Consciousness was the guiding thread of Edmund Husserl's phenomenological investigations. He understood it as a critique of experience and the metaphysics and science based on it. Phenomenology is a critique of cognition, a method of investigation and questioning. In his later writings Husserl defined consciousness as a “system of intentional functions,” a “system of intentional operations.” Its correlate is a coherent and regularized world. One of the most important aspects of the system of intentional functions are habitualities—patterns, mental representations which arise in the process of “typification” and henceforth guide our ordinary thinking and acting. Thanks to them, the type of object, its features and properties are predetermined and, in principle, the ways of knowing it are determined. My task is to characterize the broad context of habituality formation, that is, the stream of consciousness and the possibilities of feeling and movement of the bodily subject. I will discuss in turn the temporal structure of experience and its dependence on the movement and action of the bodily subject, and then characterize the form of general intimacy with the world. It is in this context of “indeterminate reality” that the constitution and evocation of the deposited sense, the anticipation of the type of object and its qualities play out. In conclusion, I will make some remarks about habituality as a source of empirical concepts.