The idea of emergence in its complex scientific sense was first formulated by the proponents of British emergentism. Emergentism in this perspective was an ontology of evolutionary processes in a broad sense, encompassing the relationships between various levels of existence. However, with the growing popularity of this trend, more and more critical voices against this theory began to appear. This article reviews and compares the critical arguments against British emergentism. Works by Stephen C. Pepper, Charles Baylis and Walter Terence Stace, who pointed to the impossibility of explaining emergent novelty from the perspective of a mechanistic view of the world, are discussed.

The text considers the concept of engaged philosophy of health protection. The recognized precursor of this philosophy is Julian Aleksandrowicz, a Polish doctor and humanist. Moral problems of the contemporary world, developed in the aspect of ultratechnology and information, are a discursive background of the presented analysis. The paper highlights a need of revaluating the neopositivitist legacy and systemic projects of pro-health methodology. The methodology includes the ideas of health protection at the individual’s level as well as of implementing order and peace in global society. According to this concept the aim can be achieved through integrating the scientific–technical revolution with the humanistic one and with the holistic interpretation of health. Health is defined in the category of emergent, dynamic and vital whole, reached as a synergic effect. In the model of the engaged philosophy the idea of self-creation assumes the value of „subjective health,” its counterweight is “objectified disease.” It is not indifferent to the ethical dimension of choice between life or death, determined in the character of an exclusive alternative. The study uses the method of qualitative research. The basic theses of engaged philosophy , defined in the light of the health care problem have been justified.

The aim of the article is presentation and critical analysis of various interpretations of neutral monism (in Bertrand Russell’s version). The subject of the author’s particular interest is the analysis of the main methodological assumptions of neutral monism, which are presented as a method of deriving logical constructions. The article discusses problems inspired by the following questions: What is the declared neutrality of base objects? Is neutral monism a kind of reductionism? Is it an ontological or logical‑epistemological position? What is the place of phenomenal consciousness in the universe of neutral monism? Can neutral monism be reconciled with different versions of emergence theory? Does neutral monism solve the mind‑body problem? Finally, the possibility of non‑standard interpretation of neutral monism is outlined by reference to information theory.