The article explores the influences and reinterpretations of Roman Ingarden’s philosophy that can be found in Leopold Blaustein’s work. The latter studied in Lvov under Ingarden and established a long‑life philosophical dialogue with his mentor. There is a common agreement in comparative literature on the two authors which claims that Blaustein was influenced by Ingarden mainly in the field of aesthetics. This author supports a different proposition that these influences were much wider and encompassed methodology and theory of consciousness as well. The article is divided into three main parts. First, Blaustein’s critique of eidetic methods in phenomenology is reconstructed. In this context, it is claimed that Blaustein’s arguments aim at Ingarden’s concept of phenomenology rather than at Husserl’s. Yet, even if Blaustein tended to understand phenomenology as descriptive psychology, and Ingarden – as eidetic analysis, they both seemed to agree that phenomenology consisted in rigorous description of the ways of how the objects are given in experience. Secondly, Blaustein’s argument against Husserl’s theory of consciousness is reconstructed. The author claims that the argument is based on Ingarden’s differentiation between ‘living through’ and ‘experiencing’ sense data. Finally, the author examines some points that connect or divide both aesthetical theories.

The problem of the existence of mathematical entities is the subject of lively discussions. Realists defend the independence and autonomy of mathematical objects, while antirealists point to their dependence and conventionality. The problem of the existence of mathematical objects is also strongly linked to the problem of mathematical cognition: do we recognize mathematical truths in special acts of intuition, as some realists claim, or do we create mathematical knowledge only by building appropriate formal systems – as some anti‑realists imagine? In this article we present the K. Gödel’s and W.V. Quine’s realistic stances and comment on them from the perspective of Roman Ingarden’s phenomenology. We point out the role that Gödel attributed to his mathematical intuition, and then we present the process of eidetic intuition in Ingarden’s perspective (indicating Gödel’s and Ingarden’s common points of view). We also argue that Ingarden’s rich ontology could contribute in a significant way to the debates currently taking place in the mainstream philosophy of mathematics.

The article considers Roman Ingarden’s fundamental questions in the context of the position called philosophical fundamentalism. It turns out that the defining feature of this position, i.e. the search for answers to the question about the conditions of validity of statements in the sphere of traditional branches of philosophy: ontology, epistemology, ethics and aesthetics, finds its counterpart in Ingarden’s ontological and epistemological assumptions in phenomenology. They guarantee the legitimacy of any other claims. Ingarden’s philosophical fundamentalism, considered here in relation to the work- ‑scheme, weakened with time, which seems to be evidenced by the author’s doubts as to the legitimacy of the existence of the sphere of ideal objects determining this work. It seems highly possible that this is Ingarden’s bow to culture, and to cultural and historical relativization of the unchanging sphere of ideal objects.