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Law and justice

Jan Woleński
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria | 2021 | No 4 | 145-164 | DOI: 10.24425/pfns.2021.138979
Keywords ius lex morality nature philosophy principle values
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Abstract

The relation between law and justice is the main subject of this paper. The distinction of ius (just, right law) and lex (statutory law) is fundamental for the Western Civilization. The paper presents the genesis of this distinction and its further development, related terminology as well as legal‑philosophical doctrines, particularly, natural law theory and legal positivism. The so‑called Radbruch’s formula is discussed (law unjust to the highest degree is not law), and further on, the so‑called renaissance of natural law and proposals to secure a harmony between law and justice are examined by reference to the views formulated by L.L. Fuller, H.L.A. Hart and J. Rawls.
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Bibliography

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Authors and Affiliations

Jan Woleński
1
ORCID: ORCID
  1. Wyższa Szkoła Informatyki i Zarządzania, Katedra Nauk Społecznych, ul. Sucharskiego 2, 35‑225 Rzeszów

Practical conditions for the multimodal contract for the carriage of goods in Poland

Krzysztof Kochanowski
Prawo Morskie | 2019 | No XXXVII | 45-62 | DOI: 10.24425/pm.2019.131321
Keywords multimodal transport MTO Lex Mercatoria contract for the carriage of goods
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Abstract

The article is an attempt to present circumstances that nowadays determine negotiating, conclusion and performance of a multimodal transport contract in Poland. Author focuses in particular on parties’ approach, their business and legal conscience in this respect, as well as their decisions’ practical consequences. Doctrinal aspects of a multimodal transport contract are taken into account only as long as it is essential in examining the most common practices of the parties to the contract. Due to particular character of this publication, the method of author’s views presentation is as brief as possible.

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Authors and Affiliations

Krzysztof Kochanowski

Non-State Law in International Commercial Arbitration

Michał König
Polish Yearbook of International Law | No XXXV | DOI: 10.7420/pyil2015j
Keywords arbitration Rome I rules of law lex mercatoria non-state law applicable law UNIDROIT lex arbitrii
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Abstract

The feature that most attracts private parties from different states to referring their dispute to an arbitral tribunal is the flexibility of the procedure. However, the differences between arbitration and court litigation are not only procedural, but they concern the substance of the parties’ cases. This is because in the realm of international arbitration the law applicable to the merits of the case is determined according to other provisions than the statutory conflict of laws rules. Depending on the arbitration law of the seat, the entire private international law statute can be captured in a single provision – “absent the parties’ choice, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the rules of law which it determines to be appropriate”. It follows that arbitral tribunals, unlike state courts, are not bound by the conflict of laws rules of the forum. What’s more, the merits of a dispute submitted to arbitration may be governed not only by some national body of law (e.g. the Polish Civil Code) but also by a non-state, nonnational set of provisions – “rules of law” (e.g. the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts). The aim of this article is to analyze how the parties and tribunals may make use of their autonomy in determining the law applicable to a dispute. Furthermore it examines whether there are any limits thereto in light of the Rome I Regulation.
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Authors and Affiliations

Michał König

Changing Evidentiary Rules to the Detriment of the Accused? The Ruto and Sang Decision of the ICC Appeals Chamber

Hanna Kuczyńska
Polish Yearbook of International Law | 2017 | No XXXVII | 101-123
Keywords ICC ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence International Criminal Court intertemporal rules lex retro non agit retroactive application of criminal law retroactive application of procedural criminal law Rome Statute Ruto and Sang case
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Abstract

The main topic of this article is retroactive application of procedural criminal law. In this text the question will be posed – and answered – whether the application of a new procedural provision that entered into force in the course of an ongoing proceeding should in that proceeding be considered as retroactive and in what scope or/and under what conditions can such retroactivity be allowed for. As will be shown the solutions in national jurisdictions differ according to the common law – continental law states divide. This problem will be discussed in the light of a decision in the ICC Ruto and Sang case. In this case the ICC Appeals Chamber had to answer several questions pertaining to the temporal application of new procedural provisions. Firstly, the Chamber had to decide whether a general ban on the retroactive application of substantive law should also apply to procedural criminal law. Secondly, the ICC Appeals Chamber had to analyze the criteria according to which it would evaluate whether the change of rules of criminal procedure in the course of an ongoing trial was to be considered as having a retroactive effect, and whether the change in the rules of admission of evidence could be considered detrimental to the accused. Thirdly, it will be shown that the ICC Appeals Chamber has chosen the common law concept of “due process rights” rather than the idea of “intertemporal rules” known from the continental doctrine, and why it chose to do so.

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Authors and Affiliations

Hanna Kuczyńska

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