In EU law a lot of attention has recently been paid to personal data protection standards. In parallel to the development of the general EU rules on data protection, the Members States also develop cooperation between law enforcement agencies and create new information exchange possibilities, including the processing of personal data of participants in criminal proceedings. The aim of this article is to analyse whether the personal data of victims of crime are safeguarded according to the standards of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. For this purpose, the author analyses two directives: 2012/29/EU, which regulates minimum standards of victims of crime; and 2016/680/EU (also known as the Law Enforcement Directive), which regulates personal data processing for the purpose of combating crime. Based on the example of the Polish legislation implementing both directives, the author comes to the conclusion that the EU legislation is not fully coherent and leaves too much margin of appreciation to the national legislator. This results in a failure to achieve the basic goals of both directives. The author expects the necessary reflection not only from the national legislator, but also from the European Commission, which should check the correctness of the implementation of the directives, as well as from national courts, which should use all possible measures to ensure that the national law is interpreted in the light of the objectives of the directives.

This article seeks to explore whether the EU system of fundamental rights protection allows room for constitutional pluralism. By looking at recent developments in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (the Court of Justice), it is submitted that the Court has answered that question in the affirmative, thereby respecting the diversity of the cultures and traditions of the peoples of Europe as well as their national identities. The application of the Charter does not rule out a cumulative application of fundamental rights. That being said, pluralism is not absolute, but must be weighed against the indivisible and universal values on which the European Union is founded. Logically, the question that arises is how we order pluralism. In this regard, I shall argue that it is not for the Court of Justice to decide when an EU uniform standard of fundamental rights protection is to replace (or coexist with) national standards. That decision is for the EU political institutions to adopt, since they enjoy the necessary democratic legitimacy to determine the circumstances under which the exercise of a fundamental right is to be limited for reasons of public interest. However, this deference to the EU political branches does not mean that EU legislative decisions are immune from judicial review. On the contrary, cases such as Schwarz and Digital Rights demonstrate that the Court of Justice is firmly committed to examining whether those legislative choices comply with primary EU law, and notably with the Charter. In this regard, when interpreting the provisions of the Charter, the Court of Justice – in dialogue with national courts and, in particular, constitutional courts – operates as the guarantor of the rule of law within the EU, of which fundamental rights are part and parcel. It is thus for those courts to make sure that each and every EU citizen enjoys a sphere of individual liberty which must, as defined by the Charter, remain free from public interferences.

The European integration process is currently faced with a notable dilemma: While the need for new impetus and for far-reaching reform is widely felt, there is not only widespread resistance to any meaningful institutional reform but there is also a dearth of really innovative ideas. Europe is in danger of losing out with its citizens, who should have become its very foundation, in contrast to the early years when this integration process was mainly state driven. European institutions have tried to oppose this trend by organizing a grass-roots process for collecting ideas for reform. The results of the “Conference on the Future of Europe” were, however, not really convincing. This contribution attempts to examine the reform impulse coming from literature – in particular Ferdinand von Schirach’s “Jeder Mensch” – for its suitability to make a meaningful contribution to this discussion. It will be shown that one of his proposals – contained in Art. 6 of this booklet and proposing a right of the individual to bring fundamental rights claims directly before the Court of Justice of the European Union, deserves particular attention.

This research aims to present and analyse selected issues of Polish return law and practice in the light of the European Union return policy and against the backdrop of the migration crises of 2015 and 2021-2023, with a return decision placed at the heart of the study. The principal research objective is to examine whether the provisions of the 2013 Act on Foreigners follow the standards established in the EU Return Directive as well as in the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Another objective is to analyse the interaction between the provisions forming the uniform national return policy, but which originate from different legal systems (national and European ones). To this end “anti-terrorism” and “pushback” cases under Polish law will be assessed. The article thus poses several crucial questions, inter alia whether the Polish law and practice comply with standards established at the European level, especially insofar as fundamental rights of individuals are concerned; whether they contribute to the establishment of an effective EU return policy; and what role harmonisation plays in this process.

The relevant ruling concerns discrimination based on religion, in particular the question of the incompatibility of national legislation with EU Directive 2000/78. Following a short presentation of the factual background, the opinion of the Advocate General, and the judgment of the Court, the article offers comments on questions raised in the judgment, including the direct horizontal effect of the general principle of non-discrimination. In its previous case law the Court confirmed that the principle has “the horizontal exclusion effect.” However, in Cresco Investigation the question was whether it can be the source of rights for individuals. The ECJ adopted a firm approach, ruling that the general principle of non-discrimination as enshrined in Art. 21(1) of the Charter is sufficient in itself to confer rights on individuals which can be invoked in disputes with other private parties. This means that the Court recognised “the horizontal substitution effect” of the general principle of non-discrimination, which is connected with both setting aside any discriminatory provision of national law and applying to members of the disadvantaged group the same arrangements as those enjoyed by persons in the privileged category. The possible consequences of this approach are discussed in the article.