Czy godność myślenia i idea poznania są wartościami, które nigdy nie utracą swojej wagi?

Jakie zanieczyszczenie najbardziej przeszkadza w poznawaniu świata? Na czym polega i czy w ogóle istnieje takie zjawisko jak współpraca najważniejszych w epistemologii władz poznawczych, czyli rozumu i zmysłów? Co nam zanieczyszcza obraz świata, skutecznie oddzielając nas od możliwości dotarcia do mającej gdzieś tam istnieć prawdy?

The article aims to show that the criticism of the psychophysiological theory of cognition formulated by Roman Ingarden in the work U podstaw teorii poznania (‘The Groundwork of Epistemology’) is in some aspects still sound. The psychophysiological theory of cognition is the forerunner of modern naturalized epistemology. Thus the author of this article undertakes to show that Ingarden’s critique applies to this modern epistemology. The paper focuses on an issue that is discussed in both theories, i.e. the problem of causal generation of cognition. Moreover, it investigates two allegations that Ingarden has formulated. The first concerns the causal explanations of the possibility of knowledge, namely the objection of a vicious circle in theory. The second concerns the objection that causal theory is unable to provide essential epistemological concepts and criteria that are necessary for the analysis of cognition. The author supports the charge of the vicious circle and agrees with the purport of the second objection by showing that it can be interpreted as the claim that causal theory is incapable of solving the problem of causal underdetermination of cognition. These responses seem to hold irrespective of whether one adopts foundationalism or anti‑foundationalism in epistemology.

Czyli o tym, czy istnieją ograniczenia w naukach z dziedzin, które obejmuje termin science, gdzie znajduje się granica naszego wszechświata i co jest poza nią oraz czym będzie kres nauki.

Zagadnienie człowieka jest u Descartes’a niejednoznaczne, ponieważ jego rozważania dotyczą najczęściej duszy i ciała branych z osobna. Konsekwencją takiego dualizmu jest rozwój kartezjanizmu albo w kierunku spirytualizmu Malebranche’a, albo materializmu La Mettriego i Condillaca. W artykule rozważam zasady czy racje dla tych dwóch linii rozwojowych. Jednak największą wartość upatruję w odnajdywaniu śladów „prawdziwego człowieka” Descartes’a, którego dualistyczna filozofia praktycznie pomija. Mamy zatem człowieka jako umysł, człowieka jako ciało, oraz człowieka jako złożenie ciała i umysłu. Dysponujemy również koncepcją człowieka jako wolnego i afirmującego swe istnienie poprzez wybór. Jedną z alternatyw tego wyboru jest byt, drugą nicość. Prowadzi to ostatecznie do planu myśli prywatnej, w której nieopisywalny dla nauki człowiek znajduje największe ocalenie, ale w efekcie pozostaje znany tylko samemu sobie.

The paper presents the usefulness of the common sense psychology, as well as of the knowledge acquired in various traditions of academic psychology in historical interpretations.

Wnętrza Zamku Cesarskiego w Poznaniu są zdobione dziesiątkami różnorodnych gatunków kamienia. Żeby je zachować i odrestaurować, niezbędne było wykonanie szczegółowych badań konserwatorskich.

The article addresses the problem of properties and epistemic functions of Russellian ‘knowledge by acquaintance’ interpreted here as a variant of intuition. The epistemic functions of intuition can be performed in two ways: first, as propositional knowledge of direct and immediate kind (a foundational function), and secondly, as a non-‑propositional form of consciousness that provides a justifying basis for intuitive truths. The distinction between these two functions of intuition presupposes a differentiation – not explicitly articulated by Bertrand Russell – between acquaintance and knowledge by acquaintance. Acquaintance as a form of non‑propositional consciousness is not epistemically autonomous, which is to say that it is not a judgment and cannot be qualified as either true or false, so a separate epistemic problem arises here, one of the shift from acquaintance to knowledge by acquaintance. The author points out that the shift from acquaintance to knowledge by acquaintance is difficult to accomplish, and she offers the opinion that the epistemic function of acquaintance or, more generally, of various similar kinds of consciousness, should not be interpreted in terms of justification. They should be understood not as a justifying element or a justifying reason for propositions that underlie other propositions, but as a factor that is an indispensable genetic and simultaneously structural element of propositional content in the sense assumed in transcendental philosophy.

The idea of revelation is closely related in theology to the concept of mediation. This article analyzes the meaning of the concept of revelation and its relation to the category of mediation in the theological thought of Paul Tillich, one of the great Protestant theologians and philosophers of the twentieth century. Tillich’s doctrine of God assumes inconceivable closeness and, at the same time, transcendence of the Ultimate Reality. However, it also assumes that God reveals Himself to man through the elements of temporal reality. The first part of the article therefore deals with Tillich’s understanding of revelation. In the next part, the question of the final form of God’s revelation, which, according to Tillich, is Jesus Christ is analyzed. Finally, in the concluding third part, the concept of revelation will be presented in the key of mediation. Through revelation, the incomprehensible God mediates in the world so that man can recognize His [God’s] closeness and presence. The revelatory mediation in this optics does not mean that the immediate closeness of God is denied but both leads to, and discloses, it.

