In the article I present and criticize the view of classical compatibilism on freedom, i.e. the view according to which free subjects and free actions can exist in the world ruled by universal, exceptionless causality. I claim that compatibilism does not solve the problem of freedom and determinism, but avoids and disregards it. Compatibilism pretends to accomplish the task by playing with semantic tricks that create a misleading impression of ‛compatibility’.
Punktem wyjścia rozważań jest dysproporcja w udziale obu płci w tworzeniu filozofii w Polsce, Wielkiej Brytanii i w wielu innych krajach na świecie. Dysproporcja ta skłania do postawienia pytania o to, co z perspektywy samej filozofii mogłoby zostać zrobione w celu zapobiegania tej oraz innym formom filozoficznej i intelektualnej dyskryminacji. Celem artykułu jest pokazanie, iż to klasyczny pragmatyzm (koncepcje Peirce’a, Jamesa i Deweya) jest źródłem metafilozoficznych idei pluralizmu, egalitaryzmu oraz włączania (inclusiveness), które pozwalają na nowo zdefiniować podmiot, przedmiot i cele praktyki filozoficznej.
The article attempts to outline Adam Mickiewicz’s concept of subjectivity. He introduces it in his visionary poetic drama Dziady (Forefathers’ Eve) where a radically ambivalent situation is presented through the duality of the main character Gustaw/Konrad. The article describes this duality in terms of Paul Ricoeur’s distinction between cogito exalté and cogito brisé. In Dziady Mickiewicz dramatizes the transition from exaltation to dejection, the condition of cogito brisé (living with a wound). His romantic subject cannot throw away his past, but because he is acutely aware of his failings and his inadequacy he is able to free himself from delusions of grandeur and self-centered pride. The condition of uncertainty, inadequacy and chronic insatiability is like a gaping wound or a lack which may lead the ‘I’ to open up and seek the Other. It is a vision of man who knows he is deeply flawed but capable of pursuing a noble desire; vulnerable and fallible, beset by ‘endless error’ and yet able to act and get his act together; self-centered and yet, because of the relational nature of the human identity, capable of redirecting his emancipatory energy to Others. It can be summed up the concept of homo capax (homme capable) which, as this article argues, provides the key to Mickiewicz’s anthropology.
The philosophical tradition defines the subject as a reflective being, in principle aware of its agency which makes it capable of making free decisions and taking responsibility for them. Agency, understood in this way, is clearly attributed only to people. However, the technological development of artificial cognitive enhancements and of increasingly autonomous artificial intelligence, that has been taken place in last few decades, casts doubts whether such an approach is not too anthropocentric. This doubt is indicated by some proponents of extending cognitive processes beyond the human brain; they argue for the need of appropriate extension of the subject as well. Moreover, there is an increasing number of proposals attributing agency to artifacts. In the first part of the article, I refer to the two most commonly used philosophical criteria distinguishing the subject of cognition from all information processing systems: being a reflective system, and being the subject of intentional stance. Next, I assess, from such a perspective, the attempts to attribute agency to both one-person extended cognitive systems and artificial systems, such as relatively autonomous computer programs. I argue that the gap between conceptions of the extended subject and the artificial subject, and the standard approach incline toward the usage of the term “agent” designating this phenomenon. The term is already widely used in cognitive science to designate any relatively autonomous information processing system performing a cognitive task. The need of the clear distinction between “the subject” (“subjectivity”) and “the agent” (“agency”) is especially noticeable in Polish, where the difference in meanings of these concepts is not so evident as in English. The awareness of the applying in cognitive science these two different notions of agency prevents against a conceptual misuse which could lead to erroneous explanations and predictions.
The author reviews the main elements of Richard Münch’s academic capitalism theory. By introducing categories like “audit university” or “entrepreneurial university,” the German sociologist critically sets the present academic management model against the earlier, modern-era conception of academic research as an “exchange of gifts.” In the sociological and psychological sense, the latter is a social communication structure rooted in traditional social lore, for instance the potlatch ceremonies celebrated by some North-American Indian tribes which Marcel Mauss described. Münch shows the similarities between that old “gift exchanging” model and the contemporary one with its focus on the psychosocial fundamentals of scientific praxis, and from this gradually derives the academic capitalism conception. His conclusion is the critical claim that science possesses its own, inalienable axiological autonomy and anthropological dimension, which degenerate in result of capitalism’s “colonisation” of science by means of state authority and money (here Münch refers to Jürgen Habermas’s philosophical argumentation). The author also offers many of his own reflections on the problem, which allows Münch’s analyses to be viewed in a somewhat broader context.
This article deals with recent Polish herstory narrations, i.e. works of fiction that, while relying on distinctly literary techniques and devices, foreground the feminine experience of history, and moreover, may be associated with the so-called Herstory Turn in Polish humanities and cultural studies. This category of fictions includes also novels in which the herstory narration belongs to a female subject created by a male author, notably Jacek Dehnel’s Abbess Macryna (Matka Makryna), Ignacy Karpowicz’s Little Sonya (Sońka) and Jarosław Kamiński’s Just Lola (Tylko Lola). These three novels are analyzed with the aim of showing how their narrative strategy foregrounds the women narrators/main characters (acting as history’s true subjects), identifying the marks of authorial imitation of the feminine discourse, and, finally, asking the question about man’s status in an ostensibly feminine text. It seems that one way of answering it would be to point to the male author’s validating the feminine experience of history and ensuring that it can be heard.
For P.F. Strawson self is an embodied agent. The aim of my paper is to discuss those fragments of Strawson’s philosophical work which directly refer to the concept of self. I try to show that Strawson’s view on the nature of self and self-reference is distinct and different from L. Wittgenstein’s nihilism and from the modest nihilism advocated by G.E.M. Anscombe.
Człowiek w każdym momencie swego życia jest równocześnie myślącą jednostką, która kieruje się wymogami kultury i cywilizacji, oraz żywym organizmem, podlegającym uwarunkowaniom biologicznym. Rozpatrując człowieka, trudno uniknąć jakiejś formy dualizmu. Samowiedza ludzi europejskiej cywilizacji naznaczona jest kartezjańskim dziedzictwem. Pokartezjański podmiot skupiony jest na ideach umysłu, na teoretycznych konstrukcjach i projektach. Traci świadomość swoich prawdziwych potrzeb, żyje niejako obok siebie, zgodnie ze swoim idealnym projektem, a nie z sobą jako osobą z krwi i kości. Popada w autoalienację, odcina się od życia, od biosfery. Wyalienowanemu z życia podmiotow i brak ontycznego zakorzenienia w bycie. Identyfikuje się z idealnym, mentalnym obrazem siebie i odrzuca swoje realne „ja”; myli swoje prawdziwe „ja” z kulturowo ukształtowanym obrazem. Rozwija narcystyczną osobowość, pozbawioną związku z życiem ciała, ze swoją wewnętrzną naturą. Obcość człowieka wobec biosfery zaczyna się od obcości wobec jego ciała i pozaracjonalnych sfer egzystencji. Ponowna integracja ze światem przyrodniczym, z samym sobą i otwarcie na pełnię doświadczenia życiowego są możliwe, gdy jednostki ludzkie ponownie doświadczą siebie jako istot żywych. Rozwiną wtedy postawę biofilną, co będzie znakiem tzw. ekologii wewnętrznej, czyli harmonii, integracji różnych sfer ludzkiej egzystencji.