The article presents an analysis of the concept of the art instinct. This is a notion introduced by Denis Dutton in his concept of the evolution of art. The autor analyses the internal coherency of Dutton’s concept and its implications, with investigations in the context of evolutionary biology and biological anthropogenesis. The article’s conclusions are that: (1) the idea of art instinct is incoherent and difficult to uphold in the light of contemporary knowledge of the mechanisms of evolution and the course of anthropogenesis; (2) it is, however, a notion that is convenient and explanatorily efficient, as long as one accepts—among other things—the reservation about the non-teleological course of evolution; (3) the art instinct and the phenomenon of art cannot be explained without referring to social processes.

In the paper I show why we should consider Stoicism as the historical source of St. Thomas’s distinction between ‘conscience’ and ‘synderesis’. I claim that the Stoic terms syntērēsis and syneidēsis became, through the ages, the Thomistic synderesis and conscientia. The Stoic syntērēsis meant ‘self-preservation’, and in all animals this ‘first instinct’ refers to the body. The man is the only creature, which, because of its ‘rational nature’, preserves not necessarily its body but rather its soul, i.e. a system of values. Such preservation of someone’s axiological integrity equals ‘salvation’, and thus assimilates Stoicism to Christianity. In the Stoic system, human values follow ‘the nature’ (or ‘the human nature’ in particular), and in Thomism, they follow ‘synderesis’, or the natural inclination toward the good. In both cases we find a natural instinct that transforms itself into a rational structure of conscience. I also argue that, thanks to the moral phenomena of ‘adaptation’ (oikeiōsis) and ‘advancement’ (teleiōsis), the Stoic ethics is not completely egocentric, but incorporates also social duties.

Animal behaviour and its underlying causal factors are investigated by numerous behavioural sciences. Ethology, one of the most important classical behavioural sciences, is concerned with the description and quantification of behaviour and the analysis of a wide spectre of its causal factors. Ethology also lays stress on the importance of comparative behavioural research and field research. Specific behaviour paterns were considered by classical ethology as elements of hierarchically organised behavioural systems focused on specific functions. The notion of instinct was, however, far from unequivocal and is no more frequently used in behavioural sciences. We also know that information flow between the levels of organization existing in the nervous system and in living systems in general is multidirectional. The assumption that processes running on higher levels of organization can and should be explained solely in terms of processes running on lower levels becomes thus largely groundless. In behavioural sciences reductionism can manifest itself also as the so called law of parsimony adopted during explanations of observed phenomena (Occam’s razor, Lloyd Morgan’s canon). Since the introduction of Karl Popper’s falisifiability criterion to the methodology of scientific research, reductionistic explanations of observed phenomena are, however, less frequently proposed in behavioural sciences. Instead, an approach currently used involves experimental testing of sets of hypotheses proposing alternative explanations of the observed phenomena, not necessarily the simplest ones. Classical ethology was the so called objectivist science of behaviour: its adherents did not deny the existence of subjective phenomena in animals, however, explanations of mechanisms of investigated phenomena in terms of underlying subjective processes were not considered to be sufficient. Presently we may put forward increasingly daring hypotheses concerning subjective experiences of animals thanks to the development of advanced techniques of neuroimaging such as the functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Behavioural sciences are constantly progressing and their methods become increasingly sophisticated. We can thus hope that philosophy and behavioural sciences will continue during a long time yet to contribute jointly to achieve new insights enriching our knowledge on factors influencing animal and human behaviour.