The question about theology is, indeed, the question about the cognitive role of faith, a mutual relationship between faith and mind, as well as cultural, social and existential consequences of accepting or eliminating faith in the cognitive (scientific) process. While developing in the space of thought, theology seeks rational arguments speaking in favour of God’s answers to existential questions. In his publications and teachings J. Ratzinger/Benedict XVI gives much attention to these issues, as they are particularly topical and important for the contemporary civilisation. He teaches that faith releases the mind (makes it independent, non-ideologized), opens it to the truth, the learning of which constitutes the key objective of all scientific research. Recogni-tion of the priority of gifts, God’s grace, who makes Himself known through his Word and actions is an important pre-requisite for theological cognition. Ultimately, it has a christological sense: Son knows His Father and wants to reveal the Mystery of God. As scientia fidei, theology has got potential to give relational and holistic character to cognitive actions, thus made them acquire sense transcending their temporary use-fulness. Theology, faithful to the Church, contributes to the development of the world and men in the deepest meaning of the word – it leads to salvation, finding fulfilment in God Himself.

I have been asked to give a thought on the University. It is arranged in a sequence of “past – yesterday – today”, to which I will occasionally refer. It will not, however, constitute a rigid scheme governing this talk. The inspiration for these thoughts was specified by the question “what perception of the University I imbibed in my family home, how I later confronted this with my own practice or «experience» of the University, how I look at it from the perspective of the experience I have had and from observing the changes taking place.”

The Author discusses a book "The Robin G. Collingood s philosophy of History" by Witold M. Nowak. He considers it as well done monographic picture of Collingwood's thinking. Nowak regards the philosophy of history of famous English thinker as a hermeneutical philosophy rather than philosophy of history itself including such basic ideas essential for the understanding of his philosophy like theory ofquestioning and answering, the method of the re-enactment, the concept of the absolute conditions. The book written by Nowak provides also to the Polish readers many precious biographical data and an interesting analysis of the cultural context ofColingwoodian thinking. It pays special attention to the late period of his work and its meaning.

The paper aims to justify the need for a philosophical reflection concerning the concept of cognitive artifact, as it is used in situated cognition, and, first of all, for conceptualize and defining them. I tentatively call this area “the epistemology of cognitive artifacts”. The paper forms the problem of reification of the cognitive artifacts and the problem of amplification in describing the cognitive impact of the artifacts. Additionally, the article discusses the issue of nonrepresentational artifacts and singles out a new class of artifacts which I call metacognitive artifacts.

The aim of this paper is to discuss possible connections between the categories of mind and life. Some authors argue that life and mind are closely connected or even are two sides of the same phenomenon. I analyze and examine this thesis in the light of different approaches to defining life: the metabolic approach (which stresses the importance of self-maintenance and self-making) and the evolutionary approach (which focuses on evolution by natural selection). The first way of defining life is Maturana and Varela' conception of autopoiesis, the second is Korzeniewski's cybernetic definition of life and van Hateren's modified Darwinian definition of life. Especially interesting is the possibility of connecting mind and life in the evolutionary framework. The text does not provide exact results, but rather it proposes possible modes of thinking of the relation of these two categories.

The main goal of this article is to characterise and compare some aspects of Hilary Putnam’s referential theory of meaning and Robert B. Brandom’s inferential theory of meaning. I will do it to indicate some similarities and differences in these theories. It will provide an opportunity for a deeper understanding of these theories and for a more adequate evaluation of how they describe and explain the process of meaning acquisition of linguistic expressions.

In his theory of meaning Putnam emphasises the importance of reference understood as a relationship which connects linguistic expressions and extra-linguistic (empirical) reality. Brandom acknowledges inference as a main category useful in characterising the meaning of expressions used in premises and a conclusion of inference. But his theory of meaning is criticised for minimalising the role of an empirical component (demonstratives etc.). He tries to defend his standpoint in the anaphoric theory of reference.

Putnam like Brandom claimed that we – as cognitive subjects – are not in a situation in which we learn about the extra-linguistic reality in a direct way. It is the reality itself as well as our cognitive apparatus that play a role in a cognitive process.

W artykule badam naturę poznania intelektualnego opisaną przez Henri Bergsona w Ewolucji twórczej (1907). W pracy tej teoria wiedzy naukowej i potocznej zyskuje w istocie swój ostateczny kształt; zostaje umieszczona w ewolucji życia. W tym kontekście analizuję charakter relacji wytyczanych przez ludzki rozum oraz rodzaj zależności występującej między poznaniem intelektualnym i rozwojem gatunkowym człowieka. Według Bergsona można stosować z powodzeniem metody rozumu w naukach ścisłych czy przyrodniczych, lecz nie w tych gałęziach wiedzy, w których oddziałuje trwanie. Dlatego błędem jest rozszerzanie praw fizyki i matematyki na zjawiska zachodzące w materii organicznej i w umyśle. Z punktu widzenia epistemologicznego życie i świadomość konstytuują inny, specyficzny dla siebie poziom. Wyznaczenie dziedziny badań właściwej intelektowi i ograniczenie pola jego aktywności pozwala zarazem na przekroczenie relatywizmu poznawczego I. Kanta.

