Though current conservation policy in Poland refl ects world trends and approaches to action, compliance with all of its assumptions would entail the Polish authorities remodelling both the system and the methods by which natural resources are managed. On the one hand this requires a change of approach to the management of natural resources from the traditional, purely nature-related one, to a more modern inter-disciplinary one that takes in social and economic conditioning. On the other hand, a system need to be put in place to allow these ideas to be introduced in practice. The work described here deals with the participation of different stakeholder groups in nature management, with this regarded as a method of increasing the latter’s effi ciency. The many examples (of good practice) presented by the author well illustrate the wisdom of the approach, which often seems to achieve success where it is attempted.
This work is a contribution to understanding the philosophical dimension of the breakthrough that took place in the 20th century historical natural science as a result of the extrapolation of Darwin’s idea of evolution to the area of inanimate matter and the formulation on this basis of a number of theories of pre-biological chemical evolution. The revealed results are the inaccurate recognition of the philosophical foundations of the broadly understood science of evolution: on the one hand, for scientists-naturalists, and on the other, in a much broader, social dimension of their research.
Istnieje czułość metafizyczna – postawa radosnego przyzwolenia na wszelkie przejawy procesu życia, który toczy się po obu stronach naszej skóry. I to ona, być może bardziej niż majątek, sława czy pochodzenie, decyduje o radości z życia.
In Christian ethical and anthropological discourse, the concept of “human nature” represented one of the main criteria from which norms for social and individual ethics derived. The age of Enlightenment brought about a serious criticism of this concept refusing its metaphysical justification. New opinions prevailed in philosophical and scientific discourse of that time. They rejected existence of common anthropological determinants and supported a thesis claiming that people are primarily formed in society and that the concept of “human nature” entails a risk of abuse of power by promoting only one view of the human being. The presented paper studies the relevance of this concept today and examines it from the perspective of Jonathan Haidt’s social psychology, which, as the author claims, contributes to better understanding of human nature. Standard metaphysical and theological definitions of human nature that prevailed mostly in Christian discourse needs to be extended by including findings from social and exact sciences and use them as a suitable medium for a dialogue in a pluralistic environment, and push the limits of our knowledge about humans.
O obojętności w świecie zwierząt i o tym, czy człowiek mimo wielkich starań może oderwać się od swojej biologicznej natury.
The paper discusses selected topics in moral philosophy of Professor Bogusław Wolniewicz. His overall approach is marked by intellectual independence and analytic treatment of moral issues. The theory of values that he has endorsed can be described as a moderate non-religious absolutism based on weak metaphysical principles. Although in general his normative position can be assimilated to the views of an enlightened liberal, it also clashes with that position insofar as he proclaimed the existence of ontological evil and supported legitimacy of death penalty.
The works of Bogusław Wolniewicz contain a philosophical system. It needs to be extracted and revealed through a recomposition of his output which comprises close to 600 individual publications and auditions. It is a system of Pythagorean-Manichean kind, or, to put it differently, Leibnizian-Augustinian kind. The Professor described his philosophy as a rational ‘tychism’. It claims that the world and man are governed by chance (especially human nature in which an element of evil has some influence) and that mind, even though it uses logic to reflect the world, is barely an irrelevant addition in the vast universe. Such a stance is unusual in modern thought, though not in the history of thinking. It is in clear opposition to the scientifically bended rationalism and irrationalism that dominate contemporary thought. The logical coherency and extensiveness of Wolniewicz’s concerns constitute the essence of his philosophical system, though it goes largely unnoticed, due to the meaninglessness of several of his claims to his opponents. At its foundation lies the metaphysics of situations developed by L. Wittgenstein but further elaborated by Wolniewicz. The contribution by Wolniewicz is not his greatest accomplishment, however. The metaphysics of situations is his organon – merely a thinking tool – used to extract the most crucial and deeply hidden truths about the world. Due to these circumstances and the modern achievements in logic when it is practiced in Wolniewicz’s style, new discoveries are made that were not possible in the past. For example, it is possible to incorporate both Christian axiology and anthropology with Marx’s sociology in one system. It evocates widespread amazement but also fierce resistance from conservative readers, but their protests are ungrounded. ‘Truth always agrees with truth’ – said Wolniewicz. When it comes to Wolniewicz’s system, its coherence counts most, and it is best manifested in the objectivistic and absolutistic philosophy of values as well as pessimistic philosophy of the human condition (both being of Christian provenance). One can depict Wolniewicz’s system as a cathedral with numerous towers, persistently built over 70 years of his active academic life. The main towers are: ontological-theological, anthropological and axiological (of practical philosophy, describing human duties). Standing shoulder to shoulder with them are smaller turrets corresponding to such subfields as epistemology, philosophy of culture, philosophy of religion, esthetics etc. The metaphysical aspect of Wolniewicz’s philosophy is blended from specific classic theorems and original claims expressed in synthetic a priori propositions. They are supported by the logical structure of language, and language itself is supported by the structure of human genotype (DNA). Technically one can reach the most general truths about the world by continuous thinking, but the ability to use that skill is a privilege reserved for exceptional geniuses.
The aim of the paper is to highlight St. Anselm’s way of thinking about nature and order in the world created by God. God for Anselm is the highest nature, one which exists most fully; He possesses the fullness of being, because His essence is identical to His existence. He is the cause of all existing things and does not have a cause Himself, for He exists per se. The order of nature may be observed in two ways: when departing from the diversity of existing beings and when considering these beings before their creation, existing in the divine intellect as ideas and models, after which God called into existence particular objects.
Deklarowane w naukach biomedycznych obiektywizm i autonomia, zarówno na poziomie badawczym, jak i praktyki klinicznej, pozwalają przypuszczać, że dziedziny te wolne są od retoryki genderowej. Przeprowadzone przez nas analizy języka wykorzystywanego w opisie procesu zapłodnienia oraz w obszarze reprodukcji wspomaganej pokazują, że dyskurs biomedyczny nie pozostaje neutralny wobec genderowych stereotypów. W niniejszym artykule głębszemu namysłowi poddałyśmy dwie cechy tradycyjnie przypisywane „naturze kobiecej”: pasywność, która pojawia się w podręcznikach biologicznych i medycz-nych opisujących proces zapłodnienia, oraz altruizm, zauważalny w debacie i praktyce w sferze reprodukcji wspomaganej.
The aim of this article is to examine the influence of the contemporary speculative philosophy on the neo-fantastic fiction (Le monde enfin by J.-P. Andrevon). The speculative philosophy presents the modern world as the source of cosmological horror for the human being. In my analysis, I focus on two anxiety-provoking motifs present both in speculative philosophy and Andrevon’s novel: the end of the anthropocentric world and the beginning of a new, inhuman world, dominated by nature.
I address the question of Marx’s understanding of the role and function of religion in social life. Marx’s pronouncements on this topic are few and far between. Yet relying on them I undertake to examine the proposal ostensibly made by Marx that it was possible, or even necessary, to purge religious institutions and religious attitudes from social life. I point to a number of inconsistencies and errors that Marx committed in making such proposals.