Consciousness was the guiding thread of Edmund Husserl's phenomenological investigations. He understood it as a critique of experience and the metaphysics and science based on it. Phenomenology is a critique of cognition, a method of investigation and questioning. In his later writings Husserl defined consciousness as a “system of intentional functions,” a “system of intentional operations.” Its correlate is a coherent and regularized world. One of the most important aspects of the system of intentional functions are habitualities—patterns, mental representations which arise in the process of “typification” and henceforth guide our ordinary thinking and acting. Thanks to them, the type of object, its features and properties are predetermined and, in principle, the ways of knowing it are determined. My task is to characterize the broad context of habituality formation, that is, the stream of consciousness and the possibilities of feeling and movement of the bodily subject. I will discuss in turn the temporal structure of experience and its dependence on the movement and action of the bodily subject, and then characterize the form of general intimacy with the world. It is in this context of “indeterminate reality” that the constitution and evocation of the deposited sense, the anticipation of the type of object and its qualities play out. In conclusion, I will make some remarks about habituality as a source of empirical concepts.

This article looks at hospitality practices in the process of recreating and modifying social structure. The author seeks the general regularities and behavioral patterns that appear when people visit others and are visited, as well as how they speak of these visits, or, in Pierre Bourdieu’s language, the principles that organize practices that are part of the class habitus. For the purposes of the analysis, two comparative groups were selected: people with the highest and lowest levels of economic, social, and cultural capital. The analysis allowed several conclusions to be drawn. First, in addition to the class factor, the age or generational factor should be taken into account as it has proven to be relevant in terms of the diversity of practices. Second, the research showed that several of the practices studied were not differentiated between the groups; they turned out to be intense in the case of people with high and low levels of capital. Such patterns involved informality and freedom, the striving for agreement and group solidarity, and an aversion to aesthetics and decoration. Third, there were sometimes differentiating nuances—the general principle could be the same, but the justification or motivation behind it was different. For people with a high level of both types of capital, naturalness/honesty was an important justification and was contrasted to falsehood, artificiality, and pretentiousness. This justification seemed to be a meta-principle that permeated many other patterns of behavior.

This article looks at hospitality practices in the process of recreating and modifying social structure. The author seeks the general regularities and behavioral patterns that appear when people visit others and are visited, as well as how they speak of these visits, or, in Pierre Bourdieu’s language, the principles that organize practices that are part of the class habitus. For the purposes of the analysis, two comparative groups were selected: people with the highest and lowest levels of economic, social, and cultural capital. The analysis allowed several conclusions to be drawn. First, in addition to the class factor, the age or generational factor should be taken into account as it has proven to be relevant in terms of the diversity of practices. Second, the research showed that several of the practices studied were not differentiated between the groups; they turned out to be intense in the case of people with high and low levels of capital. Such patterns involved informality and freedom, the striving for agreement and group solidarity, and an aversion to aesthetics and decoration. Third, there were sometimes differentiating nuances—the general principle could be the same, but the justification or motivation behind it was different. For people with a high level of both types of capital, naturalness/honesty was an important justification and was contrasted to falsehood, artificiality, and pretentiousness. This justification seemed to be a meta-principle that permeated many other patterns of behavior.

Recent research has reported that an increasing number of migrants in Norway are concentrated in the low-skilled sectors of the labour market, irrespective of their educational background, thus facilitating the formation of migrant niches in the long term. Despite the growing body of literature that raises the problem of downward professional mobility and deskilling among migrant populations, little scholarly attention has been paid to migrants’ struggles and vulnerabilities as a result of underemployment. Drawing on 30 in-depth interviews, this article explores the common experience of habitus mismatch and suffering among Poles who have worked below their level of competence or professional experience since migrating to Norway. By an-alysing subjective experiences of downward professional and social mobility and the conflict between valued and stigmatised identities, the article examines the various habitus mismatches that contribute to suffering in downwardly mobile Polish migrants.

Akratic actions are usually defined as intentional actions which conflict with the agent’s best judgement. As both irrational and conscious, actions of that type stand in need of an explanation. In this paper I reconstruct and criticize Donald Davidson’s classical standpoint on the problem of akrasia. I show the disadvantages of Davidsonian conception of practical reasoning and I defend the conception of syllogistic reasoning. I also criticize the theory of intention as unconditional normative judgement. Against Davidson’s view, I argue for the theory of intention as an act of will (not a judgement). According to this theory of intention and practical reasoning, akratic actions should be explained as actions caused by an act of will which conflicts with the best judgement. I propose to interpret the inclination of will to conflict or to follow the best judgement by the theory of habitus.