principle of territorial sovereignty, the norms of consular law, and several bilateral treaties in force between these two states. Bearing in mind that despite those concerns more than a quarter-million Polish Cards (also sometimes called Pole’s Cards) have been issued so far by the Polish authorities, the article ends with a discussion of why such a prolonged nonconformity with international law is possible.
In 1995, Professor Krzysztof Skubiszewski added a Dissenting Opinion to the East Timor Judgment, wherein the ICJ declined jurisdiction in a proceeding started by Portugal against Australia for its having concluded the East Timor Gap treaty with Indonesia, in blatant violation of the East Timorese’s right to self-determination. Ad-hoc Judge Skubiszewski posited that the Court should have accepted jurisdiction and he presented a series of convincing arguments for this proposition. In 2019 the ICJ rendered an Opinion in the Chagos Islands case. The fact that the ICJ accepted jurisdiction in this case demonstrates that an impressive development has taken place since 1995, one whereby many of Professor Skubiszewki’s requests have been implemented. At the same time however, the Chagos Opinion is not fully satisfying as it neglects, to a considerable extent, the human rights issue. This contribution shows that Skubiszewski’s Dissenting Opinion would have provided guidance also for these questions and that it remains as topical today as it was in 1995.
The Polish Government’s proposal, submitted in autumn 2017, for a comprehensive reprivatisation bill revived the international discussion on the scope of Polish authorities’ obligations to return property taken during World War II and subsequently by the communist regime. However, many inaccurate and incorrect statements are cited in the discussions, e.g. the argument that the duty of the Polish authorities to carry out restitution is embedded in the European Convention on Human Rights and its Protocol No. 1. This article challenges that claim and analyses the jurisprudence of the Convention’s judicial oversight bodies in cases raising issues of restitution of property taken over in Poland before the accession to both of the above-mentioned international agreements. In the article I argue that there is no legal basis for claiming that there exists a legal obligation upon the Polish State stemming directly from international law – in particular human rights law – to return the property and that the only possibly successful legal claims in this regard are those that can already be derived from the provisions of the Polish law applicable to these kinds of cases. In its latest rulings, issued in 2017–2019, the European Court of Human Rights determined the scope of responsibility incumbent on Polish authorities in this respect.
This article critically evaluates the summary procedure introduced by Protocol No. 14 to the European Convention on Human Rights, adopted within the reform of the European Court of Human Rights system. The summary procedure, now set out in Art. 28(1)b of the Convention, was instituted in order to facilitate expediency and to reduce the case load of the Court. This article argues that while judicial economy is a legitimate goal, the summary procedure under Art. 28(1)b has considerable deficiencies that undermine some of the systemic goals and core values of ECHR law. There is a manifest lack of remedies vis-à-vis the choice of the procedure, choice of applicable law, and no appeals against final decisions rendered in the course of the summary procedure. Notably, the concept of “well-established case-law” seems to be neither clear nor reliable, as evidenced in the cases analysed in the article. These cases, which involve the issue of socially- owned property in Serbia, serve to demonstrate some of the significant errors in interpretation and decision-making which can result from application of the summary procedure.
The article offers a revisited look at the classic jurisprudence of the ECtHR and CJEU concerning the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus from the perspective of the phenomenon of judicial dialogue. In this context, it aims to examine whether judicial dialogue contributes to the development of coherent jurisprudence and in consequence of effective judicial redress in cases involving unrecognised entities and individuals. It draws attention to the threats for both the international rule of law and the protection of rights of individuals resulting from inconsistencies within own jurisprudence of the respective court, as well as from lack of coherence in interpretation and application of the same rules of international law by different courts.
As many as three international disputes containing allegations of infringement of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms Racial Discrimination (ICERD) have been brought before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), thus contributing to the number of cases allowing the Court to pronounce itself on the international human rights law. Even though none of the cases invoking violations of ICERD has been (yet) adjudicated on the merits, they have already provided an opportunity to clarify (at least in part) the compromissory clause enshrined in Art. 22 of ICERD, as well as to tackle some other issues related to provisional measures ordered by the Court. This article discusses the ICJ’s approaches to the application of ICERD in the three above-mentioned cases, while posing the question whether indeed the 1965 Convention can be useful as a tool for settling inter-state disputes. The author claims that ICERD and the broad definition of “racial discrimination” set out in its Art. 1 constitute cornerstones for the international protection of human rights, though the recourse to the procedures provided in Art. 22 of ICERD – vital as they are – should not necessarily be perceived as a better alternative to the inter-state procedures and the functions exercised by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD).
The purpose of this article is to determine the relationship between the principles of subsidiarity and effectiveness and an effective remedy for the excessive length of proceedings within the legal order of the European Convention on Human Rights. The article assumes that these key principles of the ECHR’s legal order have an impact on such a remedy, both in the normative and practical dimensions. This assumption has helped explain many aspects of the Strasbourg case law regarding this remedy. Concerning the relationship of this remedy with the principle of subsidiarity, it raises issues such as: the “reinforcing” of Art. 6 § 1; the “close affinity” of Arts. 13 and 35 § 1; and the arguability test. In turn, through the prism of the principle of effectiveness, the reasonableness criterion and the requirement of diligence in the proceedings are presented, followed by the obligations of States to prevent lengthiness of proceedings and the obligations concerning adequate and sufficient redress for such an excessive length of proceedings. The analysis shows that an effective remedy with respect to the excessive length of proceedings is not a definitive normative item, as the Court consistently adds new elements to its complex structure, taking into account complaints regarding the law and practice of States Parties in the prevention of and compensation for proceedings of an excessive length.
Article published in Science, 2012 by Jennifer A. Doudna, Emmanuelle Charpentier and their team presented a novel tool named as CRISPR/Cas9. The original CRISPR/Cas9 tool and the whole system developed from it since then allow making precise changes in the nucleotide sequence in the defined locus of the genome. The article presents the already known as well the potential future applications of the system for improvement of cultivated plants. The separate section is devoted to present the background of the Court of Justice decision C-528/16. Discussed are the far reaching negative consequences of this, based not on the merit decision, for the future of European green biotechnology.