The linguistic philosophy (Oxford School) is a trend in analytical philosophy, critical about the claims of formal logic. Its followers want to investigate problems using an analysis of ordinary language. Peter F. Strawson is one of the most prominent representatives of this line of thoughts. He is also a philosopher who has done a lot toward a rehabilitation of metaphysics in British philosophy. In my paper I present an analysis of Strawson’s metaphilosophical ideas and I offer a critical discussion of Karl R. Popper’s attitude to linguistic philosophy.
P.F. Strawson and J.L. Austin approach the problem of other minds from different perspectives. Peter Strawson looks at this problem from the perspective of descriptive metaphysics, which largely disregards the concrete situations in which we use mental language. John Austin, on the other hand, believes that to understand what is happening in such situations holds the key to solving the former problem. However, as it turns out, the considerations of both authors in the key fragments rely on similar observations. In addition, Austin’s perspective, which looks at the language from the point of view of its usage, makes it possible to formulate an answer to the Strawson’s critics. This does not exclude the possibility of agreeing with Strawson on the primacy of the reference function of language, if we understand it properly. Ultimately, Strawson and Austin’s approaches do not compete, but complement each other.