Seldom did Bertrand Russell discuss the movement or the trend that he himself contributed in a large measure to establish. He did not make frequent use of the term ‘analytic philosophy’, which was entering circulation in the first half of the twentieth century. However, he was fully aware of the distinctiveness of this movement that he described, using the lenses of his own philosophical preferences, referring to it as new realistic philosophy or scientific philosophy. In his later works Russell vehemently and inadequately attacked the linguistic version of analytic philosophy that originated with and was developed by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations, to be later continued by Oxford ordinary language philosophers. The juxtaposition and consideration of various Russell’s statements on analytic philosophy from the successive stages of the development of his philosophical views help the reader to better understand Russellian metaphilosophy and follow the evolution of the philosophical tradition that he exemplified.

In the article I indicate and synthetically discuss issues that can be found in the achievements of Bertrand Russell, and which can be included in the domain of metaphilosophy. I point to Russell’s philosophical inspirations and to his views on philosophy. His views are intertwined with the threads of the traditional understanding of philosophy and innovative elements. These innovative elements include assigning a special role to mathematical logic, of which Russell is one of the founders, and emphasizing the role of analysis in philosophical research. It is also characteristic of him to emphasize the role of science for philosophical reflection. At the same time, however, Russell rejects the radical slogans of logical positivism. This justifies the thesis that in his oeuvre there are threads of both traditional and innovative understanding of philosophy and its tasks.