In the paper, I analyze four types of ontic subordination, which constitute key elements of Ingardenian ontology: heteronomy, derivativeness, non-self‑reliance and dependency. This analysis leads to the conclusion that the concepts constructed by Ingarden are either logically incorrect, or are not sufficiently explained, or refer not to ontic but to semantic relations.

The article focuses on the problem of possible relations of a work of art to the Absolute Being. The essence of the discussed issue can be put as a question: Is it possible, without mentioning God explicitly, to declare that a piece of art, as a carrier of beauty, indicates His presence? Relating to a number of Roman Ingarden’s significant statements that refer to metaphysical experience and the status of metaphysical qualities, and drawing upon Ingarden’s existential and ontological claims, the article presents metaphysical quality as a manifestation of existential dependence. This interpretation invokes the context of the primary being, and by extension, of the Absolute Being. If a work of art (or to be more precise, its concretization) is a carrier of aesthetic beauty through which a qualitative and metaphysical atmosphere emerges (and discloses its metaphysical quality) and if (as it is postulated in the interpretation suggested) it refers to the Absolute, then the thesis that beauty leads to God has been vindicated.

The concept of the existence of the absolute being can be characterized by four criteria which correspond to four existential aspects of the ultimate reality. In volume one of the Controversy over the Existence of the World Roman Ingarden argues that the absolute being is to be characterized as self-sustained, primary, self‑activated and independent. When some general remarks are put aside, the article focuses on arguments that have been adduced by the author in support of three claims. (1) Ingarden accepts the existence of the absolute being and flanks it by additional seven kinds of relative beings. The author finds the abundance supernumerary in the material world. (2) No material (or physical) object possesses properties (or existential moments) that belong to the absolute being. (3) There are fundamental reasons which exclude the possibility that the physical world (the manifold of all material objects) can be identified with the absolute being (absolute existence).