The celebrated Polish avant‑garde artist Stanisław Ignacy Witkiewicz turned form arts to philosophy in the later years of his life. He was in contact with prominent Polish professional philosophers, e.g., T. Kotarbiński and R. Ingarden. He wrote a philosophi-cal treatise of his own and published several essays explaining his views, defending them in fiery polemical tracts. Although an autodidact himself, his erudition on recent philosophical topics, scientific trends and achievements was impressive. To his favorite philosophical ‘enemies’, as he was fond to say, belonged Bertrand Russell, along with other famous thinkers of that time, e.g., A. Whitehead, R. Carnap or L. Wittgenstein.

The article is an attempt to present the main reasons why the anthropological hylomorphism of St. Thomas Aquinas goes beyond the monism-dualism dichotomy in metaphysical anthropology. It cannot, as is most often done, be classified as a substance dualism of the Cartesian type. It is also not a position that can be included in the group of materialistic monisms, even of the non-reductionist type. Aquinas‘s anthropological hylomorphism seems to be a position that contains both the intuitions of materialistic and dualistic positions in metaphysical anthropology, although not reducible to either of them. On closer examination of positions such as Aquinas‘s anthropological hylomorphism, the question must arise whether the dichotomous and disjunctive division of positions in metaphysical anthropology into materialistic and dualistic is justified and operational.

The aim of the article is presentation and critical analysis of various interpretations of neutral monism (in Bertrand Russell’s version). The subject of the author’s particular interest is the analysis of the main methodological assumptions of neutral monism, which are presented as a method of deriving logical constructions. The article discusses problems inspired by the following questions: What is the declared neutrality of base objects? Is neutral monism a kind of reductionism? Is it an ontological or logical‑epistemological position? What is the place of phenomenal consciousness in the universe of neutral monism? Can neutral monism be reconciled with different versions of emergence theory? Does neutral monism solve the mind‑body problem? Finally, the possibility of non‑standard interpretation of neutral monism is outlined by reference to information theory.

This article provides an overview of the approach taken by the International Court of Justice and its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, to questions of municipal law. Beginning with an outline of the theoretical framework, it discusses the conventional position that domestic law is a factual issue for the Court, before considering the ways in which the two Courts have utilised municipal law. It also considers to what extent the Court employs domestic law in ascertaining international legal rules.

Bogusław Wolniewicz’s book Things and facts, although it is essentially devoted to the interpretation of the Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, also has a substantive layer in which Wolniewicz raises very important problems in the fields of methodology, semiotics and metaphysics, such as: (a) the problem of clarity of philosophical texts and its relation to simplicity and brevity, as well as to thoroughness and suggestiveness; (b) the problem of semantic correlation types; (c) the problem of analysis, interpretation and definition; (d) the problems of modality, negative facts, absolute monism and coherentionism; (e) the problem of abstraction and moral-praxeological antinomy. The author of the paper reconstructs Wolniewicz’s views on these matters.