The subject matter of this article constitutes the semiotic mapping of human of knowledge which results from cognition. Departing from the presentation of human subjects as world-model-builders, it places epistemology among the sciences of science and the sciences of man. As such the understanding of epistemology is referred either to a static state of knowledge or to a dynamic acquisition of knowledge by cognizing subjects. The point of arrival, in the conclusive part of a this article, constitutes the substantiation of the two understandings of epistemology, specified, firstly, as a set of investigative perspectives, which the subject of science has at his/her disposal as a knower on the metascientific level, or, secondly, as a psychophysiological endowment of a cognizing subject who possesses the ability of learning and/or knowing a certain kind of information about cognized reality.
In this article the author intend to use an epistemological concept and its categories of description to analyse two specially chosen biographies reflecting diverse postmodern life patterns. Postmodernity, or in fact the postmodern order, refers to the concept of order-making dimensions discussed in the previous article concerning hypermodernity. It is treated there as casual and variable with regard to the category of relations and work, and the only certainty for the individual, in regard to future possibilities or necessities, is the individual’s own identity. This article adds the category of resonance to the characteristics of postmodernity, as a synonym for a person’s primary entanglement in the world. It is a category of which individuals are increasingly aware, on which they reflect, and which they make an object of their experience.
In the paper, I present the views of Alina Motycka, a Polish philosopher of science who died in 2018. I place Motycka’s scholar activity in a historical context, relative to two traditions of the philosophy of science—its historical version signed by Thomas Kuhn, and the tradition of logical reconstruction of science which in the second half of the twentieth century was revived by the thought of Karl Popper. I believe that this historical situation forms the context in which Motycka shaped her view of the philosophy of science and, because of such a particular context, she has participated in it with her own problematizations. So, what constitutes the originality of her way? Two issues come to the fore here. The first is the reconstruction of the fundamental problem of the philosophy of science, which, according to Motycka, is the question of confronting two scientific theories, of which the earlier (T1) is replaced by a later and competitive one (T2). Motycka shows the inability of the epistemology of the second half of the 20th century to adequately capture this relationship. The reason for this is the lack of intellectual means to problematize the situation T1–T2. The second area of the author's interest is the issue of creativity in science. She was inspired by the theories of Carl G. Jung. In this context, it is of interest to use the philosophy of science of terms such as archetype and myth.
The article presents the main functions of aesthetic values (beauty, simplicity, symmetry) in the process of formulating, evaluating and accepting scientific theories in the work of physicist: 1) they motivate to undertake scientific research; (2) have a heuristic role which enables the direction of the search for a new theory to be selected; (3) are a criterion for choosing between empirically equivalent theories in the absence of empirical evidences and (4) sometimes constitute an epistemological obstacle. The basic thesis of the work is that aesthetic values, in addition to positive functions, also play a negative role in science, hindering the acceptance of new theories or leading to inefficient research. Too much weight on the aesthetic side of theory can pose a threat to the objectivity of scientific cognition.
According to Descartes, it is possible to doubt successfully that there is external world, all around us, yet still to have language, in place, without any complication. According to Wittgenstein, to doubt everything about the external world except language means nothing more than to doubt everything about the external world including language. Why? No speaker is more certain about the meaning of his words than about the external things he believes to be unassailable (for example, that he has two hands and two legs). Without this constitutive connection there would be no communication of a definite sense. Wittgenstein suggests that, after the author of the Meditations on First Philosophy adopts the hypothesis of evil deceiver, we are only under the impression that we deal with language (or that we read a text). We instead deal with symptoms of something rather different. The objective of this paper is to critically reassess Wittgenstein’s criticism of the possibility of holding such a radical sceptical position.
The end of the nineteenth century was the period when revolutionary scientific discoveries challenged well-established theories, forcing both philosophers and scientists to ask questions about the nature and certainty of scientific knowledge. A group of French scientists not only performed a thorough critique of contemporary science and its history but proposed a new model that adequately described the development of scientific knowledge. Gaston Milhaud made a significant contribution to this new description of knowledge creation. He is however rarely mentioned in the context of the theory of knowledge and remains overshadowed by his famous colleagues. Despite the fact that more than a hundred years have passed since the conventionalist philosophy of science was formulated, H. Poincaré’s, P. Duhem’s and G. Milhaud’s positions have not gained much popularity beyond the circle of philosophers of science. This article briefly outlines personal relationships within French conventionalist circle, presents important results of Milhaud’s analysis, and the reasons why philosophers do not recognize the role he played in creating a new model for the development of scientific knowledge.
This contribution to the critical discussion of Ryszard Nycz’s Culture as Verb draws on his use of the parts-of-speech model to submit another formula of conceptualizing culture, based on the adverb, and complementary to the already existing approaches. They can be divided into three classes: those that treat culture as adjective (i.e. all epiphenomenal interpretations which view culture as a set of attributes), those that treat it as noun (i.e. an object, a separate academic discipline), and those that focus on action and the processual nature of culture (hence culture as verb), and even – in association with pragmatist and performative theories of language and the more recent ‘Activist Turn’ in the social sciences – have come to regard culture as culture-in-the-making, constituted and sustained by action (activities, performances). Most important for the adverbial approach are the modalities of culture, manifested in a variety of life styles. The study of culture as adverb (‘how’) can be pursued independently of the trench wars of cultural determinists and functionalists. Responding directly to Culture as Verb, qualifi ed as, chiefl y, an epistemological study, the article calls for a closer examination of the ontological implications of Nycz’s project of reinventing the humanities.