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Abstract

The issue of rationality and the term itself appear in the works of John Rawls, for instance in his famous volume A Theory of Justice. At the same time, in another of his books, Political Liberalism, we can find not only the correlated terms ‘rational’, but also the term ‘reasonable’. In that volume Rawls enlightens their meaning. In this article, the author analyses the terms mentioned more closely and reflects on their use in various contexts. The explanatory hypothesis adopted by the author is that the use of these two terms, not just one of them, may enrich our conceptual network and increase the possibilities of analysing the sphere of human action. The aim of the analyses is to confirm this hypothesis and to extract the specific sense of the term ‘reasonable’, and of its use, especially in Rawls’s Political Liberalism.
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Bibliography

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Authors and Affiliations

Ryszard Kleszcz
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Uniwersytet Łódzki, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Lindleya 3/5, 90-131 Łódź
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Abstract

Most philosophers believe that a unified philosophical account of mental and non -mental actions is possible. This article presents two arguments indicating that in fact it is not possible. The first one says that thinking is not an activity. Its formulation, however, is exposed to significant difficulties. The second argument avoids these difficulties and puts forward a different, though sometimes erroneously identified, thesis that mental and non-mental actions differ significantly, and therefore one theory should not be expected to include both phenomena. Acceptance of this result sheds new light on the problems associated with the language of thought and gives promise to a new answer to the question “What is Le Penseur doing?”

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Authors and Affiliations

Mateusz Karwowski

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