In this paper, I present a short 10-point characteristics of the classical conception of truth. Subsequently I point to the importance and comprehensive usefulness of this truth, among others, to the possibility of applying it in some virtual environments, e.g., in those which include virtual objects of types A and C. I also emphasize that—independently of views of promotors and creators of the “post-truth era” (e.g. the will of politicians, propagandists and the authors of conspiracy theories)—truth as it is grasped in the classical theory is in principle non-withdrawable from social discourse, including its philosophical and scientific fields.

In the first part of the article, Krzysztof A. Makowski describes how the idea of granting Poland the opportunity to host the 23rd International Congress of Historical Sciences in 2020 in Poznań came about and how Poznań’s application to host the Congress was prepared. Moreover, the author presents the ongoing preparations for the Congress. In the second part of the article, Ewa Domańska discusses the origins and evolution of the idea of “alter-native modernities” and “epi- stemic justice” as leitmotifs of Poznań’s application. She stresses the need and importance of developing an intellectual alliance of East-Central European countries and lists activities that could help raise the region’s status as an important centre of knowledge building.

This contribution to the critical discussion of Ryszard Nycz’s Culture as Verb draws on his use of the parts-of-speech model to submit another formula of conceptualizing culture, based on the adverb, and complementary to the already existing approaches. They can be divided into three classes: those that treat culture as adjective (i.e. all epiphenomenal interpretations which view culture as a set of attributes), those that treat it as noun (i.e. an object, a separate academic discipline), and those that focus on action and the processual nature of culture (hence culture as verb), and even – in association with pragmatist and performative theories of language and the more recent ‘Activist Turn’ in the social sciences – have come to regard culture as culture-in-the-making, constituted and sustained by action (activities, performances). Most important for the adverbial approach are the modalities of culture, manifested in a variety of life styles. The study of culture as adverb (‘how’) can be pursued independently of the trench wars of cultural determinists and functionalists. Responding directly to Culture as Verb, qualifi ed as, chiefl y, an epistemological study, the article calls for a closer examination of the ontological implications of Nycz’s project of reinventing the humanities.

Dependence Between the Residential Area Type and the Sense of Security. The Case of Poznań. The need for safety is one of the most important needs of every person. The sense of security level depends to a great extent on the place of residence. The study aims at showing the relationship between the residential area type and the sense of security in Poznań. The author uses the results of the survey on the crime risk conducted among Poznań inhabitants and assess the sense of security level of the following types of residential area: tenement houses area, blockhouses area, dettached houses area and the city center. In the opinion of inhabitants, the highest sense of security level was in the dettached house area. The following positions included: the city center and the blockhouses area. The lowest sense of security level was characteristic for the tenement houses area. The time of the day was at great importance in the context of respondents assessments, during the day the sense of security level was higher than at night, regardless to the residential area type.

W artykule podjęto próbę przybliżenia zagadnień związanych z kształtowaniem ważnej sfery publicznej miasta Poznania – ulicy Święty Marcin, której przestrzeń jest przejawem wzajemnego oddziaływania potencjałów: historycznego, estetycznego, kulturotwórczego kolejnych pokoleń. To przestrzeń, która jest efektem ciągłego ścierania się „nowego” ze „starym”. Podejmowane zagadnienia przedstawiono w kontekście uwarunkowań artystycznych, funkcjonalnych, przestrzennych i architektonicznych.

The author shows the activity of the inhabitants in the process of revitalization which took place in Poznan at the turn of the 20. and 21. century. Overview of actions demonstrates the transformation of instruments and methods of conduct, but also is a presentation process of self-education of all participants: the associations, municipal authorities and residents. Relevant are also the examples of intentional educational and cultural initiatives addressed to the residents and held with residents in the framework of the Urban Renewal Program. Accumulation of these activities led to stimulate of civic awareness, neighborly relationship and local identification, but also initiated the transformation of individual mental. As a result, they developed a multi-threaded relationship: realization by the people of the right to co-decision and shared responsibility influences the attitudes of representatives of the local authorities and a kind of reciprocal social education, leaning to the subjective treatment of all participants of social processes.

At the entrance to the Grand Theatre in Poznań (built in 1910), there are two sculptural groups: Lyric, represented by a young woman sitting on a lion, by Constantin Starck (1866–1939), and Drama, featured as a young man with laurel wreath striding with a leopard at his side, by Georges Morin (1874– 1950). Both works have not been convincingly explained until now. The author identifies the Lyric as Euterpe, the Muse of lyric poetry, and the Drama as the young Dionysus. The pair put in front of the theatre entrance is modelled on similar artworks elsewhere in Europe, such as the statues at the Teatro Massimo in Palermo and the Konzerthaus in Berlin.