This paper sets out to characterise and analyse logical atomism of Bertrand Russell. Main tenets of that theory are described by reference to Russell’s lecture Facts and Propositions (1918) and to other publications by that author. The essential claims of Russell’s position are discussed and confronted with tenets of ontology of situations developed by Bogusław Wolniewicz, a position inspired by logical atomism of Ludwig Wittgenstein. The author argues that several of Russell’s theses on logical atomism can be interpreted in the light of Wolniewicz’s ontology of situations. Finally, some minor concluding remarks are offered that can help to develop an ontology conceived in the spirit of the ontology of logical atomism. 366 Janusz Kaczmarek

In this article I present the problem of identity of objects (that persist in time and space) and their identification (also in time and space, when these objects persist and change their location) indicated in the title of the paper. I therefore present an outline of P.F. Strawson’s proposal, but also a purely formal approach that can be found in formal sciences (logic and mathematics). In the final part I give some ontological solution to Strawson’s research. It is a solution based on formal considerations within the so-called ontologically oriented versions of modal and temporal logics, which I proposed in my book Indywidua. Idee. Pojęcia (2008).