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Abstract

The problem of the existence of mathematical entities is the subject of lively discussions. Realists defend the independence and autonomy of mathematical objects, while antirealists point to their dependence and conventionality. The problem of the existence of mathematical objects is also strongly linked to the problem of mathematical cognition: do we recognize mathematical truths in special acts of intuition, as some realists claim, or do we create mathematical knowledge only by building appropriate formal systems – as some anti‑realists imagine? In this article we present the K. Gödel’s and W.V. Quine’s realistic stances and comment on them from the perspective of Roman Ingarden’s phenomenology. We point out the role that Gödel attributed to his mathematical intuition, and then we present the process of eidetic intuition in Ingarden’s perspective (indicating Gödel’s and Ingarden’s common points of view). We also argue that Ingarden’s rich ontology could contribute in a significant way to the debates currently taking place in the mainstream philosophy of mathematics.
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Authors and Affiliations

Bartłomiej Skowron
1
ORCID: ORCID
Krzysztof Wójtowicz
2
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Politechnika Warszawska, Wydział Administracji i Nauk Społecznych, Pl. Politechniki 1, 00-661 Warszawa
  2. Uniwersytet Warszawski, Wydział Filozofii, ul. Krakowskie Przedmieście 3, 00-927 Warszawa

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