In this paper Peter Strawson’s idea of non-reductive analysis is illustrated with the example of an analysis of knowledge along the lines of my book on the ‘sandwich theory of knowledge’: Epistemologia. Sandwiczowa teoria wiedzy (Kraków 2019). On this theory, knowledge and justification are intertwined and relativized to the context that has been determined, on the one hand by pragmatic presuppositions, including idealizations and the ceteris paribus clause, and on the other by the intended scope of applications. Knowledge so conceived need not be true, which permits granting to the outdated knowledge an epistemic status different than that of mere superstition. Still, the mechanism of revision of presuppositions in the face of novel applications can be thought of as driven by the regulative idea of truth in Kant-Popper sense.

In the paper I present the famous argument between Peter F. Strawson and Bertrand Russell on definite descriptions. I do not go into details of the two rival solutions to the problem of definite descriptions. Instead I present the controversy against the background of two traditions within analytic philosophy, i.e. the philosophy of natural language (Strawson) and the philosophy of ideal language (Russell). In consequence, the aim of this paper is to sketch the principal features of the two traditions and to indicate their influence on the argument. In the first paragraph I discuss Russell’s theory of descriptions and present it as a result of dramatic changes that he had made in his philosophy before he finally presented them in On Denoting in 1905. The second paragraph deals with the two traditions within analytic philosophy after the linguistic turn and underlines the role of Strawson in the philosophy of natural language. In the third paragraph I analyze in detail Strawson’s arguments against the theory of descriptions and I focus on some details that are usually omitted in standard presentations. The fourth paragraph discusses Russell’s response to Strawson’s objections, i.e. the counter-arguments formulated from the standpoint of philosophy of ideal language. I end with some suggestions about how to reconcile both approaches.

While working on the oeuvre of P.F. Strawson (1919–2006), and especially on his metaphysics, I had a unique opportunity to exchange ideas with this eminent exponent of Oxford philosophy. Those exchanges, of which some have been reflected in private correspondence and in a published reply to one of my papers, were focussed on various interpretative questions. Three threads of those discussions seem especially pertinent for grasping the gist of Strawson’s philosophy and its general orientation. The first one concerned the nature of philosophical analysis, or to be more precise, the connective model of it, favoured by Strawson, and its relationship with the idea of concept presupposition. The second thread had to do with the position taken by the Oxford philosopher in the realism debate on three levels: semantic, epistemological, and metaphysical. Strawson made every effort to take a realist stand in this debate and avoid antirealism in any of its forms; however, his realism is in many respects very moderate and not so distant from antirealism. Similarly moderate was his stand in the traditional debate about universals, constituting the topic of the third thread of the exchanges with Strawson. He claimed that universals exist, but at the same time emphasized that they are objects of pure thought alone and as such do not form a part of the spatiotemporal world in which we live. One cannot also say much about the relation of exemplification in virtue of which universals manifest themselves in the world as particular instances. Presentation and elaboration of these three threads has led to the conclusion that although Strawson was a deeply systematic thinker, he avoided wide-ranging and ambitious statements and radical views. In characteristically minimalist way he dispelled some questions, and the ultimate resolution of many crucial and fundamental issues were for him choice and taking a particular attitude or stance.

Paul Ricoeur claims that while John Rawls seeks to present his theory of justice as a purely procedural conception, which remains axiologically neutral, it is in fact entangled in certain presuppositions with ethical overtones. In order to bring those presuppositions out we need, according to Ricoeur, to consider that, contrary to appearances, its justification is not inherently linear but undesirably circular. This circularity of the justification of the theory of justice manifests itself in Rawls’s postulate to strive for a ‘reflective equilibrium’, which should reconcile accepted principles of justice with ‘our considered convictions’.

The article is devoted to the identification of mechanisms of influence of the value picture of the world on the semantic development of phraseological units. Considered is the structure of the components of the value picture of the world. We consider the concept and image, as segments of value components, to be the basic ones based on which the objects of extra linguistic reality within a national culture are evaluated. Image / presupposition are the basis of phraseological semiosis. We consider the onomasiological basis of phrase formation not to be a holistic image / presupposition, but only their isolated features, those which have been stereotyped. Evaluated is the image in the system of cultural values. The result of the assessment depends on the location of the image on the value scale of the ethnic group. In the course of stereotyping, the distinctive features of the image are distinguished. The selected features of the image have an evaluative component and can broadcast binary evaluations. During the development of language, phraseological semantics undergoes modifications, which are associated with changes in the value picture of the world of speakers. The reasons for such changes are recognized as out‑of‑order factors. Because of extra lingual influence, transformations of the components of the value picture of the world take place, which is reflected in the structure of phraseological meaning. Semantic changes are caused by image modifications, the features of which serve as an onomasiological basis. Due to the change of the components of the value picture of the world, there is a reassessment of the whole image, or only its already categorized features, which leads to a modification of the semantics of phrases. The reflection of value in the phraseological sense provides a significant denotative component, which associatively correlates with the referent, recording and maintaining the assessment of its features. The isolated feature is the onomasiological basis of the internal form, which reflects the assessment of the object of stereotyping within the connotative component.