The most interesting area of ethical considerations by Bertrand Russell belongs to the field of metaethics and concerns the meaning of basic ethical concepts and their epistemological status. In the classic dispute between cognitivism and noncognitivism, Russell has chosen the emotivist position which deprives moral opinions of any cognitive value by treating them as an expression of individual emotive attitudes. Thus, he advocates a kind of subjectivism in ethics, and at the same time he refutes all arguments ascribing to moral phenomena specific objective qualities independent of human attitudes and emotions. He also puts to doubt all sources of morality that have a religious character. His own normative statements concerning metaethical issues are so phrased, however, that a serious methodological doubt arises: Is it possible to practice normative ethics without using an objectivist hypothesis?

The aim of this paper is to present and explain the metaethical theory proposed by Ayn Rand. In particular, Rand’s view of ethics as necessary for human life is discussed. I also analyze the concept of value which is crucial to Rand’s ethics. I seek to demonstrate that the concept of value is rooted in the concept of life, and from this it follows that the normative sphere is secondary to the existence of living beings. Further, I introduce Rand’s argument concerning human life as an ultimate point of reference in her philosophy. Finally, I explain the conditional character of morality, and end my paper with a short discussion of Rand’s unique view on objectivity of values.