The article offers a revisited look at the classic jurisprudence of the ECtHR and CJEU concerning the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus from the perspective of the phenomenon of judicial dialogue. In this context, it aims to examine whether judicial dialogue contributes to the development of coherent jurisprudence and in consequence of effective judicial redress in cases involving unrecognised entities and individuals. It draws attention to the threats for both the international rule of law and the protection of rights of individuals resulting from inconsistencies within own jurisprudence of the respective court, as well as from lack of coherence in interpretation and application of the same rules of international law by different courts.

Over the last three years European Union (EU) law has experienced a veritable revolution triggered by the Court of Justice’s rethinking of the fundamental aspects underpinning both the EU’s competence to deal with Rule of Law matters (especially related to the independence and the irremovability of judges at the national level), and the substantive understanding of the key elements of the Rule of Law pertaining to the newly-found competence. An upgraded approach to interim relief in matters related to the Rule of Law completes the picture. As a result, EU law has gone through a profound transformation and the assumptions as to the perceived limits of its reach – insofar as the organization of the national judiciaries is concerned – no longer hold. However, there is also the opposite side to this “Rule of Law revolution.” While its effectiveness in terms of bringing recalcitrant Member States back on track has not been proven (and Poland and Hungary stand as valid reasons for doubts); the division of powers between the Member States and the EU has been altered forever. Rule of Law thus emerges as a successful pretext for a supranational powergrab in the context of EU federalism. The picture is further complicated by the fact that the substantive elements of the Rule of Law required by the Court of Justice of the European Union of the Member States’ judiciaries are seemingly perceived as inapplicable to the supranational level itself. These include structural independence from other branches of power and safeguards of the guarantees of irremovability and security of tenure of the members of the judiciaries. Taking all these elements into consideration, the glorious revolution appears to have triggered at least as many questions as it has provided answers, while being entirely unable to resolve the outstanding problems on the ground in the Member States experiencing significant backsliding in the areas of democracy and the Rule of Law.

This article concerns constitutional problems related to the implementation of EU directives seen from both the legal and comparative perspectives. The directives are a source of law which share a number of characteristic features that significantly affect and determine the specificity of Member States’ constitutional review of the directives as well as the legal acts that implement them. The review of the constitutionality of EU directives is carried out in accordance with the provisions of national implementing acts. Member States’ constitutional courts adopt two basic positions in this respect. The first position (adopted by, inter alia, the French Constitutional Council and German Federal Constitutional Court) is based on the assumption of a partial “constitutional immunity” of the act implementing the directive, which results in only a partial control of the constitutionality of the implementing acts, i.e. the acts of national law implementing such directives. The second position, (adopted, explicitly or implicitly by, inter alia, the Austrian Federal Constitutional Court, Czech Constitutional Court, Polish Constitutional Court, Romanian Constitutional Court and Slovak Constitutional Court) concerns the admissibility of a full review of the implementing acts. This leads to the admissibility of an indirect review of the content of the directive if the Court examines the provision as identical in terms of content with an act of EU law. Another issue is related to the application of the EU directives as indirect yardsticks of review. The French Constitutional Council case-law on review of the proper implementation of EU directives represents the canon in this regard. Nonetheless, interesting case studies of further uses of EU directives as indirect yardsticks of review can be found in the case law of other constitutional courts, such as the Belgian Constitutional Court or Spanish Constitutional Court. The research presented in this paper is based on the comparative method. The scope of the analysis covers case law of the constitutional courts of both old and new Member States. It also includes a presentation of recent jurisprudential developments, focusing on the constitutional case-law regarding the Data Retention Directive and the Directive on Combating Terrorism.

People appear in the courtroom when they engage in various disputes with others and have diverse problems of their own. The courts are supposed to provide them with a space where they can obtain justice, in accordance with the law. It is no less important, however, that while pursuing this goal the courts should deal with people’s problems in a way that makes the people willing to accept and comply with their decisions. The central issue defining the scope of this empirical study was the question of what element of the construct of procedural justice promotes behaviors associated with legitimacy and compliance with the law in the Polish judicial system. The author set out to investigate what identified procedural justice in Polish legal culture and what variables pertaining to the context of legal proceedings it was related to. The sample consisted of 115 individuals taking part in civil court proceedings conducted in civil divisions of district courts. Based on analyses performed on research results it can be concluded that behaviors associated with legitimacy and compliance with the law in the Polish judicial system is determined by the sense of fairness experienced in the courtroom, whose structure is built by experiences such as being given the opportunity to speak, being treated with respect, the judge’s impartiality, the comprehensibility of the language used and procedures applied in the courtroom, and the sense of influence on the final outcome of the proceedings.

This research aims to present and analyse selected issues of Polish return law and practice in the light of the European Union return policy and against the backdrop of the migration crises of 2015 and 2021-2023, with a return decision placed at the heart of the study. The principal research objective is to examine whether the provisions of the 2013 Act on Foreigners follow the standards established in the EU Return Directive as well as in the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Another objective is to analyse the interaction between the provisions forming the uniform national return policy, but which originate from different legal systems (national and European ones). To this end “anti-terrorism” and “pushback” cases under Polish law will be assessed. The article thus poses several crucial questions, inter alia whether the Polish law and practice comply with standards established at the European level, especially insofar as fundamental rights of individuals are concerned; whether they contribute to the establishment of an effective EU return policy; and what role harmonisation plays in this process.

The article underlines the importance of the substantive debate for a stable and sustainable social development and presents key Polish problems which require such a debate.

This article critically evaluates the summary procedure introduced by Protocol No. 14 to the European Convention on Human Rights, adopted within the reform of the European Court of Human Rights system. The summary procedure, now set out in Art. 28(1)b of the Convention, was instituted in order to facilitate expediency and to reduce the case load of the Court. This article argues that while judicial economy is a legitimate goal, the summary procedure under Art. 28(1)b has considerable deficiencies that undermine some of the systemic goals and core values of ECHR law. There is a manifest lack of remedies vis-à-vis the choice of the procedure, choice of applicable law, and no appeals against final decisions rendered in the course of the summary procedure. Notably, the concept of “well-established case-law” seems to be neither clear nor reliable, as evidenced in the cases analysed in the article. These cases, which involve the issue of socially- owned property in Serbia, serve to demonstrate some of the significant errors in interpretation and decision-making which can result from application of the summary procedure.