Following the so-called “special military operation”, which was in fact an open aggression against Ukraine, Russia was expelled from the Council of Europe. This step has significant legal consequences, including for the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights. Meanwhile, many individual applications were filed with the Court, and Ukraine brought an inter-State complaint against Russia. Ukraine has also triggered the International Court of Justice. The Court has already ordered provisional measures. The ICC Prosecutor has launched an investigation into the most serious international crimes, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in Ukraine and delivered arrest warrants against the Russian President and his Commissioner for Children’s Rights. There is a serious discussion going on concerning the establishment of a special tribunal for the crime of aggression. This text deals with some aspects of the Russian “special military operation” cases before international courts. It attempts to identify what role the international courts may play in the new phase of the conflict in Ukraine and the extent and effect of their intervention, given the jurisdictional limitations and the inability to enforce judgments.

This article discusses definitions of crimes included into the Act of 18 December 1998 on the Institute of National Remembrance – Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation, and their usefulness in prosecuting individuals who committed international crimes. It is argued that the provisions of the Act cannot constitute a ground for criminal responsibility of individuals, as they violate the principle of nullum crimen sine lege certa.

This article provides an overview of “memory laws” in Europe, reflecting upon what may be called the “asymmetry” of such laws. It then looks at the special case of Poland and its troubled experience with memory laws; it considers the question of whether, in the eyes of the law – genocide, and in particular the Holocaust – is so “special” that its public denials warrant legal intervention. It also looks at the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and its (not necessarily coherent) “doctrine” on memory laws and their consistency, or otherwise, with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (and in particular with freedom of expression as laid down in Art. 10). The article concludes by asserting that even if we take the law as an indicator of European public memory, there is no consensus on the past, except perhaps for the special case of the Holocaust. The main challenge lies in determining whether memory laws, defined by some as social engineering and the imposition of “imperative” versions of memory, are consistent with the principles inherent in open, democratic and free societies in Europe. This challenge remains unmet.