In recent years, some expressway tunnels have started broadcasting warning sounds, such as fire alarms, to improve driver attention and traffic safety. However, there is few research on it, and in contrast to previous studies, we have considered different evaluation indices and through field measurement to determine the effectiveness of this practice. The characteristics of three warning sound signals, i.e., fire alarm, dynamic music, and voice command, in a tunnel were analyzed usingMATLAB. Considering pupil diameter and blink duration as evaluation indexes, the change in the mental state of the driver after hearing a warning sound was analyzed. Based on Markov chain theory, the change in the gaze region and gaze shift of the driver under the condition of a warning sound was analyzed. Results shows fire alarms and voice commands can increase the mental load of drivers, but the degree of impact was not determined. Dynamic music does not affect the mental load of the driver. The fire alarm and dynamic music attracted the attention of the driver; conversely, as the voice command warns the driver to focus on safety, it did not impact the attention of the driver. The research results provide a scientific reference for the selection of warning sounds in expressway tunnels and new research ideas for the prevention of traffic injuries in expressway tunnels.

The article is a critical analysis of Ingarden’s theory of how we learn about other people’s mental states. The author discusses arguments that have been offered by Ingarden against competing theories and highlights their shortcomings. Next, he presents Ingarden’s original theory, underlining its strengths and weaknesses. He shows that Ingarden’s theory, apart from giving an insight into the mechanisms underlying the cognition of other people’s mental states, has a limited explanatory power even if treated as a phenomenological description of a select class of cognitive situations.

In the article, the topic of mentalization as the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others is considered. The author concentrates on the aspect of the mental states in different approaches to mentalization. She proposes that the inclusion of various mental states is justified, although it induces some difficulties. In the conclusion, consequences of applying current conceptions and using them to elucidate the variety of mental states are presented.

Most philosophers believe that a unified philosophical account of mental and non -mental actions is possible. This article presents two arguments indicating that in fact it is not possible. The first one says that thinking is not an activity. Its formulation, however, is exposed to significant difficulties. The second argument avoids these difficulties and puts forward a different, though sometimes erroneously identified, thesis that mental and non-mental actions differ significantly, and therefore one theory should not be expected to include both phenomena. Acceptance of this result sheds new light on the problems associated with the language of thought and gives promise to a new answer to the question “What is Le Penseur doing?”