In this article, I compare two positions – emergentism and panpsychism, in relation to the problem of the nature of consciousness. I analyze arguments offered in support of both positions and undertake to question them. I focus on panpsychism as the less known and more controversial position. Panpsychism and emergentism are considered “metaphysical hypotheses”. Finally I propose emergentism as a preferable position in view of the fact that it is impossible to defend panpsychism as a coherent position, compatible with science.

This article presented the critical remarks relating to the understanding of the resurrection, proposed by Ph. Clayton and S. Knapp in their book The Predicament of Belief. Science, Philosophy, Faith. The main objections relate to the incorrect putting the research problem, that is interpretation of the resurrection compatible with modern science and erroneous approach to the New Testament’s relations about the resurrection of Christ. A way of solving of this problem is also causing reservations, that is to support the proposed understanding of the resurrection on the theory of emergence, its participatory approach and an understanding of the resurrection appearances as the personal but nonphysical theory of Jesus’ postmortem presence. Doubts are also caused by panentheism, and above all by the rejection of the deity of Jesus Christ. Taking all this into account, it turns out that the resurrection becomes subjective and deeply spiritual event, and the divine action is performed by the impact on the human minds and is not a miraculous event, and it does not suspend the laws of nature. According to the authors, such an approach is compatible with modern science. It is doubtful, however, whether their understanding of the resurrection of Christ makes it possible to understand the phenomenon of Christianity.

The idea of emergence in its complex scientific sense was first formulated by the proponents of British emergentism. Emergentism in this perspective was an ontology of evolutionary processes in a broad sense, encompassing the relationships between various levels of existence. However, with the growing popularity of this trend, more and more critical voices against this theory began to appear. This article reviews and compares the critical arguments against British emergentism. Works by Stephen C. Pepper, Charles Baylis and Walter Terence Stace, who pointed to the impossibility of explaining emergent novelty from the perspective of a mechanistic view of the world, are discussed.